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مذكرات فكرية

 البعض يراه هوسا قطريا‏!
صلاح النصراوى 

الموقع الالكتروني الذي بث أخيرا ان قطر اشترت حصريا حقوق تنظيم جنازة ابرز رئيسة وزراء بريطانية البارونة ثاتشر في عاصمتها الدوحة‏,‏ كان سيحقق سبقا صحفيا هائلا لولا أن المتابعين للمصدر يعرفون جيدا أنه موقع يجنح للسخرية السياسية كأسلوب للتعامل مع قضايا المنطقة رغم أن اكثر قضاياها هي فعليا من أنواع الكوميديا السوداء التي يجدر بعد مشاهدتها القول ان شر البلية ما يضحك.
قبل ذلك بأيام اثار مقدم البرامج الساخر باسم يوسف ضجة عندما حور نشيد الوطن الاكبر في حلقة من حلقات برنامجه والتي استهدف فيها قطر في تعبير يعكس استياء طيف واسع من المصريين مما يرونه من محاولات قطر في دس أنفها بشئون بلادهم واستغلال ظروفها الصعبة لاهداف مريبة.
وفي الحالتين تقف قطر, التي يراها المتشككون مجرد ظفر إبهام يبرز كنتوء علي ساحل الخليج العربي يتعملق امام رموز ذات دلالات كبري, مثل لندن وكاتدرائيتها الشهيرة سانت بول حيث سيسجي جثمان ثاتشر, في الحالة الأولي, في حين أنها وقفت في الثانية ازاء ايقونات خالدة في الوجدان الشعبي المصري كالوحدة العربية وجمال عبد الناصر, وبطبعية الحال مصر ذاتها.
في الواقع ان طموحات قطر مقارنة مع صغر حجمها كانت دوما موضع علامات استفهام واحيانا سخرية منذ اختط اميرها الحالي بعد توليه الحكم عام1995 لها هذا النهج الطموح.
واذا كان أكثر ما يروي يظل في خانة التنكيت فان ما هو موثق ان الرئيس السابق حسني مبارك لم يستطع أن يحبس احساسه بالازدراء حين زار عام2000 مبني تليفزيون الجزيرة, وهو رمز الدورالقطري الاشهر, حين تساءل كيف بإمكان علبة كبريت صغيرة أن تثير كل ذلك الضجيج.
لكن هل تستحق قطر فعلا كل هذه السخرية في حين تقف اليوم في الصف الاول من الدول التي تلعب ادوارا بارزة في السياسة والاقتصاد والاعلام والرياضة وغيرها من المجالات الحيوية بفضل تلك الاموال المهولة التي في حوزتها والتي تستثمرها في ميادين متعددة, أم أن الأمر ينطوي علي عدم استيعاب وسوء فهم من قبل المشككين للتغيرات في موازين القوي في المنطقة وللتطورات الدراماتيكية الجارية فيها؟.
بطبيعة الحال لا يمكن لقطر ان تتكلم عن مكونات جغرافية او تاريخية أو بشرية أو ثقافية أو ايديولوجية أو عسكرية, وغيرها من عوامل القوة والقيادة التقليدية, إلا أن مصادر القوي المتمثلة بثروتها من مليارات الطاقة والحيز الذي تدير به سياساتها الخارجية ربما لا يقل اهمية عن كل تلك المكونات, ان لم يكن اكثر اهمية في عصر العولمة والسماوات المفتوحة وتكنولوجيا المعلومات والتي تؤهلها كقوة ناعمة ان تكون شريكا في نادي الفاعلين الدوليين.
فقطر تضع نحو250 مليار دولار في استثمارات متنوعة تتوزع علي قارات العالم, هي الاضخم عالميا نسبة لسكانها, وبما ان وارداتها السنوية تزيد علي100 مليار دولار في بلد لا يتجاوز عدد سكانه ربع مليون نسمة الا قليلا ولن يكون بحاجة الي اي استثمارات كبيرة في البناء التحتي لسنوات طويلة, فلنا ان نتخيل حجم هذه الاستثمارات خلال الاعوام المقبلة.
وفي حين ان القيادة القطرية ترفض الربط عادة بين هذه الاستثمارات وسياسات المعونة السخية التي تتبعها وبين اي طموحات او اجندات فان شاشات الرادار لا يمكنها ان تخطئ في رصد الابعاد السياسية للدور القطري المتصاعد سواء في دعم اقتصاديات الدول الغربية المنهارة أو في ملفات اقليمية عديدة ومحاولاتها المستميتة لتولي دور قيادي في المنطقة, محل قوي تقليدية آفلة بعد ان تعرضت مراكزها للاهتزاز خلال العقد الأخير.
هذه المسألة بالذات هي التي تثير الكثير من الاسئلة بشأن السياسة الخارجية لقطر.هناك سؤالان هما الاكثر إلحاحا; اولهما لماذا تقوم قطر بكل ما تقوم به, وهل ينسجم ذلك مع حاجاتها الاساسية ومصالحها الوطنية من ناحية, ومتطلبات الأمن والاستقرار في الاقليم, من ناحية ثانية, في حين يتمادي البعض في السؤال عما اذا كانت تلك السياسة القطرية تعمل لمصالحها فقط ام وفق اجندة خفية تتناغم فيها مع مصالح قوي دولية واقليمية واهدافها.
أما السؤال الثاني فهو الي اي مدي نجحت قطر فعليا الي الآن في تحقيق أي من مرآبها او اشباع طموحاتها كي يكون ذلك معيارا حقيقيا للحكم علي فاعلية نهجها هذا, أم أن الأمر سيبقي في نطاق التجريب, او في حدود المغامرات التي لن توصلها الي نتائج فاعلة او حقيقية, عدا طبعا الارتدادات التي تتحق فعليا علي الأرض.
في الحقيقة ليس هناك اجابات شافية لهذه ولغيرها من الاسئلة في ظل غموض قطري بشأن أجندتها الخارجية كما يغيب اي تفسير مقنع عما تقوم به, سواء في ضوء حجم الاستثمارات القطرية المهول عالميا, او الدور المتزايد الذي تلعبه الدوحة في ملفات اقليمية بالغة الخطورة, في حين تلجأ القيادة القطرية هي ايضا كما يفعل مهندس هذه السياسة رئيس الوزراء الشيخ حمد بن جاسم ال ثاني بالرد الي طريقة لاتقل سخرية عن تلك التي يلجأ اليها منتقدو قطر.
ومع ذلك فان غياب, او بالاحري احجام قطر عن أن تطرح اطارا مرجعيا لسياستها الخارجية او اي رؤية نظرية لها لا يعني بأي حال من الاحوال أن ما تقوم به طلسم يستعصي علي الفهم والتحليل, فسلوكيات أي دولة ضمن أي نظام اقليمي أو دولي هي بالتالي التي تفسر سياساتها الخارجية, وليس بيانات او تصريحات قادتها التي لا تخرج عادة عن معسول الكلام.
وهناك عدة ملفات تتأبطها قطر الآن هي الأخطر في حاضر ومستقبل المنطقة, وخاصة بسبب ارتباطها بمواقف دولية واقليمية متشابكة, وهي الاسلام السياسي وعلاقاته بالثورات العربية وما يتفرع من ملفات وخاصة التمويل, القضية الفلسطينية والصراع العربي الاسرائيلي والنظام العربي المتمثل بالجامعة العربية, التي اصبحت فعليا تدار بريموت كونترول قطري.
إن السخرية السياسية التي تطال قطر لا تعبر عن استعلاء أو حسد أو غيره, بل هي موقف نقدي تجاه ما يراه البعض من هوس قطري بالادوار والمواقع والزعامات الوهمية ينبغي ألا تصم القيادة القطرية آذانها عنه, كما فعلت تلك الانظمة العربية التي عملت وتعمل قطر علي اسقاطها.
Early elections in Iraq?

Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki is seeking early elections in a bid to secure a third term in office, writes Salah Nasrawi
Iraq’s Shia Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki, who is facing growing opposition from Sunni Arabs and Kurds in his country, has renewed his suggestions that Iraqis should go for early parliamentary elections in an apparent bid to outmanoeuvre his rivals and maintain his grip on power.
Iraq has been gridlocked by crisis since the US withdrawal in December 2011, and this has paralysed Al-Maliki’s government and is increasingly pushing the ethnically and sectarian divided country to the brink of chaos.
Al-Maliki, perceived by Iraq’s Sunnis and Kurds and even by many Shias as an affront to Iraq’s stability and nation-building efforts, would most likely benefit from early elections because he wields enormous powers, oversees many state organisations involved in elections, and controls the state-owned media, the army and the security forces.
Arab Sunnis and Kurds have been protesting against what they consider to be Al-Maliki’s dictatorship and have boycotted the government, and occasionally the parliament, to press their demands for greater autonomy and a larger say in national decision-making.
On Saturday, Al-Maliki said holding parliamentary elections three or four months before the scheduled date in late 2014 would help rescue Iraq’s political process, which he described as being in “intensive care.”
“There should be an early election because the government is dysfunctional and the political process is on hold,” he told a rally of his supporters in the Shia holy city of Najaf.
Al-Maliki also said a “majority government” should be formed after the upcoming elections, instead of the kind of national partnership government that took power in Iraq following the ouster of former president Saddam Hussein in the US-led invasion in 2003.
Iraq’s Sunni speaker of parliament Osama Al-Nujaifi, a staunch critic of Al-Maliki, dismissed the suggestion and insisted that early elections would require Al-Maliki’s resignation and the appointment of a non-partisan government to supervise the polling.
The Democratic Current, a small liberal-oriented group, also rejected elections overseen by Al-Maliki.
Meanwhile, a four-month-old Sunni uprising against Al-Maliki is showing no sign of abating.
Since late last year, tens of thousands of Sunni protesters have been rallying after Friday prayers in Sunni-dominated cities and neighbourhoods against Al-Maliki’s government.
At the centre of the crisis are Sunni grievances that they are being sidelined and their efforts to seek greater autonomy from the central government ignored.
Sunni dissatisfaction with the government started with complaints about its failure to provide services and jobs and the mistreatment by the Shia-controlled security forces of Sunni detainers, but protesters later revamped their demands to wanting the devolution of state powers.
Many Sunnis are now calling for the revoking of the US-orchestrated political process in the country that they believe has empowered the majority Shias at their expense.
They are pushing for a new constitution that they say should end their perceived neglect and marginalisation. Some Sunnis have even declared that they should secede from Iraq and seek autonomy outside it.
Several ministers from the mostly Sunni Iraqiya bloc have either resigned or suspended their participation in the government to protest against what they call Al-Maliki’s increasingly dictatorial behaviour.
Things are also in a crisis situation in the northern Kurdish region of Iraq.
Kurdish ministers and legislators have been boycotting the cabinet and the parliament over disagreements with Al-Maliki’s handling of government affairs.
One recent quarrel was over state budget allocations, after Al-Maliki was able to gather enough votes in the parliament to pass a law on this despite Kurdish protests against blocking payments to oil companies operating in the Kurdish region.
A delegation from Al-Maliki’s bloc who met with the President of the Kurdistan regional government Massoud Barzani last week failed to convince him to send the Kurdish representatives back to Baghdad.
Fouad Hussein, Barzani’s chief of staff, later said that the Kurdish leader had made it clear to the delegation that the Kurds would seek self-determination if they were not treated as equal partners in the government.
“It is either make or break,” he told the London-based Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper on Sunday.
Relations between the country’s Kurds, who make up about 20 per cent of the population, and the Shia-led government have worsened over other long-running disputes, including power and resource-sharing.
Oil and territorial disputes lie at the heart of a long-running feud between the Kurds and the Baghdad government.
The Kurds have been pursuing separate oil-and-gas exploration deals with foreign companies, and they have started selling oil on international markets in independent export deals.
The moves have aggravated tensions with Baghdad, which considers the sales to be illegal and a challenge to its claim to full control over Iraq’s oil.
In defiance, the Kurdistan government on Friday shipped its first direct cargo of crude oil to the international market. The cargo, about 30,000 tonnes and worth around $22 million, was pumped from an oilfield near Kirkuk and trucked over Iraq’s northern border with Turkey.
Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Hussein Al-Shahristani, one of Al-Maliki’s strongest allies, said that the federal government considered such oil exportations to be “smuggling operations.”
The Kurds, meanwhile, are seeking help from the United States, which they fear might be siding with Al-Maliki by assuming that he can be shoed-in to remain Iraq’s prime minister.
On Sunday, the Kurds dispatched a delegation to Washington for talks with the Obama administration on the Iraqi crisis. The visit came on the heel of remarks made by Brett McGurk, US secretary of state special advisor for Iraqi affairs, that Washington may have no objection to Al-Maliki’s bid to form a majority government.
“No matter which solution the political leaders in Iraq choose, we will support it as long as it abides by the constitution, even if it’s a political majority government,” McGurk was quoted as saying after meeting Al-Maliki in Baghdad.
Although the US embassy in Baghdad played down the statement, the Kurds seem to be worried about McGurk’s increasing role in Washington’s Iraq diplomacy.
McGurk, nominated as US ambassador in Iraq before being turned down by Congress because of sex allegations, is also seen by Al-Maliki’s Sunni opponents as close to the Iraqi premier.
Last month, a Kurdish delegation held talks with senior US officials in what was described by the head of the delegation, Khaled Shwani, as “a bid to solve the current problems plaguing the country”.
Shwani, a prominent Kurdish parliament member, was later quoted by the local press as saying that Iraq’s problems could be solved by “the establishment of three federations in Iraq” based on the “project of US Vice president Joe Biden”.
In 2007, and while serving in the US Congress, Biden introduced a non-binding bill for “decentralising” Iraq into three entities, one Shia, one Sunni and one Kurdish. The bill was approved by the Senate by 75 votes to 23.
Many Iraqis perceive that the Biden proposal is aimed at paving the way for the breakup of Iraq, and Shwani’s remarks seem to be designed to rekindle a debate in Washington on Iraq’s future in favour of Kurdish ambitions for independence.
All this should have made Al-Maliki more careful about how to end Iraq’s increasing political chaos by reaching out to his opponents instead of throwing the country into more uncertainty.
The Kurds, the Sunnis and even his own Shia co-religionists such as radical Shia cleric Muqtada Al-Sadr, will consider any third term by Al-Maliki as a reward for his failure by giving him yet more power.
In January, Al-Sadr’s followers joined Sunni and Kurdish representatives in the parliament to pass a law blocking Al-Maliki from a third term.
Al-Maliki challenged the bill in the federal courts and many Iraqis believe that he will exert pressure on the judiciary, as he has done many times in the past, to make the court veto the law.
Two worries continue to dog the country. The first is that Al-Maliki will succeed in mobilising Shia support for his ambitions for a third term, and thus increase sectarian polarisation in Iraq.
The second is that Al-Maliki will try to play on rivalries within the Kurdish and Sunni camps to muster enough support for his plans for early elections.
This will mean that the elections will end in another failure in nation-building efforts, and Iraqis will emerge from the process far more divided than they were before along sectarian and ethnic lines.

Risky business

Cash-strapped Egypt is seeking finance from Iraq, but it could well be disappointed, writes Salah Nasrawi


Egypt is facing enormous difficulties in its attempts to convince Iraq’s Shia-led government to extend it financial and economic aid amid growing fears that the country is on the brink of an economic downhill slide.
Hard hit by its inability to finance imports of fuel, wheat and other basic commodities caused by sliding foreign currency reserves and a soaring budget deficit following the 25 January Revolution that toppled former president Hosni Mubarak, Egypt has been casting around for credits and cash to stem an economic collapse.
Iraqi officials say that Cairo’s efforts to gain Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki’s approval for a multi-billion dollar bond to be deposited in Egypt’s Central Bank to bolster its faltering economy and pay for badly needed supplies of crude oil have stumbled over Egypt’s desire for generous terms and domestic political complexities in both countries.
Last week, Al-Maliki’s deputy Hussein Al-Shahristani was quoted as saying that his country would ship four million barrels of crude oil to Egypt every month starting from April. The announcement raised hopes that the Iraqi supplies would help assuage a severe fuel shortage that has been feeding anti-government sentiment in Egypt.
But one Iraqi official said that little had been done to finalise an agreement that could meet Egypt’s ambitious expectations from a country that is already embroiled in political conflict and ethno-sectarian strife that its Shia-led government partially blames on its Sunni-dominated Arab neighbours.
“We haven’t seen any sign of concrete talks. In order for the oil deal to hit the ground, Baghdad is waiting for detailed negotiations with Cairo regarding a broader and more systematic approach to bilateral relations,” the Iraq official told Al-Ahram Weekly on Tuesday.
“There are outstanding issues which need to be tackled before any financial or oil deal can be reached,” he stressed without elaborating.
Among the obstacles that Iraq says could block any financial deal with Egypt are restrictions on transactions put in place by the UN sanctions following former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, including an embargo on the Cairo branch of the Iraqi state-owned Rafidain Bank which Iraq wants to reopen to handle financial transactions.
Iraq also wants Egypt to lift visa restrictions on its citizens, who currently need security clearance for entry.
In addition to these restrictions, a request from Egypt for a $4 billion bond to be deposited in Egypt’s Central Bank to shore up its foreign currency reserves has hit a snag over the easy terms requested by Egypt, according to the Iraqi official, who spoke on condition of anonymity.
Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi had initially made a request for a $5 billion deposit during a visit by Al-Maliki to Cairo in February. The sum was meant to be similar to the deposits in Egypt’s Central Bank from Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey that have been ring-fenced and cannot be touched.
Al-Maliki reportedly told Morsi that he could not guarantee the endorsement by Iraq’s fractured parliament of such a huge sum, but that he would consider a smaller amount and suggested negotiations between the two governments on terms.
Egypt is also believed to be seeking Iraqi crude oil at preferential prices in a deal similar to the one with neighbouring Jordan. Egypt is said to want to import diesel fuel from Iraq on a daily basis.
Last month, Egyptian Prime Minister Hisham Kandil visited Iraq at the head of a large government and business delegation to follow up on the loan request and make other requests, including the provision of Egypt with crude oil.
The talks also focussed on the areas of trade, power, health and reconstruction. After the visit, Iraq lifted a ban on Egyptian dairy imports and released pensions owed to Egyptians who left Iraq after Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990.
Iraqi-Egyptian relations were broken off in 1990 after Egypt joined the US-led coalition that forced Iraq out of Kuwait during the Iraq-Kuwait war. The two countries partially patched up ties during Saddam’s last years in power, with Egypt becoming Iraq’s fourth-largest business partner, but relations have remained cool with the Shia-led government that came to power in Iraq following Saddam’s ouster.
Last year, Iraq transferred $408 million, the value of remittances owed by Iraq, to 670,000 Egyptian workers who left the country in the 1990s during the Gulf War. Efforts to solve the problem during Mubarak’s rule had faltered because Egypt had insisted that Iraq should also pay some $100 million in interest.
While Egypt is still waiting for Baghdad’s nod to help salvage its sky-diving economy, it has also escalated attempts to improve relations with Shia Iran, which is believed to be a close ally of Al-Maliki’s government.
Iran and Egypt resumed commercial flights this week some 34 years after the two countries severed relations following the Islamic Revolution in Iran that toppled the pro-Western shah Mohamed Reza Pahlavi and triggered an ideological backlash from Egypt.
Relations soured even more under Mubarak, who accused Iran of supporting radical Islamist groups in Egypt and Shias throughout the Middle East.
But Tehran and Cairo moved to improve ties following the ouster of Mubarak, and Morsi was the first Egyptian president to visit the Islamic Republic last August. In February, Morsi received Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Cairo while the latter was attending a conference of Islamic nations.
On Sunday, dozens of Iranian tourists arrived in southern Egypt to visit Pharaonic sites as part of a bilateral tourism-promotion deal. The following day, Ahmadinejad signed a draft law that would see the lifting of visa requirements for Egyptian tourists visiting the Islamic Republic.
Under a cooperation agreement signed last month, charter flights between Egypt and Iran will link the Upper Egyptian tourist cities of Luxor, Aswan and Abu Simbel with Iran.
Iranian tourists will initially not be allowed to visit Shia shrines in Cairo.
Egypt’s willingness to engage with Iraq and Iran could be largely motivated by economics, but it also indicates how economic difficulties are shaping the perspectives and strategies of Egypt’s new Islamist rulers.
Many observers believe that thaws in relations with Iran and stepping up ties with Iraq could signal the intention of the Egyptian government to integrate economic relations with foreign policy, even if that could harm its relations with some of Egypt’s traditional allies.
Many Egyptians feel they have been betrayed by their Sunni Arab brethren since the 25 January Revolution and feel shock and anger at what they consider to be their economic excommunication, leaving the country to scramble to cut deals abroad to help keep it from sinking into chaos.
Egypt has sought help from several wealthy Arab countries to shore up depleted reserves in its Central Bank, but few have been forthcoming. Only the oil-rich Gulf emirate of Qatar has provided funding, including a $5 billion loan deposit.
Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest oil exporter, has provided only $1 billion in loans.
On the other hand, Cairo’s new approach could challenge the United States, which considers Iran to be its arch-enemy in the Middle East. Washington is Egypt’s largest donor, and it has announced that it will provide an extra long-term loan of $450 million to spur reform.
Some Egyptians believe that their Muslim Brotherhood-controlled government is playing a dangerous game by trying to put pressure on the oil-rich countries in the Gulf by strengthening cooperation with Iran and Shia-led Iraq.
They believe that this policy could further alienate Egypt from its Arab neighbours, while giving no guarantees that the Iraqis and Iranians will deliver.
The policy is also facing domestic opposition. Hard-line Islamist groups such as the Salafists have voiced concern that Iranians and Iraqi Shias could soon be flocking to Egypt to spread their Shia brand of Islam.
A previously unknown group called the Islamic Alliance for the Defence of the Prophet’s Companions and his Family warned on Sunday that it “would not allow” Iranian tourists into Egypt and would send them back to their country.
But Essam Al-Erian, a senior Muslim Brotherhood leader and deputy president of its political front the Freedom and Justice Party, dismissed the threats.
“Egypt cannot be infiltrated by a trend or an ideology. It has defied communism and secularism, and it has mixed its nationalism with an Islamist element,” he wrote on Facebook on Saturday.
“Egypt will remain Sunni,” Al-Erian wrote.
However, the hard political facts remain. Iraq’s Shia-led government and its Iranian allies are not going to help Egypt without reciprocal political benefit. For them, the goal should be to lure Egypt further away from its Arab Sunni brethren, especially Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf nations.
Such an outcome would be extremely costly to Egypt, which would likely suffer from restrictions and probably boycott by the Gulf countries and the United States, jeopardising other aspects of its foreign policy.

                                            

27-03-2013 04:25PM ET

More than a border dispute

Can Iraqis and Kuwaitis draw appropriate lessons from their turbulent past and live peacefully as neighbours, asks Salah Nasrawi

The escalation of tensions along the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border and the consequent political developments have cast a long shadow over efforts to normalise relations between Baghdad and Kuwait more than two decades after the invasion of the tiny emirate by former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein.
Iraq hopes that the UN Security Council will make a formal announcement next month to lift the remaining UN sanctions imposed on Iraq after the 1990 invasion following the completion of the border demarcation between the two long-time foes.
Under the sanctions to force Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait, Iraq was placed under Chapter 7 of the United Nations charter, which gives the Security Council the power to take military and non-military action to “restore international peace and security”.
Kuwait has rejected all Iraqi attempts to lift the embargo until Iraq fulfils its obligations, including ending border-demarcation disputes, determining the fate of missing Kuwaiti persons and property, and payment of war reparations and loans made to Saddam to fight the 1980-88 Iraq-Iran War.
Earlier this month, Iraqi residents of the border town of Umm Qasr threw stones in protest against the demarcation of the border with Kuwait after workers tried to evict them from their houses to build pillars along the 205km border.
The United Nations has set 31 March as the deadline for ensuring the completion of the work and before the Security Council meets again to review Iraq’s compliance with the obligations.
In a report to the council this month, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon reminded Iraq of the need to remove all obstacles to the completion of the project marking the border between Iraq and Kuwait on time.
The Umm Qasr incident, which prompted security forces on both sides of the frontier to fire in the air to disperse the protesters, underlined the lingering territorial dispute between the two neighbours.
Successive Iraqi governments since the modern state of Iraq came into being in 1923 have not accepted the British-drawn borders that established Kuwait as a separate sheikhdom after the signature of the Anglo-Ottoman Convention of 1913.
After his 1990 invasion, Saddam annexed Kuwait and declared it to be Iraq’s 19th province. However, after the sheikdom’s liberation by a US-led international coalition Saddam formally accepted UN resolutions that assigned the organisation to assist in making arrangements with Iraq and Kuwait to demarcate the boundary between them.
The United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission was established to help define the border between the two countries, its mandate being that its decisions regarding the demarcation of the boundary would be final.
The Security Council also provided a map for the demarcation and decided to “guarantee the inviolability of the above-mentioned international boundary and to take as appropriate all necessary measures to that end in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations”.
Work in demarcating the boundaries, however, was brought to a halt by the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. Later, the IKBMP, or Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Maintenance Project, was established in the form of a joint committee between both countries to finalise efforts to determine the borders.
No final agreement has yet been announced, and many Iraqis in the area remain opposed to the demarcation negotiations, saying that the new border has robbed them of property and territory.
After the Umm Qasr incident, Kuwait expressed its dismay to the United Nations, claiming that the Iraqis had obstructed UN-supervised border-sign maintenance and had removed the border fence between two signs.
Days later, Kuwait arrested at least six Iraqi fishermen and seized their boats, allegedly for crossing into the emirate’s territorial waters, in the latest incident to have taken place in the narrow strip of water separating the two countries at the northern tip of the Arabian Gulf.
The Kuwaiti coastguard often opens fire on Iraqi fishermen in the area, claiming encroachment on its territorial waters.
Government officials in Iraq and Kuwait have avoided making public statements on the recent incident probably in order to avoid a flare up, but politicians on both sides have talked up the border dispute, some apparently for reasons of political opportunism.
In Kuwait, several lawmakers wanted to question their government and called for tougher measures to protect Kuwaiti employees and military personnel in the border area. Others have been seeking a slow-down in normalising relations with Iraq.
Iraqi parliamentarians went as far as to ask their government to stop its cooperation with the United Nations in the demarcation work altogether.
The Al-Sadr bloc, which is controlled by the radical Shia cleric Muqtada Al-Sadr, called on the Iraqi government to renegotiate the border deal, which it said had been unfairly imposed by the United Nations.
The Iraqi government has made it clear that it wants to comply with all the UN resolutions relating to Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait in order to convince the Security Council to lift the crippling obligations under chapter 7 of the UN charter from Iraq.
Iraq hopes that an expected visit by Kuwait’s Prime Minister Sheikh Jaber Al-Mubarak to Baghdad next month will end several pending issues, including the demarcation of borders.
Ahead of the visit, Kuwait said it had agreed with Iraq to build new houses for Iraqis to quicken the demarcation process. Under the plan, a new housing project accommodating more than 200 Iraqi families will be built some three kilometres from the border posts and beyond a security zone.
For Kuwait, the US-led war that toppled Saddam in 2003 was supposed to herald a new relationship with Iraq, a country that had long been ruled by hostile regimes and had briefly subjugated it to a ruthless military occupation.
For many Kuwaitis, the question now is still whether post-Saddam Iraq will be peaceful and friendly towards Kuwait and abide by the rules of international law, or whether it use its oil heft and large population to get its way.
Ten years after the US-led invasion, Kuwaitis still seem concerned by the spectre of threats from their northern neighbour. The Kuwaitis fear that some Iraqis still challenge their version of the history of their country and could still claim that Kuwait belongs to Iraq.
Another mantra repeated by many Kuwaitis, mostly Sunni Muslims, is that post-US-invasion Iraq is dominated by pro-Iranian Shias and these could be just as threatening as an Iraq led by the Sunni Saddam.
Recently, some Kuwaiti lawmakers have alleged that thousands of Iraqi Shias who entered the emirate during the invasion and sought settlement there are loyal to the Mahdi Army, an Iraqi paramilitary force created by Muqtada Al-Sadr.
Meanwhile, many Iraqis are worried about Kuwait’s intentions and wonder if the oil-rich emirate will want to relinquish its past fears about Iraq and work to maintain long-term friendly relations with their country regardless of who is in power in Baghdad.
They also prefer to limit the disputes and claims and counter-claims within the two countries in order to try to resist any involvement and display of leadership by a third party, even if it is the United Nations.
One of the remaining contentious issues is Kuwait’s construction of a major port on Boubyan Island on the Khor Abdallah waterway, which is the only strategic access to the sea for Iraq.
Many Iraqis maintain that the Mubarak Al-Kabir Port will limit access to Iraqi ports because the Kuwaiti port would leave only a narrow lane free for Iraq-bound ships.
Kuwait maintains that the mega-project is being built in order to meet its needs for a strategic port in the region and that it would not choke off Iraqi ports.
Amid tensions over the construction of the Port last year, Iraqi radical groups threatened to launch rocket attacks on the port if work was not stopped on its construction.
Iraq and Kuwait are bound to find common ground and to start confidence-building measures in order to maintain a stable and amicable relationship. It is essential that Iraq quickly frees itself from the UN Chapter 7 sanctions and that Kuwait facilitates this.
Iraq, on the other hand, should also make every effort to mitigate fears that it is an existential threat to its southern neighbour. If relations between Iraq and Kuwait were to become hostile once more, the whole region would suffer.
                        
                                                                  قمــة الـلامعنــــي 

يزخر المعجم السياسي بمقولات ساخرة عن القمم العربية باعتبارها جزءا من فولكلور أسهم في ادامة حالة العجز والتردي العربي في مواجهة تحديات هائلة واجهتها المنطقة علي مدي نحو سبعة عقود هي عمر جامعة الدول العربية‏,‏ التي تتولي زمام ما يطلق عليه بمسيرة العمل العربي المشترك.لعل خلاصة خبرة هذه التجربة التاريخية المريرة تتجلي الآن في ما آلت إليه المنطقة العربية من أوضاع تسير بها الي النقيض تماما لما قامت عليه الجامعة, حيث لا دولها عادت دولا ولا مجتمعاتها غادرت قبليتها وطائفيتها لتكون أمة, كما تواجه هويتها القومية الآن تحديات التعصب الديني والانقسام المذهبي.
هذه الحالة هي التي ستضلل ثاني قمة عربية تعقد بعد موجة الهبات الثورية التي أطاحت بعدد من أعتي الأنظمة العربية قبل عامين ووضعت المنطقة برمتها علي أعتاب مرحلة جديدة, ما يجعل من مجرد التئامها نشازا في ايقاع حركة التطور في المنطقة, وكأنها تعقد خارج السياق التاريخي التي أصبحت تسير عليه. والقائمون علي قمة الدوحة يدركون تماما هذه المفارقة ولذلك استعانوا بمحترفي تدبيج الشعارات الذين أطلقوا علي القمة التي تفتتح اليوم قمة الوضع الراهن وآفاق المستقبل وأسبغوا عليها أيضا مهمة وهي انعقادها من أجل غد أفضل للشعوب العربية, وهو ما ينتمي الي منظومة الخداع والتضليل السياسي, وليس إلي الحقيقة.
كل الوقائع المتوافرة تشير الي أن هذه القمة, ومثلها كانت قمة بغداد العام الماضي أيضا, هي مجرد عرض من تلك العروض البائسة التي دأب علي اقامتها النظام العربي سنويا والتي لا هدف لها إلا انعاش مؤسسة تحتضر بعد أن فقدت بوصلتها وانطفأ بريقها وأصبحت عاجزة عن مواجهة متطلبات مرحلة ثورية تسعي لاقامة الحرية علي الأرض العربية التي جرفها الاستبداد والفساد. مؤسسة القمة العربية هذه فقدت حتي عنصر الكوميديا التي كانت توفرها اعلاناتها بالتنديد والاستنكار والشجب, أو مشاهد المناكفات بين المشاركين فيها أو الممارسات المسلية التي كان يضفيها عليها طاغية مهووس مثل معمر القذافي.
فمهما وضع منظمو هذا المهرجان السنوي من شعارات أو ترنموا بخطابات فانهم سيكونون بعيدين عن الواقع الدراماتيكي الذي يمر به العالم العربي اليوم. وما لا يدركونه هو أن العالم العربي لم يعد ذلك الاقليم الذي أسست من أجله الجامعة العربية بهدف حماية دوله وكياناته التي صاغت حدودها اتفاقية سايكس بيكو الاستعمارية وأنه يعيش اليوم وفق حقائق جيوسياسية جديدة ومتغيرات تفرزها وقائع سنين الغليان التي سيظل يعيشها العرب بعد أن حطمت ثورات ربيعهم ذلك الاستثناء العار الذي وصمت به كأمة غير قادرة علي كسر جدران الخوف والانعتاق من الطغيان.
أحد أهم أسباب حالة الفوضي الحالية والثمن الباهظ الذي ندفعه لها والاحتمالات المفتوحة علي تفكيك المنطقة وتشظي بعض دولها هو المؤسسة نفسها, التي تمثلها القمة التي تدعي أنها ستأتي للعرب بمستقبل أفضل. لقد فوتت هذه المؤسسة أهم فرصة توافرت لها قبل عقد من الزمان لاصلاح أنظمتها ومجتمعاتها.
في قمة تونس عام2004 أجهض المشاركون فرصة نادرة للبدء بعملية الاصلاح والتحول الديمقراطي في العالم العربي حين استخدموا كل حيلهم وألاعيبهم وأساليب المماطلة والتسويف بغية افشال مشروع الاصلاح, الذي لو كان انجز لانتشل المنطقة من المستنقع الذي كانت فيه وأنقذها من هذا المصير الذي آلت اليه. وفي تلك القمة تجلت بشكل فاضح شراسة الأنظمة العربية في مواجهة أي محاولة حقيقية للاصلاح.
محاضر جلسات القمة تكشف عن كراهية لا مثيل لها لكلمة الاصلاح نفسها, رفضت بعض الوفود العربية أن تتضمنها أي وثيقة واستبدلوها بكلمة تطوير المطاطة ضمنوها ورقة سموها التطوير والتحديث في الوطن العربي وبيانا أطلقوا عليه  وثيقة العهد في ايحاء مزر أن الحرية لن تكون إلا منحة بأيدي الحكام وليست حقا من حقوق الشعوب.
ولم ينج بيان قمة بغداد العام الماضي من هذا الازدراء لكلمة الاصلاح حتي بعد ثورات شعبية في خمسة بلدان عربية, حيث أشار الاعلان الي الاشادة بـ التطورات والتغييرات السياسية وربطها بـ احترام القانون, في حين أصر البعض في مؤتمر وزراء الخارجية العرب الأخير علي اعادة إحياء وثيقة العهد البائسة بـ اعتبارها الأساس الأمثل الذي ينبغي الانطلاق منه في التطوير برغم ان الوثيقة ؤدت في مهدها لحظة مولدها عام.2004
ولم يقتصر الأمر علي اجهاض تلك الفرصة الذهبية, بل أن الأنظمة العربية ذات الامكانات المالية البترولية والمواقف السياسية المحافظة والتي أخذت مقعد القيادة في غيبة اطراف مؤثرة في النظام العربي, تعاملت مع حركات التغيير والثورات العربية بطريقة تآمرية, كما شاهدنا في العراق وفي مصر وليبيا واليمن وسوريا, لحسابات علي رأسها منع امتداد شرارة التغيير إليها, وأيضا لرغبة دفينة في اضعاف دول رئيسية تزعجهم قدراتها البشرية والجيواستراتيجية.
الطربقة الوحيدة التي يمكن أن تكون فيها القمة العربية هذه نافعة هي أن تقر استراتيجيات ايجابية متكاملة للوقوف الي جانب الثورات العربية وتتبني أهدافها في تحقيق الديمقراطية الحقيقية والحرية والعدالة والمساواة لجميع الشعوب العربية. ومن مستلزمات ذلك توفير دعم مالي سخي لاعادة بناء دول الثورات العربية التي خربت بسبب سياسات الدكتاتورية ونهب الثروات والفساد ومساعدتها علي تعزيز نموها الاقتصادي والاجتماعي في الفترات الانتقالية التي تمر بها.
مثل هذه المساعدات ليست منة, بل هي كفارة عن تلك السياسات التي عرقلت التحول الديمقراطي في العالم العربي لعقد من الزمن دفعت خلاله شعوبه وستدفع اثمانا باهظة, ولكي تكون ترجمة فعلية لشعار القمة من أجل غد افضل للشعوب العربية. إن مؤتمرا يأنف عن دعم الثورات ويجعلها ورقة في المساومات الاقليمية والدولية, ناهيك عن أن يقر بها في بياناته لا يستحق أن يسمي قمة, بل سيكون قمة اللامعني للنظام العربي ولجامعة دوله.