All posts by Salah Nasrawi

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Iraq’s next leader?

Disappointed by the impotence of Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki, the country’s Shia groups are in search of a new political leader, writes Salah Nasrawi
With the vote only days away, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki’s prospects for re-election look dim, and the country’s Shia parties, which together are poised to win the most seats in parliament, have started looking for a challenger to the incumbent leader.
Al-Maliki, who is seeking a third term in office, is in trouble as Iraq is teeming with problems. Many blame him for the country’s sectarian violence, political turmoil and economic deadlock and are eager to see a new prime minister in place.
For the time being, there is no frontrunner in Iraq’s elections, scheduled for 30 April, as several Shia politicians have been vying for the powerful position which also includes the key post of commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
The hopefuls, who include former ministers and party leaders, aren’t saying much publicly about their candidacies, but privately they have been active in seeking political support and building alliances.
However, a popular Shia provincial governor has recently emerged as a lead candidate to succeed Al-Maliki, who has been in power for eight years.
On Sunday, the Al-Ahrar Bloc, which is affiliated to the powerful Shia cleric Muqtada Al-Sadr, said it was considering fielding Ali Dawai, the governor of the southern oil-rich province of Maysan, against Al-Maliki.
Dawai is Iraq’s most popular government official. He is known for his hardwork in a country ranked as having one of the most dysfunctional governments in the world.
In a country that has had no functioning president for more than a year, where parliament rarely meets, where politicians spend most of their time abroad, and where public officials live on graft, Dawai has been an exception to the rule.
He was first elected governor for Maysan in 2010 and was re-elected in 2013 for a second term after he managed to turn Amara, the provincial capital, from being one of Iraq’s most impoverished towns into an outsized and prosperous city.
Under his rule, Amara, formerly the “city of the oppressed,” has enjoyed good public services including security, electricity, education and healthcare.
Dawai has launched new projects for streets, schools, houses, luxury hotels, bridges and buildings that have changed the landscape of the city.
Admirers say Dawai, known as Mr Clean in a country which is rife with corruption, offers a rare example of how Iraq’s vast oil resources could be put to people’s benefit.
Born in the impoverished marshlands of the Maysan province in 1965, Dawai is a university graduate with a degree in Islamic studies. Little is known about his activities during the rule of former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein, and he seems to have little public service background.
Pictures posted by his supporters on social networks show him wearing a blue workman’s overall. In some pictures he is seen sleeping on the floor of his office covered by a coat.
Many in Maysan call Dawai the “Guevara of the Poor” after the legendary Argentinean revolutionary Che Guevara.
However, Dawai is considered to be an outsider to national politics, and there are questions as to whether he will have enough support from other Shia groups to enter the race against Al-Maliki.
Since the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, a Shia politician has been chosen as the country’s prime minister in line with the post-Saddam political process that has empowered Iraq’s Shia majority.
This year’s election has largely been characterised as a referendum on Al-Maliki, who has been facing charges of sectarianism, inefficiency and authoritarianism.
Critics point to Al-Maliki’s heavy-handed style of governance and his efforts to make changes to the political process that seem to benefit him and his party.
Even Shia politicians and clergy have deplored Al-Maliki, who has shown himself to be incapable of managing the political and the security portfolios or stopping the country’s unrelenting violence.
Central to this deep-seated sense of failure has been Al-Maliki’s inability to achieve the kind of national reconciliation that would bring peace and stability to the deeply divided nation.
His inability, or unwillingness, to craft a credible national security strategy and build all-inclusive armed forces has served to reinforce Sunni suspicions and consequently insecurity in the war-torn country.
Under Al-Maliki’s rule, reforms went undone, roads and electricity remained unavailable, and children were left without proper schools. Meanwhile, politicians and officials in his administration are thought to have taken bribes worth billions of dollars.
Dawai’s possible candidacy has rattled the Al-Maliki re-election campaign. The pro-Al-Maliki media have been attacking him as a Saddam crony.
On Sunday, Al-Maliki travelled to Amara where he hurled campaign salvoes against Dawai.
“It is sad that a province such as Maysan, so rich in oil and agriculture, has most of its schools built of mud bricks,” he told a crowd of supporters. To lure undecided voters, Al-Maliki promised to provide 15,000 jobs in the government and the armed forces for Maysan residents and to build new schools and houses in the province.
There have been no opinion polls on how Iraqis intend to vote in this month’s election, but various estimates show that Al-Maliki’s bloc, the State of Law Alliance, is losing ground to the two main Shia contenders, the Al-Ahrar Bloc of the Sadrists Movement and the Citizen Bloc of Ammar Al-Hakim’s Iraqi Supreme Islamic Council.
Al-Maliki seems to have lost the confidence of Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, who is widely seen as being the moral force that helped create and save the patchwork Shia-led administration following Saddam’s ouster.
Al-Sistani has been showing increasing signs of dissatisfaction with Al-Maliki and has reportedly been refusing his request for an audience for several months.   
Al-Sistani does not speak in public, but his representatives have voiced concerns over increasing corruption and mismanagement by Al-Maliki’s government, which has given a bad name to Shia rule in Iraq.
On Monday, Al-Sadr met with Al-Sistani, the first such meeting between the two clerics for some time, in what appeared to be an attempt to receive the Ayatollah’s blessing on the Al-Sadr Bloc.
Following the meeting, Al-Sadr’s office said Al-Sistani had stressed the need to combat sectarianism and corruption and to provide security and services. “He stressed the need to elect the best and the most efficient [candidate],” it said. “This is the only way for change.”
Such remarks have certainly hurt Al-Maliki’s campaign, but can only benefit Al-Sadr, who has vowed to deny Al-Maliki a third term.
Other Shia politicians have also joined the anti-Al-Maliki chorus.
“If we get the confidence of the Iraqi people, we will not give the post of prime minister to failed politicians,” said Baqir Al-Zubaidi, head of the Citizen Bloc. “Authoritarianism and political obstinacy have resulted in unmeasurable losses,” he said.
Even Ibrahim Al-Jaafari, a close political ally of Al-Maliki who is running on a different ticket, blasted the prime minister’s attempts to get re-elected. 
“Iraq is a factory of leaders, and it cannot be defined by one bloc or one man,” he told a campaign meeting.
Ahmed Chalabi, the veteran Shia politician who has long aspired to be Iraq’s leader, ridiculed Al-Maliki on Facebook for his handling of the insurgency in Fallujah.
Al-Zubaidi, Al-Jaafari and Chalabi are believed to be frontrunner contenders to Al-Maliki.
Iraq’s most prominent Sunni politician and the speaker of the parliament Osama Al-Nujaifi also reiterated his bloc’s rejection of Al-Maliki’s attempts to stay in power.
“He is the maker of crises,” he told an election rally in his hometown of Mosul on Monday. “We say that there will be no third term under any circumstances.”
The Iraqi media have reported that the Sadrists, the Supreme Islamic Council, the main Kurdish parties and Al-Nujaifi’s Motahdoon Bloc have been discussing forming an alliance against Al-Maliki.
The key question remains, however, of how smooth the process of picking Iraq’s next prime minister will be after this month’s elections.
No single political group is expected to win the majority of the seats needed to form a government, and this will likely require coalition-building through a lot of horse-trading as was the case in the previous elections.
In 2010’s inconclusive elections, the leaders spent about ten months of hectic negotiations before they reached an agreement on a coalition government.
With Iraq’s three main communities further divided this time round, the formation of a coalition government could well drag into the end of this year or even into next year.
Until then, Iraq’s next prime minister will remain a mystery.
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        دولة علي بابا  : في تشريح سلطة الفساد والمحاصصة في العراق 
                                               
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                                                  وللفساد تأصيل شرعي
تثير مسألة تفاقم الفساد في العراق الذي يتولى قيادة حكومته المركزية واغلب محافظاته الجماعات السياسية الاسلامية الشيعية تساؤلات حول الموقف الشرعي الذي تتبناه هذه الجماعات من قضايا الفساد من نهب المال العام والرشاوي والابتزاز والسرقة وغير ذلك مما عالجته ابواب الشريعة الاسلامية المختلفة.واذا كان الفساد ظاهرة سياسية واخلاقية عابرة للاديان والمذاهب والمعتقدات فان التساؤل بشأن الموقف العقدي والفقهي لهذه الجماعات حول الموضوع يبقى جوهرياً طالما انها تؤسس شرعيتها على اساس ديني ومذهبي اولا كما انها تطرح مشروعها الاسلامي الذي يستوجب ان يكون لمماراسات السلطة فيه تأصيل شرعي محكم.
في البداية لا بد من القول ان الاسلام وقف موقفا حديا من الفساد الذي اعتبره بكل اشكاله من الكبائر وحفل القرأن الكريم بتحذيرات عديدة للمؤمنين من مغبة الوقوع فيه كما توعد مرتكبيه بعذاب الدنيا والاخرة والطرد من رحمة الباري وبركاته.بل وفي عبارات قاطعة حذر القرأن الكريم ممن يحاول ان يغطي على فساده بالادعاء والكذب كما ورد في سورة البقرة: (وَإِذَا قِيلَ لَهُمْ لاَ تُفْسِدُوا فِي الأَرْضِ قَالُوا إِنَّمَا نَحْنُ مُصْلِحُونَ.اَلاَ إِنَّهُمْ هُمُ المُفْسِدُونَ وَلَكِن لاَّ يَشْعُرُونَ).وترسخت في العقيدة ان الفساد من الرذائل التي ينبغي على المسلم تجنبها كما شرع بتجريمها ووضع لها العقوبات الرادعة بشكليها الالهي والدنيوي.اذ بينما يحفل القرأن بالكثير من الايات التي تنذر الفاسدين وتضع افعالهم في الاخرة موضع الموبقات فان جزائهم في الدنيا كان اشد وضوحا. قال تعالى (إنما جزاءُ الذين يحاربون اللهَ ورسولَه ويَسعَونَ في الأرضِ فسادًا أن يُقتَّلوا أو يُصلَّبوا أو تُقطَّعَ أيديهم وأرجلُهم من خِلافٍ أو يُنفَوا من الأرضِ ذلك لهم خزيٌ في الدنيا ولهم في الآخرة عذابٌ عظيم-المائدة). 
غير ان من الواضح ان التفسيرات الفقهية ذهبت بعد ذلك مذاهب شتى بشأن الفساد ومعانيه حيث تباينت التؤيلات والاجتهادات التي ينسب بعضها الى الاحاديث النبوية وبعضها الاخر الى رؤيا الخلفاء الراشدين والصحابة والفقهاء.واذا كان الفساد في معناه المعاصر اكثر شمولية مما ورد في النصوص القديمة فان هذه النصوص اخذته بالمعنى الضيق باعتباره سرقة للمال كما ميزت بين السرقة التي جاءت عقوباتها واضحة في الاسم وبين سرقة المال العام.اضافة الى ذلك فقد طال الاجتهاد ما يتعلق بسرقات المال بالتخفيف من العقوبات التي فرضوها عليه باعتبارها لم تحدد بالاسم في النصوص وايضا تحت ذريعة انه مال عام وللناس نصيب منه وهي نظريات استغلها الفاسدون والمفسدون عبر التاريخ الاسلامي.ان خير دليل على وجود مثل هذا الاتجاه هو ما اشار اليه بيان لهيئة النزاهة صدر في 9/3 يحمل فتوى لاية الله السيد على السيستاني بتحريم الرشوة تقول فيها الهيئة “ان السيستاني يسلط الأضواء على محرمات عدة توهم بعض وانخدع بعض آخر بأنها رزق حلال”. صدور الفتوى واشارة هيئة النزاهة تأكيد واضح على الضبابية التي تحيط بالموقف من الفساد لدى الجماعات الحاكمة واتباعها المتورطين فيه.
واذا ما كان يعنينا هنا بالدرجة الاولى هو موقف الجماعات الشيعية من مسألة الفساد فان الامر يبدو حتى لغير اهل الاختصاص ان فقهاء الشيعة لم يهتموا كثيرا بهذه المسألة حيث تكاد كتبهم ورسائل المجتهدين تخلوا من ابواب خاصة باظهار الاحكام بشأن الفساد بانواعه المالي والاقتصادي والادراي، وبالذات نهب الاموال العامة وسؤ استخدامها وعدم المحافظة عليها.صحيح ان البعض تناول قضايا الرشوة المعنوية والمادية وحرمها من باب السحت الحرام، الا ان البعض الاخر اجازها، او احتاط بشأنها، اذا ما كانت، حسب قولهم،  في “مورد الحاجة”، وهو تفسير او بالاحرى فتوى اباحة غريبة، توفر لنا تفسيرا لما يجري في عراق اليوم.
ان اكثر ما نراه في التفسيرات الفقهية الشيعية الحديثة بشأن الفساد هو انه يدخل في باب “اكل المال بالباطل” (وََلا تَأْكُلُوا أَمْوَالَكُمْ بَيْنَكُمْ بِالْبَاطِلِ وَتُدْلُوا بِهَا إِلَى الْحُكَّامِ لِتَأْكُلُوا فَرِيقًا مِنْ أَمْوَالِ النَّاسِ بِالْإِثْمِ وَأَنْتُمْ تَعْلَمُونَ-البقرة)وهو مصطلح فقهي مستحدث يراد له ان يشمل النهي عن كل انواع  الفساد مع الاقرار ممن صكه ان بعض المفاسد المالية والاقتصادية ليست لها عقوبة دنيوية في الاسلام وانما تترتب عليها عقوبات اخروية فقط. 
ان جزءا اساسيا من هذا الموقف الشرعي الشيعي من مالية الدولة والعلاقة بينها وبين الناس، يعود، في ما اظن، الى جوهر النظرية الشيعية المتعلقة بالامامة وايامانهم عبر التاريخ الاسلامي ان السلطة في العالم الاسلامي السني كانت مغتصبة من قبل الحكام من صاحبها الاصلي اي الامام وورثته.اذ ما دامت الدولة تحكم من قبل سلطة مغتصبة فلا حدود ولا تعزير فيها لانها ليست اسلامية وتفتقد للشرعية، ولربما اعتبر البعض من فقائهم ايضا ان اموال الدولة (غير الشرعية لانها ليست دولة الامام) انفالا والتي يعرفها اية الله السيد محمد محمد صادق الصدر في كتابه “ما وراء الفقه” بانها “كل ما كان ملكا للامام من اموال.
واذا كانت تلك هي الفلسفة المتعلقة بشكل الملكية في دولة غير الامام فان السؤال هو كيف تعاملت الجماعات الشيعية العراقية مع الدولة التي يتولون حكمها، او يقودون حكومتها، منذ سقوط صدام.لاتتوفر هنا اجابات نظرية في مجالات الفقه والتشريع بشان المفهوم الفقهي او الموقف الشرعي من مالية الدولة وهو موقف غريب لانه يطرح السؤال الاهم وهو موقف المرجعية الشيعية العليا من الدولة العراقية الحالية ومدى علاقاتها بدولة الامام المتصورة، او على الاقل هل هي من وجهة النظر الشرعية دولة شيعية.ان عدم التحديد هنا يثير اشكالات بشأن الموقف من التعامل مع الدولة وبضمن ذلك ماليتها وقوانينها ومعاملاتها وبطبيعة الحال الموقف من الفساد باشكالة المختلفة.
وخلاف المفهوم الفقهي، فان الكيفية التي تعاملت بها الحركات والقيادات الاسلامية السياسية الشيعية العراقية مع المال العام عمليا تكشف انها اعتبرت المال العام مالا سائبا ومباحا.فحتى قبل ان تتولى السلطة كانت الحركات الشيعية تنظر للدولة باعتبارها ارثا تستحقحه على نحو شرعي.كانت معظم هذه الحركات ترفع الاية القرأنية ( ونريد أن نمن على الذين استضعفوا في الأرض ونجعلهم أئمة ونجعلهم الوارثين–القصص) شعارا سياسيا لنضالها السياسي ضد نظام صدام بكل ما ينطوي عليه من دلالات بوراثة النظام التي كانوا يتطلعون اليه بعد صدام، وايضا الدولة ذاتها.في هذا السياق ايضا تلجأ هذه الجماعات الى التوسع المفرط في تفسيراتها الخاصة بشأن قضية الملكية وهي ان الارض ومن عليها هي ارث في هذه الحياة وفقا للاية ( ولقد كتبنا في الزبور من بعد الذكر أن الأرض يرثها عبادي الصالحون-الانبياء) حيث تعتبر هذه الحركات نفسها بانها وارثة وان الله قد نصرها في هذه الارض ومكنها من ثرواتها. 
يشكل استيلاء السيد حسين الشامي المقرب من رئيس الوزراء نوري المالكي وحزب الدعوة على مباني وارض جامعة البكر للدراسات العسكرية العليا نموذجا صارخا للفساد الذي تقوم به هذه الجماعات.وقصة هذه المنشأة التي تعود ملكيتها الى وزارة الدفاع وتحولت الى مؤسسة تحمل اسم الامام الصادق اصبحت موثقة بسبب الجدالات التي دارت بشأنها وكيفية تحويلها الى مؤسسة تدر ارباحاً هائلة لاصحابها الجدد والتي لم تنفع كل المحاولات الى اعادتها الى ملكية الدولة.ولم يحاول الشامي وهو رجل دين بارز ان يبرر شرعياً كيفية استيلائه على المبنى ومن ثم شراءه بسعر بخس ودون اجراءات سليمة كعرضها في مزاد علني، او التقيد بالشفافية، مستغلا مركزه وعلاقاته مع السلطات الحاكمة، سوى وصفه للمشروع الذي اقامه بانه اسلامي.
ولم يكن ممكنا ان تتوالى عمليات نهب مماثلة جرت للمال العام منذ بداية الاحتلال الامريكي الا بعد ان ضربت قيادات شيعية بارزة مثالا على ذلك باستيلائها على مباني واراضي ومنشئات الدولة حين احتلت قصوراً ومباني تتبع ملكيتها رجالات نظام صدام، او الدولة بحجج رد المظالم التي تعرضوا لها وبالتالي اباحوا شرعية استباحة المال العام.ولقد شجع ذلك العامة من الناس على الاستيلاء على اراضي الدولة والتجاوز عليها بالبناء في واحدة من اكبر عمليات انتهاك المال المال العام في تاريخ الدولة العراقية والتي تم تشريعها لاحقا من خلال الاقرار بالكثير من تلك التجاوزات رسميا.
تلك كانت بداية رحلة الفساد التي شرعت فيها الجماعات السياسية الشيعية الحاكمة والتي اسست لدولة علي بابا لاحقا والتي ان لم تكن قد وفرت لها الغطاء الشرعي، فانها عجزت عن ان ترفع هذا الغطاء عمن يمارسونه وهو امر كان سيحدث فرقا كبيرا في حجم الفساد الذي ترسخ وتغول وطغى.
ملاحظة/هذا فصل اخر من السلسلة سيتم التوسع فيه لاحقا حين تصدر في كتاب.
—— 
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الانتخابات العراقية بين ملهاة السياسة ومأساة الواقع
12 أبريل 2014

صلاح النصراوى

تتجاوز الانتخابات التشريعية العراقية المزمع إجراؤها نهاية الشهر الحالى نتائجها المباشرة إلى تقرير مآلات العراق نفسه، حيث يغرق البلد بعد أحد عشر عاما من الغزو الامريكى له فى مستنقع لا قرار له من الفوضى والأزمات، وتنسد أمامه كل افاق المستقبل.ففى الوقت الذى تنغمس فيه الجماعات السياسية التى تمكنت من السلطة اثر الغزو فى سباق محموم من أجل الفوز مجددا بنصيبها من كعكة الثروة والسلطة من خلال صناديق الاقتراع، يبدو العراقيون أنفسهم أكثر اقتناعا الآن مما مضى بأن الانتخابات هى مجرد تمرين عبثى آخر على طريق انهيار الدولة والمجتمع الذى سلكته الجماعات المهيمنة. 
هل يبدو هذا التقييم متشائما، بالأقل إزاء فكرة أن إجراء الاقتراع بحد ذاته يبدو فعلا إيجابيا يستحق التثمين، كما يجادل المتفائلون، حيث تشكل الانتخابات السد الأخير أمام ذلك الانهيار ومنح الشرعية الضرورية لحمايته وتحصينه.شخصيا لا أعتقد ذلك، إذ أن كل عراقى يدرك بالتجربة الآن أنه وفى ظل قواعد المحاصصة الاثنوطائفية التى أقيم عليها نظام ما بعد صدام حسين فإن الانتخابات الثالثة ستعيد انتاج نفس تلك المنظومة من الجماعات والسياسات والقيم المسئولة عما وصلت إليه الأوضاع فى العراق من ترد جعلت منه واحدا من أسوأ اماكن العيش فوق كوكبنا هذا.
تأتى الانتخابات وسط تدهور أمنى فظيع وأزمات سياسية ودستورية وخلافات حول السلطة والموارد وصراعات طائفية وقومية هى بمجملها نتاج فشل المرحلة الانتقالية التى اعقبت الغزو الامريكى عام 2003 فى العبور بالعراق إلى مرحلة إعادة بناء الدولة والمجتمع.والعامل الأساسى الذى يقف وراء ذلك الفشل هو ذات الطبقة السياسية التى قادت العملية السياسية بعد انتخابات عامى 2005 و2010 والتى تسعى الآن إلى تجديد رخصة هيمنتها على السلطة من خلال الانتخابات المقبلة.
ان أزمة العراق المستفحلة خلال أكثر من عقد هى أزمة قيادة بالدرجة الأولى حيث عجزت هذه الطبقة عن تقديم حلول بارعة للمشكلات العويصة التى واجهتها المرحلة الانتقالية، وذلك لأسباب عديدة منها افتقادها الخبرة والرؤية والخيال السياسى والنظرة الاستراتيجية، ومنها تخندقها وراء العصبيات الطائفية والاثنية.كان العراق فى ذلك المنعطف الخطير من تاريخه بحاجة إلى قيادات حكيمة ونزيهة وواعية وشجاعة تقود مشروعا وطنيا للبناء والنهضة وبرنامج ــ ديمقراطى ــ للتغير والتنوير إلا أن الزمن لم يجد إلا بطغم لم تجلب للعراق سوى المبائس والآلام والخراب.
هنا تكمن الأزمة العراقية بالذات حيث تحول برنامج التغير والتحول لمرحلة ما بعد صدام إلى مشروع سيطرة وتحكم فى الدولة وفى الموارد وانتصار لطائفة معينة على الطوائف والأعراق الأخرى، وإطلاق معارك الهويات الصغرى، فى حين تلاشت بالتدريج أهداف المشروع الوطنى وعناصر الهوية الوطنية المتميزة، وتبخرت معها، بطبيعة الحال، الأطر الديمقراطية والدستورية التى تمت صياغتها لتوجيه وإدارة العملية الانتقالية، وما كان ينبغي أن توفره من عدالة وتكافؤ ومشاركة.
النتيجة الأسوأ لأزمة المشروع الوطنى العراقى هى ظهور المشكلة الطائفية التى أصبحت العقبة الكأداء أمام عملية إعادة بناء الدولة وإنجاح الفترة الانتقالية، ليس فقط من خلال الفشل فى تحقيق أى إجماع وطنى وتوافق سياسى وبالتالى مصالحة وطنية، بل بسبب الإخفاق أيضا فى الوصول إلى مشاركة حقيقية وتقاسم فعلى للسلطة والثروة فى عراق قائم على أساس التعددية والتنوع.إن أسوأ ما فى نهج المحاصصة الاثنو لطائفية هو تحوله إلى نظام سياسى قائم على مبدأ الأغلبية والأقلية فى المجتمع، وليس فقط فى السلطة، دون اعتبار لمفهومى المواطنة والشراكة، والحقوق والواجبات المترتبة عليهما.
ما أنتجته سياسات التمكين واستراتيجيات الهيمنة التى مارستها الأغلبية بحق الأقلية هو التهيمش والإقصاء والعزل والتقزيم، مما أدى إلى فشل جهود المصالحة الوطنية، وكشف عن استحالة تحقيقها، كما أخل بالتوازن الوطني، وأفرز خطابات وممارسات مذهبية، وأوجد صراعا طائفيا أخذ بالنهاية منهجا مسلحا.ولا غرابة أن النهج الإقصائى التعسفى امتد ليشمل كل العراقيين من مختلف المذاهب والاعراق الذين يرفضون وضع الوطن فى حجرة هوية ضيقة ويأنفون عن ركوب الموجة الاثنوطائفية وما يصاحبها من برامج جهنمية وردات فعل غرائزية.
كل هذا يدفع إلى الاعتقاد بأن إجراء الانتخابات البرلمانية فى ظل المشهد الطائفى الزاحف يعد تهربا سرياليا من الواقع يصل إلى حد كونه ملهاة ساخرة يدعون إليها العراقيين بهدف إعادة التصديق على صيغة المحاصصة الطائفية وتجديد شرعية العملية السياسية القائمة عليها.ما ستتمخض عنه هذه الجولة الانتخابية هو إعادة إنتاج نفس السياسات وذات الأشخاص الذين كانوا سببا فى وقوع العراق فى هذا الشرك البنيوى المحكم الذى سيظل العراق عالقا فيه والمتمثل فى الفصل الطائفى الزاحف على كل مناحى الحياة.
إن القول بأن الانتخابات استحقاق دستورى وطريق ديمقراطى وآلية اختيار حر، هو فى السياق العراقى الحالى بضاعة بالية ولغو فارغ، بل واذا شئنا ميكافيلية سافرة، في ظل حقائق مزرية على رأسها الكلام المكشوف حول الاهداف الطائفية للجماعات السياسية المتنافسة وانماط القوائم والدعوات للتصويت للسياسات الطائفية والغياب الصارخ لخطاب الوطن والمواطنة.ما تكشف عنه المعسكرات الانتخابية هو ان العراق اصبح اشبه بدول الفصل العنصري، حيث جماعة واحدة محددة الاصول، تسيطر “ديمقراطيا” على الفضاء العام، وحيث الامن والموارد تشكل الاداتين الرئيسيتين لحرمان الاخرين من المساواة في السلطة والثروة.
فالمأزق الذى ستتمخض عنه الانتخابات المقبلة هو حالة مستدامة من الانقسام الجغرافى والسياسي، سيظل يدور فى الفضاء الصراعى الطائفي، ما لم يتم إجراء تحولات إساسية فى الخطوط الحمراء الموضوعة من قبل الجماعات الطائفية لإعادة بناء الدولة على أسس من العدالة والمساواة.العراق بحاجة إلى بنية سياسية جديدة يتخطى من خلالها حالة الصراع، إذ لا ديمقراطية، ولا معنى للانتخابات مع استمرار الاحتراب الأهلى الذى يوسع من شقة الخلافات ويضع البلد برمته على حافة التفكك والانهيار.
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Iraq’s futile elections

With their hopes for change dashed by chaos, Iraqis are losing interest in another meaningless set of elections, writes Salah Nasrawi
Shortly before Iraq kicked off the election campaign for the 2014 parliamentary polls last week, the Shia-led government sent a draft emergency bill to parliament that introduces draconian anti-democracy measures.
The National Safety Law, as it is billed, raises serious questions about the viability of the parliamentary elections as the government plans to twist the constitution and take unrelenting actions against its critics and opponents.
The proposed law gives the government the right to impose sweeping restrictions on the freedoms of movement, travel, speech and political activities.
Under the law, the government can impose censorship on media, personal letters, cables and emails as part of larger restrictions if it deems these necessary “to confront security threats from military or non-military actions”.
It can also declare curfews, issue house arrests, limit the opening hours of shops, take control of state economic assets and delay payments of government debts.
The law has yet to be ratified by the parliament, but concerns have been raised that Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki, who is seeking a third consecutive term in office, might be planning the emergency measures in order to manipulate the elections. 
The elections, scheduled for 30 April, also come amid political turmoil, constitutional disputes and increasing instability in the country, which have cast heavy shadows over the polls.
Violence has risen sharply in the past year, fuelling fears that Iraq is slipping back into the all-out communal conflict that plagued the country following the US-led invasion in 2003 and left hundreds of thousands dead.
UN figures put the overall toll for 2013 at 8,873 deaths in violent attacks across Iraq, while nearly three thousand people have been killed this year alone, not including in the rebellious Sunni-populated town of Fallujah.
On the other hand, Iraq’s annual budget has been languishing in parliament over a dispute between the Baghdad central government and the self-ruled Kurdistan region. Political stalemate has gripped the country as ethno-sectarian bickering and disagreements over sharing power and oil revenues have continued vigorously.
Parliamentary elections are required to be held once every four years. In the event a group or coalition wins a majority of the seats, it can then go on to form a government.
More than 9,000 candidates are vying for the 328 seats in parliament. Dozens of hopefuls, including four current MPs, have been disqualified either for links with the former regime of former president Saddam Hussein, for their bad reputation, or for having criminal records. 
But the race still appears to be a wide-open competition between Iraq’s three main communities, the Shia, the Sunnis and the Kurds, whose candidates run on ethnic and sectarian tickets.
Iraq has been ruled by a Shia-led coalition government for the last decade, and questions now largely centre on whether the new parliament can ever hope to change the hopelessly dysfunctional ethno-sectarian based political system created by the Americans for the post-Saddam era.
Even before the election campaign officially kicked off on 1 April, the main contenders in the increasingly bitter battle to lead the violence-torn country had been intensifying their mobilisation and personal duels.
The polls are expected to worsen Iraq’s already fragile communal ties, as political parties typically conduct election campaigns by appealing to voters’ sectarian, ethnic or tribal backgrounds rather than to national issues.
The UN envoy to Iraq, Nickolay Mladenov, has warned that the elections seem to be “highly divisive” as parties have been appealing to their sectarian bases at a time of worsening violence.
Al-Maliki is also eyeing a third term in office, even as he faces criticisms from opponents who accuse him of an authoritarian style of government at odds with Iraq’s post-Saddam constitutional system of political compromise and consensus-building.
They have also been attempting to capitalise on his failure to provide security and basic services in the country, as well as to curb the rampant corruption which has combined to make Iraq one of the most deadly and miserable places on earth.
Since the campaign started, the rhetoric against Al-Maliki has increased, with key politicians and religious leaders picking on his mistakes and political follies.
Top Sunni politician and speaker of the parliament Osama Al-Nujaifi warned on Sunday that Iraq’s failure would have far-reaching consequences, including serious “repercussions for the entire world”.
Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani has warned that the political process launched by the Americans and installing Al-Maliki in power is now “on the verge of failure”.
“Iraq is disintegrating,” he said in an interview with the pan-Arab newspaper Al-Hayat on Friday.
Even Shia leaders who traditionally have defended Shia empowerment against Sunni opposition have become disenchanted with Al-Maliki’s policies.
Representatives of Shia Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, who rarely speaks in public, have been urging voters to choose “new faces” instead of “the ones who have brought no good to Iraq”.
Another Grand Ayatollah, Basheer Najafi, has gone public in demanding that Al-Maliki step down. “If Al-Maliki stays in power, Iraq will never be able to stand up again,” he said in a statement last week.
Iraqi Shia leader Muqtada Al-Sadr also urged Al-Maliki not to run for a third term, accusing him of terrorising Sunnis so that they did not go to the polls in the upcoming elections.
He has repeatedly accused Al-Maliki of trying to “build a dictatorship” by excluding his partners from the government.
Now there are increasing signs that Barzani, Al-Sadr and the leader of the Shia Iraqi Islamic Council Ammar Al-Hakim are coordinating their efforts to stop Al-Maliki from getting a third term in office.
Al-Maliki seems to be unable to counter his opponents’ confident campaign, but he may be using the prolonged instability in the country to outmaneuver his opponents and even stage-manage crises.
The four-month standoff in the Sunni-dominated Anbar province between the Iraqi security forces and Al-Qaeda linked militants seems to be Al-Maliki’s best bet in appealing for Shia votes.
Many now fear that Al-Maliki will also use the emergency measures he has proposed to parliament, even though the new law has not been ratified, if he feels the chances of his reelection have been compromised.
Others believe that he may resort to drumming up hostile sentiments in order to deepen the divide between the two branches of Islam in Iraq in an attempt to gain more Shia votes.
In the latest escalation, al-Maliki has threatened to use “the most extreme force” against Sunni rebels who seized a major dam on the Euphrates and cut water supplies to southern Shia provinces.
This has raised fears that al-Maliki could use the new dispute to whip up the Shias against the Sunnis in order to garner more support among the Shias ahead of the elections.
In another worrying development, al-Maliki ordered security to be tightened around Baghdad this week in what officials say was a precautionary measure against a possible incursion of Al-Qaeda fighters from Sunni-dominated satellite towns into the capital.
Obviously, all these moves indicate that al-Maliki, who is facing electoral difficulty at the polls, is using the sectarian card to perpetuate fears among Shias and herd Shia voters in his direction.
One reason behind al-Maliki’s increasing resort to sectarian hectoring is the mounting evidence that the race will not attract a large portion of the electorate, even among Shia voters.
Frustration with al-Maliki’s self-serving and mostly authoritarian politics, combined with the fact that he has failed to bring security to the country, is expected to damp down turnout in the elections for the Iraqi parliament.
In post-Saddam Iraq’s first poll in 2005, when the elections were trumpeted as Iraq’s “example of democracy,” about 79.6 per cent of the electorate cast their votes. Four years later, only 64 per cent of voters showed up in polling stations.
Another low turnout was registered in the local elections in 2013, when only 50 per cent of people voted although three million new voters were added to the electoral rolls.
Many now fear that the wave of political apathy that has been sweeping Iraq will also dent voter turnout at this month’s balloting, as the country’s leaders fail to resolve political and sectarian tensions.
In fact, regardless of voter participation Iraq’s elections are increasingly proving to be meaningless, as they continue to produce sectarianism instead of genuine democracy and the rule of the people.
If the country’s present pointless elections mean anything, it is that they will change nothing and will remain a scandal for the country’s democracy. Indeed, many people in Iraq see things this way already, even if the sectarian politicians do not.
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An unnoticed massacre

The latest massacre in Iraq is just one more on an already long list of sectarian atrocities in the country, writes Salah Nasrawi

It took place on a warm and breezy spring day last week in a little town that provides beautiful views of two small rivers and surrounding citrus orchards and palm groves. The Sunni rebels who knew that the government forces were coming stood among lines of mud huts and concrete block houses ready to fight.

Buhriz, a rebel Sunni-dominated town in the mixed Diyalah province, was reportedly controlled by terrorists from the Al-Qaeda-linked Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) two days before the Iraqi army was due to try to take it back.

Hours before Iraq’s SWAT troops stormed Buhriz, the fragrance of orange flowers, which usually fills the air at this time of the year, was mixed with gunpowder smoke from the artillery shells fired by the Iraqi army.

When Buhriz eventually fell to the army on 23 March, a convoy of armed men in civilian clothes weaved its way behind the assaulting troops through the deserted streets right to the town centre.
What happened next in the troubled Sunni-dominated town remains unclear, but according to eyewitnesses suspected Shia militants raided Buhriz for hours without any intervention from the army.
The gunmen reportedly rounded up a group of men and shot them before hanging some of the bodies from electricity poles.
Among those who were killed were teenagers and elderly men, the eyewitnesses were quoted as saying, also telling Iraqi Sunni-controlled television networks that the gunmen had set fire to Sunni mosques, shops and houses.
Thousands of residents fled Buhriz to other Sunni-dominated towns in Diyalah. Other witnesses described how the attackers had arrived in trucks and on motorcycles under the eyes of the soldiers.
Iraq’s Al-Sharqiya television, which usually reflects Sunni views, said 27 people had been summarily executed in the massacre by what it described as militia members who had accompanied the army.
The television channel quoted Abdullah Al-Hayyali, the governor of Baquba, the provincial capital, as saying that at least five persons had been executed in the Nissan quarter of Buhriz while members of their families were watching.
The Qatari Al-Jazeera satellite channel also showed footage of bodies which it said belonged to men slain in Buhriz.
Though details remain sketchy, the finger of blame has been pointed at Shia militias.   The main Sunni bloc Mutahdoon accused what it termed as sectarian “militias” of attacking Buhriz but stopped short of naming any specific group.
It said the attack had been part of a plan to change the demographic profile of Diyalah, a reference to the sectarian cleansing of Sunnis from the province which has a diverse population of Sunni Muslims, Shia Muslims, ethnic Kurds and Turkoumans.
Mutahdoon, which is headed by the Sunni speaker of the Iraqi Parliament Osama Al-Nujaifi, also demanded an investigation into the atrocities.
Surprisingly, the government did not issue an official comment on the events in Buhriz, but a statement by the Interior Ministry a week later categorically denied the allegations of atrocities.
The ministry, which is responsible for the security forces, accused “some media outlets” and politicians of fabricating the allegations for “sectarian reasons.” It said the security forces had intervened in Buhriz only after a terrorist group had killed two policemen and a woman in the town. 
However, Ali Ghaidan, commander of the land forces that are operating under the command of the Ministry of Defence, gave a slightly different version of the events in Buhriz.
He told an Iraqi television station that locals had joined some twenty ISIL fighters in a fight to take control of the town. “The defeat of the armed men in Buhriz sent a strong message to the terrorists never to think again of reaching Buhriz,” Ghaidan said.
Violence in Buhriz is nothing new, since this is a town, with its tribal and farming community, that has been a haven for the Sunni insurgents who have been fighting the Shia-led government for years.
During the US occupation of Iraq, Buhriz became a flashpoint where US soldiers and Sunni rebels embittered by the US-led invasion of Iraq regularly fought fierce battles.
The small agricultural town, about 30 miles northwest of Baghdad, acquired the nickname of “Little Fallujah” after it became a symbol of Sunni resistance to both the Americans and the Shia-led government.
In 2006, American forces killed Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian founder and leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, in a village just north of Buhriz. Like many other towns in Diyalah, Buhriz has remained a stronghold for the Al-Qaeda-affiliated group the ISIL and other Sunni insurgents.
A cycle of violence, distrust and extremism has festered since the US troop withdrawal in 2011, and Sunnis who are complaining of marginalisation and exclusion have organised an anti-government rebellion in the area.
The violence has escalated since early January, when Sunni insurgents seized large parts of the area after government forces had dismantled a Sunni Muslim protest camp in the city of Ramadi.
Sunni rebels also stepped up their attacks against the military, police forces and pro-government tribes in other Sunni-populated provinces, such as Nineveh and Salah Al-Din.
The attacks and clashes in some of Baghdad’s outskirts have raised fears of a Sunni attempt to create a territorially controlled zone to encircle the capital and increase pressure on the government.
Buhriz seemed to be a key link among this ring of towns around Baghdad, since it needed to be under rebel control to create the zone.
According to some accounts, the ISIL fighters controlled the town for a full two full days before it was taken back by the army.
Different accounts suggested that security forces wearing ISIL-style black uniforms and checkered headdresses had entered the town to give the impression that Buhriz was being taken over by terrorists.   
However, the army’s onslaught seemed to be part of an effort to deny the Sunni rebels the territories to consolidate their power in areas where they can dominate.
The participation of the Shia militia, if confirmed, would be a major development in the ongoing sectarian conflict in Iraq and could usher in the collapse of the state’s security apparatus.
While Sunnis have been complaining about Shia hegemony in the army and police force, the direct participation of Shia militias in the fight against Sunni insurgents would be tantamount to a fully-fledged civil war.
Shia militias have reportedly begun to remobilise in recent months, including the Badr Organisation, Kataib Hizbullah, the Mahdi Army and Asaib Ahl Al-Haq. Reports abound about militiamen carrying out targeted or extrajudicial killings.
On the other hand, many Sunnis are questioning the terrorist tactics used by the ultra-violent ISIL, such as execution-style killings and indiscriminate killings and mass murders, which they consider as provocative to the Shia.
On 20 January, ISIL members killed four members of the SWAT near Ramadi. A video posted online showed ISIS members firing on four SWAT fighters in an execution-style killing.
SWAT, or Special Weapons And Tactics, are Iraq’s special forces, which are tasked with fighting terrorism. Iraqi Sunnis accuse the forces of brutality, including the use of excessive force and the destruction of property.
These atrocities raise fears of tit-for-tat sectarian killings, and the massacre in Buhriz could offer a snapshot of what is now going on in Iraq.
Many Iraqis believe that the killings in Buhriz could be retaliation for the execution of SWAT soldiers by the ISIL.
The truth about the Buhriz massacre is not known for the time being, and like many horrific events of the war in Iraq it may be buried with the bones of its victims.
However, years of bitter sectarian fighting is now deepening the divide between the two branches of Islam in Iraq, as Sunni and Shia politicians wage campaigns against each other to drum up hostile sentiments.
“The militias, which are Iran’s agents, wouldn’t have dared to kill civilians without a license from Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki,” wrote former Sunni vice-president Tariq Al-Hashemi on his Facebook page following the Buhriz events.
“When seven Shias get killed, I want seven Sunnis to get killed, too,” Shia lawmaker Hanan Al-Fatlawi told the Al-Sumeria television station last week.