Tag Archives: Iraq

ما بعد التجربة

Oil vs Kurdish independence

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Oil vs Kurdish independence
Iraqi Kurds pinned high hopes on oil to fulfill their independence dream. Too bad oil is undermining it, writes Salah Nasrawi
Iraqi Kurds have always argued that they have nothing to lose by fighting for independence but the chains of Iraq’s Arabs. For decades, they have been waiting for, and sometimes trying to create, the right moment to go their own way.
When Kurdistan started extracting oil after gaining autonomy following the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 hopes were high among Kurds that lucrative revenues would be used to build an independent economy and consequently help them to break away from Iraq.
This year as the Kurdistan Region Government started selling its crude independently it cut off most of its ties with Baghdad and started preparing for the day when Kurds will erect the political barriers that would separate them from Iraq.
With an estimated reserve of 45 million barrels and initial export of some 320,000 bpd, to be raised to one million bpd next year, in addition to huge gas reserves, the KRG was hoping to generate finance and laying economic foundations for Kurdish independence.
But a sharp drop in oil prices in recent weeks with market forecasts for cheaper crude for years to come has pushed excitement to leave Iraq to ebb. The sudden slide in prices and fear of revenue decline has prompted a different scenario and forced Erbil to handover its oil to Baghdad for sell.
The trend should be familiar in oil geopolitics. History repeats itself and oil shows again it’s a double edged sword.
Last week Baghdad and Erbil announced that they reached a deal to end a lingering oil and budget dispute. Under the agreement the KRG will sell 550,000 barrels of oil a day, including 300,000 from Kirkuk province, through the Iraqi state-owned Oil Marketing Company (SOMO).
In return, the government of Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi will start sending Kurds’ about $17 billion which is their share in the national budget, and an additional $1 billion for weapons and salaries for the Kurdish Peshmerga force. The agreement should end a year long crisis when the government of former Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki ordered a freeze on the KRG’s share of the national budget over an oil dispute after Erbil started selling its crude independently.
While Al-Abadi’s government put a vague statement saying that the agreement “has established that oil belongs to all Iraqis”, the deal was immediately declared as breakthrough by Kurdish leaders. Some Kurdish politicians even celebrated the deal as consent by Baghdad to Kurds’ claims to Kirkuk and other disputed areas.
There are not enough details to confirm if the deal is a breakthrough. It is only a one year agreement that will cover Iraq’s 2015 state budget and clearly states that exports will be made through SOMO’s facilities in Ceyhan, in Turkey.
As expected, disagreements emerged soon. Kurdish Deputy Prime Minister Qubad Talabani said the Kurdish government would still be able to sell its oil after it delivers the amount of oil agreed on in the Baghdad agreement, according remarks published by Kurdish media outlet Rudaw.
Iraq’s oil ministry, however, denied that and insisted in a statement Sunday that the government will consider further oil sales as illegal. Some Iraqi lawmakers wanted the deal to be put for debate in the parliament, a proposal rejected by Kurdish MPs.
Moreover, the deal reignited resentment among Shia in the southern provinces which produce the bulk of Iraq’s oil. They complain that their provinces are badly neglected even though they contribute a significant amount of oil wealth to the national coffers. Angry politicians in Basra renewed calls to turn their province into an autonomous region.
There are even more controversies surrounding the deal. Some Iraqis have pointed to complacency by some Shia political groups. Though the deal was endorsed by the government it was negotiated by Minister of Oil Adel Abdel Mehdi whose Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council maintains close ties with the Kurdish leadership. Before the US invasion, exiled SIIC leaders, including Abdel Mehdi, worked side by side with the Kurdish parties in the opposition fight to topple Saddam Hussein’s regime.
Abdel Mehdi had earlier reached an understanding with the KRG which allowed Erbil to receive an initial $500 million from Baghdad in return for the KRG starting to pump oil to SOMO’s Ceyhan export terminal. That understanding has apparently opened the way for new deal.
Facing these charges the SIIC did not shy away from acknowledging complacency. “If Kurds take 100,000 barrel of oil they have given us the rule of Iraq,” SIIC spokesman Baligh Abu Galal told Dijla television station. Without Kurds, we (Shia) could not have been empowered to rule Iraq. We are strong because we rule Iraq,” he said in a rare acknowledgment of the marriage of convenience that was part of the founding principles of the post-US invasion Iraq.
Still, the question that arises is not how the new deal was reached but why it happened now. Kurdistan has battled for years to secure exporting its oil away from Baghdad’s supervision. It defied all efforts by the federal government to control the crude’s flow. The KRG is already entangled in a legal battle, including a court case in Texas filed by Baghdad to stanch the Kurdish crude exports. In response, the KRG has filed an appeal to overturn the Iraqi request.
In June, following the advances made by the Islamic State terror group and its seizure of several Sunni-dominated cities in northern and western Iraq, Kurdish Peshmergas captured Kirkuk and huge swathes of territories bordering Kurdish Region, taking advantage of the collapse of the Iraqi security forces.
Kurdish officials vowed that they will never give the territories back to Baghdad. Kurdistan Region’s President Masoud Barzani called on the Kurdish parliament to prepare a referendum on independence. Kurdistan also has been pushing the United States and other foreign countries to give the Peshmergas direct military aid, rather than having them received through Baghdad.
In October, the KRG unveiled plans to find funds through foreign loans against future oil revenues. Though it had justified the loans to deal with financial difficulties created by the blocking of its budget by the Al-Maliki’s government, the measure was apparently intended to achieve independent financial institutions.
If any, all these measures show that the vigorous strategy followed by the KRG is to break away by showing that Iraq’s federal system is not working. Even after Baghdad and Erbil reached agreement on oil and the budget KRG officials continued their defying and provocative statements.
On Sunday, speaker of Kurdistan parliament Youssef Mohammad Sidiq told the Turkish Anatolia News Agency that the region will proceed with plans to hold a referendum on independence if “the Baghdad government fails to acknowledge Kurds’ rights.” Barzani’s deputy Kusrat Rasoul said in remarks published Saturday that “Kurdistan flag will be flying over every inch of Kurdistan’s territories,” in reference to the disputed territories seized by the Peshmergas.
But one must look beyond rhetoric in the fraught relations between Baghdad and Erbil to figure out if Iraqi Kurds will keep their bid for independence on high gear or they will concede to the bitter political and economic realities. Contrary to the idea of a prosperous economy depicted in media-hyped images of Erbil’s construction cranes and new housing complexes, Kurdistan’s economy remains fragile.
With little industrial, agricultural, financial and communication infrastructure, landlocked Kurdistan remains highly dependent on its two ambitious neighbours, Iran and Turkey, for trade, investment and transport. The two countries are effectively financing everything from construction to oil installations and from clothing boutiques to food products.
Most villages in the Kurdistan have no electricity or running water, and the region’s overall infrastructure is lacking with few paved roads. Unemployment rate is among the highest in the region and corruption and cronyism are rampant.
It goes without saying that shortage of finance will have devastating consequences on the region’s economy which is already put on hold because of the dispute with Baghdad. This is why Kurdish leaders might have found out that going it alone isn’t any better, and maybe worse, than staying in Iraq.
While the plunge in the crude prices serves a reminder of how geopolitically significant oil prices can be, there are other dominant factors which must have influenced the Kurdish decision to agree to a deal with Baghdad that bans their independent export of oil.
A national homeland for Kurds in Iraq has always been a nightmare for Iraq’s neighbours with a detrimental impact on regional stability. It will lead to the division of Iraq on ethno-sectarian lines with a ripple effect throughout the region. If that happen, oil won’t save Kurdistan from a messy and even bloody Middle East.
By signing last week’s agreement Kurds must have realized that they will run high risks if they continue to give the independence option priority over tangible economic interests and regional stability. That could be enough reason for the KRG to try to look into a different scenario, at least for now.

*This article appeared in Al-Ahram Weekly on December 11, 2014

Iraq-Partitioning, ما بعد التجربة

Iraq’s army under friendly fire

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Iraq’s army under friendly fire

Criticism against the dysfunctional Iraqi army is well deserved. But there maybe a hidden agenda behind it, writes Salah Nasrawi

Writing in the New York Times on 6 September 2007 former American governor of Iraq Paul Bremer described the army he ordered to build following the US invasion in 2003 as “the country’s most effective and trusted security force.”

“By contrast, the Baathist-era police force, which we did recall to duty, has proven unreliable and is mistrusted by the very Iraqi people it is supposed to protect” wrote Bremer who ordered to disband Saddam Hussein’s army and replace it with the new force.

“In fact the policy was carefully considered by top civilian and military members of the American government. And it was the right decision,” he concluded. When President Barak Obama decided to pull out US troops in 2011 one alibi he used to answer critics was that the Iraqi army is capable enough to fill the security vacuum.

The American assessment has routinely been challenged and experts have warned of fundamental problems with the new Iraqi army. Though the United States spent some $25 billion and several years training, the army has been fraught with corruption, inefficiency and lack of fighting skills. Its most serious problem remained sectarianism.

It took the near total collapse of the Iraqi army when the Islamic State terror group advanced into northern and western Iraq in June and captured huge chunks of land and arsenals of abandoned weapons for Washington to admit that the army it had created was nothing but a rag tag force.

In recent weeks, however, US officials started delivering their criticism to the Iraqi security forces publically. Mainstream US media have been awash with stories based on official leaks about the army’s incompetence and sectarianism, effectively ruling out the force from efforts to liberate areas taken by IS.

In a front-page report last week the Washington Post talked about “the larger decay across Iraq’s security forces and institutions.” It described them as a “deeply rooted phenomenon that undermines the country’s stability.”  “The force is also insufficient on its own to retake strategic cities such as Mosul,” wrote the paper.

Its main competitor, The New York Times, detailed “entrenched corruption” among top commanders who are involved in businesses such as selling soldiers provisions, liquor on the job or officer commissions. The paper noted that the pattern of corruption and patronage in the forces threatens to undermine a new American-led effort to drive out the IS extremists.

The Lose Angels Times, another leading US paper, joined the anti-Iraqi army chorus and in a report it concluded that the main factor behind the collapse of the army was its “rampant corruption.” It said army’s equipment and ammunition are sold by officers on the black market.

The US media blitz seems to echo similar criticism by leaders of Iraq’s Kurdish and Sunni communities who are at loggerheads with the Shia-led centeral government which controls the security forces. Leaders of both communities are now pushing for dealing with the Americans away from Baghdad, including direct weapons delivery and training.

In a series of interviews last week Kurdish politician and Finance Minister Hoshyar Zebari lambasted rampant corruption and mismanagement in the army. In one interview with Reuters Zebari said “only the Sunni tribes are the ones who can deliver” in the war against IS. Also, Gen. Jamal Mohammad, chief-of-staff of the Kurdish forces, the Peshmeraga, told Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper last week Baghdad insistence of deliveries of weapons through its airport is delaying liberating territories seized by IS.

Sunni leaders were even more blunt and to the point. The main Sunni bloc in the parliament, the Iraqi National Forces, has appealed to Washington to send weapons and ground troops to help Sunni tribes in fight against

While frustration with post-Saddam era’s Iraqi security forces is justified, this sudden surge of US, Kurdish and Sunni criticism and complaints seem to be orchestrated to prove a point. The Iraqi government-controlled security forces are becoming a problem and the United States and its allies in the international coalition should deal directly with Kurdish and Sunni forces.

The roots of the Iraqi army’s problems lie with the US occupation which dismantled the Iraqi state and dissolved the army and built a political system along ethnic and sectarian lines. After the ouster of Saddam, Shia groups insisted that the army should be put under their control. Shia believed that ensuring security for the country’s reconstruction needs an army loyal to the central government in which they were a majority.

But during former Shia Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki’s eight years tenure Iraq’s security forces became too sectarian due to his policies of exclusion and marginalization against Sunnis and staffing the army and police with corrupt cronies.

His successor Haider Al-Abadi faced the daunting task of fixing the security forces problem.

On Sunday, Al-Abadi disclosed that an investigation into corruption in the Iraqi army has revealed that there were 50,000 false names on its payroll. Known by Iraqis as “ghost soldiers”, because they do not exist while still receiving their salaries, the system has undermanned the security forces’ capabilities in facing security challenges.

Last month Al-Abadi ordered a major shakeup of the military by relieving 26 army officers of their commands and retiring 10 others for corruption and incompetence. He appointed 18 new commanders as part of efforts to reinforce the work of the military on the basis of professionalism and fighting graft in all its forms.”

Also, Al-Abadi is now trying to reform the ministry of interior and the vast police force it controls. On Monday he fired 24 senior officers, few days after removing the deputy minister who was accused of negligence and mismanagement. A plan for overhauling the force is also underway

But the question now how far can Al-Abadi go in reforming the army and police without sparking accusations that he is weakening the Shia tight grip on the security forces?

Iraqi Shia lawmakers and politicians have vehemently rejected the US-proposed mainly Sunni dominated national guard force to police the Sunni provinces. They also reject the idea of US training or supplying weapons to Sunni tribes without government approval and supervision.

Shia groups have also been resisting pressure to dispose off with the Iranian-backed Shia militias which are playing a key role in the war against IS’s by fighting alongside the security forces. In addition, thousands of Shia have volunteered since the IS made its advances in June. On Sunday, Al-Abadi ordered to pay salaries for some 21,000 Shia volunteers which the government now plans to accommodate in the national guard.

But as criticism of the army and praise to Al-Abadi’s reforms are making headlines, other aspects of the story have began unfolding.

On Monday, the pan-Arab Al-Hayat newspaper revealed that Washington has informed a Sunni delegation that it will start training some 100,000 Sunni fighters to combat IS. The paper quoted members of the delegation which includes politicians, tribal chieftains and former insurgents that the force will also police the Sunni areas after IS’s expulsion. The delegates told Al-Hayat that the programme will be carried out without Baghdad’s consent.

If it could some how be implemented, this means Washington is creating a Sunni armed force in spite of the centeral government. With the Kurdish Peshmergas already operating independently from Baghdad, Iraqi will have three armies on the ground with the all implications and the consequences it could have in a nation enmeshed in a civil war.

The Iranians, meanwhile, seem to have their own vision, or even plans, for Iraq’s security forces. On 27 November Iran’s Supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei issued a surprising statement which went largely unnoticed. “The ideology of the Basij has reached Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Gaza and, God willing, it will reach Jerusalem soon,” he said referring to Iran’s powerful paramilitary force which works as an auxiliary force engaged in security activities.

On 30 November the Lebanese National News Agency quoted leader of Hezbollah Shia party Hassan Nassrullah as warning of plans to “create a Sunni region in Iraq” which he said with parts of Syrian territories under Sunni control would together be annexed to Jordan. “This would be the alternative Palestinian state,” he was quoted as telling Al-Maliki who was in a visit to Lebanon.

As both Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah continue to have stakes in giving a strong political and military support to Iraqi Shia, there is much to read into Khamenei’s and Nassrullah’s apocalyptic statements and the Baghdad government’s rejection of an autonomous Iraqi Sunni force.

The mere process of having three armed forces built on ethno-sectarian lines will effectively mean Iraq is divided to three different entities. With Syria unraveling, the much talked about scenario of combining the Sunni heartland in both Iraq and Syria in a larger Sunni country could become a reality.

And that is a nightmare for Shia in Iran, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon who will be separated by the new Sunnistan.

This article appeared in Al-Ahram Weekly Dec. 4, 2014

Iraq-Shia

A row over Iraq’s Shia militias

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A UAE’s list of “terrorist organizations” provokes outrage by Iraq’s Shia ruling coalition, writes Salah Nasrawi
Every time Iraqi Shia armed groups are accused of abuses against Sunnis, the country’s Shia ruling elite come to their defense. They even express indignation for calling them militias and insist that they are para-military forces which function as back-up to the security forces under the government’s guise.
But last week’s Iraqi Shia leadership’s reaction to the United Arab Emirates’ move to include some of these militias in its new terrorism list was so furious that it had almost provoked a diplomatic tussle. Vise President and former Nuri Al-Maliki accused the UAE of supporting terrorism while some Shia leaders accused it of being sectarian. Protesters in several Shia cities demanded that the oil-rich state make an apology.
The controversy started on 15 November when the UAE blacklisted 83 organisations as terrorists in line with a law it has issued to combat “terrorism crimes.” The measure is also part of the Gulf state’s continued crackdown on Islamic–oriented groups deemed to be a threat to its security. Though the list includes IS, Al-Nusra and other jihadist groups, others are well known Sunni Muslim organizations active in politics or charity.
At least one UAE group, Al-Islah, that the authorities say is part of the Muslim Brotherhood is included in the list.
The UAE move has satisfied a promise by its government to crackdown on Islamist political groups in co-ordination with other countries in the region like Egypt and Saudi Arabia which also consider groups like the Muslim Brotherhood as terrorist organizations.
In August, the UAE passed a law which defined a wide range of activities as terrorism crimes. Under the law people charged with crimes, such attempts on the life of head of the UAE president and rulers of other emirates or their families or endangering their freedoms of their safety will be sentenced with death by hanging.
But the law imposes harsh punishments on other “terrorism crimes”, including attending meetings by people deemed be terrorists. For example, those who “declare publically their hostility” to the state or to the regime, or show “disloyalty to the leadership” are punished by ten years in jail.
UAE officials did not comment on Iraq’s Shia groups’ reactions but its State Minister for Foreign Affairs Anwar Mohammed Gargash said organizations on the list can appeal to his country’s courts to revoke the decision if they can provide enough evidence that they are not involved in terrorist activities.
While it remains unclear how the UAE’s measures will affect foreign organzaitions, the move can still carry political and moral weight. Groups which have been included on similar lists in the past suffered from negative publicity even after they were removed from the lists. Terrorism branding may also have political ramifications, such as condemning the political and ideological goals of the communities the groups represent.
This explains the immediate strong reaction to the news of the inclusion of Shia militias, such as Asaib Al-Haq, Kataab Hozbollah and the Badr Organisation in the UAE’s list. These groups have joined the so-called the “Popular Mobilization”, or Shia fighters who answered a call by Iraq’s most senior Shia cleric Ayatollah Ali Sistani to arms after the Islamic State (IS) terror group captured Sunni towns in a June major offensive.
“We condemn these false accusations,” said a statement by the leadership of the Iraqi National Alliance after an emergency meeting chaired by its head Foreign Minister Ibrahim Al-Jaafari and attended by Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi and other Shia leaders.
The sharp-worded statement also slammed the UAE’s move as “hostile” to the Iraqi people and “a clear support to terrorism and the criminal forces.” “It is like throwing a rescue rope to IS while it is breathing its last,” the Shia leaders said, demanding that the UAE revoke its decision.
Iraq’s government, which has been reaching out to Sunni neighbours whose relations with Baghdad were strained in the years of former Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki’s rule, did not react immediately to the UAE’s decision. Still, the Shia Alliance’s statement seems to be purposeful and reflective of Iraq’s Shia ruling elite.
There is a big controversy in Iraq over the Shia militias. Sunnis have accused them of committing atrocities while carrying out retaliatory attacks. Last week Sunni Vice-President Osama Al-Nujiafi told senior Shia politician and leader of the Iraqi Supreme Islamic Council Ammar Al-Hakim that the government should “put a halt on violations by irresponsible groups” against Sunnis.
The UN human rights agency and international rights groups have accused the Shia militias of gross violations, including abducting and murdering Sunnis in retaliation for attacks by IS. Amnesty International has said that the militias, which are armed and supported by the Iraqi government, face complete impunity for their actions.
The government of Prime Minister A-Abadi has vowed to rein in the Shia militias. On Friday Minister of Interior Mohammad Salim Al-Ghaban denied any connection between “these factions and kidnapping or blackmailing of citizens.” Shia leader Muqtada Al-Sadr, however, acknowledged violations by “some” of these militias though he distanced his Sadrist Movement from atrocities.
“Those who terrorize people and aggress on them and their properties unlawfully don’t belong to us. The majority are infiltrators who belong to enemies and abhorrent militias,” he said in a statement.
Iraq’s Shia militias were created after the US invasion in 2003 to fill security vacuum and encounter increasing attacks on Shia neighborhouds and towns by extremist Sunni insurgents. Some of them, such as the Mahdi Army and Asaib Ahl Al-Haq, joined major armed confrontation against the US troops.
The issue of the Shia militias, however, has become very contentious after the IS advance and its seizure of nearly one third of Iraq’s territories. The Iranian-backed Shia militias are reported to have played a key role in halting IS’s onslaught, protecting the capital Baghdad and key Shia shrines and retaking key towns from the terror group.
In recent months the Iraqi government has been talking about integrating the Shia militias into the security forces. It is already paying their salaries and providing them with weapons. Many of the militias are wielding enormous influence in Shia neighborhouds. They are also represented in the parliament and the government and play an increasing role in Iraq’s polity.
Many questions now surround the UAE’s decision to include the Iraqi Shia militias in its terrorism black list. While the UAE has not explained why the Iraqi Shia militias are on its list of terrorist organizations, the simmering sectarian crisis in Iraq has cast a shadow on its move. Many Iraqi Shia feel that they are being targeted by the Arab Sunni world as Iraq’s sectarian tensions have reached a fever pitch.
One precondition made by the US-led coalition to help Iraq combating IS is for a political process that allows for the various communities of Iraq to come back together. A centeral piece of the strategy, pushed by the coalition, which includes the UAE and several other Arab countries, to defeat IS, is to create a mainly Sunni national guard force to police Sunni-dominated provinces.
The Shia political groups which dominate the government have been reluctant to endorse the creation of such an autonomous force for fear that it will be infiltrated by Saddam Hussein’s loyalists and other Sunni insurgents who might turn against the government once they are left operating independently.
As a counter proposal, the Shia groups want to incorporate the Shia militias into the national guard which should also be put under the prime minister’s command. Some Shia lawmakers say that if a bill to set up the guard will come to the parliament they will insist that Kurdish Peshmergas forces should also be part of the new guard units, a move Kurds have vehemently rejected.
Hence comes the furry of the Iraq Shia leaders for the inclusion of several Iraqi Shia armed groups in the UAE terrorism list. With ethno-sectarian tensions continue, Iraq’s communal factions are expected to rely more heavily on their armed groups as their traditional insurance policy. This trend is expected to continue until an all inclusive security system is established and a political solution for Iraq’s sectarian crisis is found.
By branding their armed groups terrorists, Iraqi Shia will feel that there is a deliberate attempt by some Sunni Arab governments to mix what they perceive as their legitimate self- defense against terrorism with the brutal violence which is driven by ideological appeal sought by the IS.
—
The article in Al-Ahram Weekly November 27 issue was sent to print before UAE’s foreign minister’s visit to Baghdad a day earlier.

Iraq-Corruption

Iraq’s fishy business

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Iraq’s fishy business

A mysterious Russian plane landing in Baghdad airport prompts questions of illicit oil-for-weapons deals with IS, writes Salah Nasrawi

The news came first from a Jordan-based television channel owned by an Iraqi Kurdish tycoon and well known for his dubious business. A Russian cargo plane landed at Baghdad airport on 2 November with some tons of weapons on board after it was denied permission to land in Suleimaniya International Airport in the autonomous Kurdistan Region, Al-Tagheir TV reported.

The delivery of weapons and ammunition to a country in a state of war shouldn’t have made headlines except that the story surrounding the plane started growing more mysterious after the Baghdad government distanced itself from the shipment.

The stunning reports must have also raised concern with the US administration which is leading an international coalition to support Iraq in the war against the barbaric Islamic State (IS) terror group which has seized one third of Iraq’s territories.

Details about the plane and its cargo gradually began emerging highlighting suspicions that the weapons on board may have been on their way to IS.

According to accounts given by Kurdistan’s media, the Russian plane was approaching Suleimaniya when it was denied permission to land in the city’s international airport which is under the control of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, one of the two main parties in the region.

Kurdish media outlet Awene quoted Head Manager of Suleimaniya International Airport Tahir Abdullah as saying the airport refused to grant permission for landing because it had no prior knowledge of the plane’s arrival. Awene quoted a PUK official as saying the plane was carrying 44 tons of weapons, including anti-tank rockets, guns and night vision equipment.

Basnews, another Kurdish outlet quoted Atta Sarawi, a local Kurdish official, as saying the plane was expected to land in Suleimaniya airport. “There was coordination in this regard but there were communication problems with Baghdad. So, the plane continued its flight to Baghdad,” Sarawi said. A translated version of Basnews story appeared on the Arabic news outlet Elaf on 12 November quoted Sarawi as saying the weapons on the plane were sent to the “Kurdistan Region.”

On 15 November Basnews came with another story on its website saying the weapons “might have been sent to a senior Kurdistan Democratic Party official.” It quoted “unofficial” sources as saying that the pilot of the Russian “military plane” which started its journey from the Czech Republic told Turkish air traffic controllers in Adana, southeast Turkey, that the plane’s cargo was mainly a cigarettes shipment bound to Iraq.

In Baghdad, Iraqi government officials kept their mouths shut about the plane and its dangerous goods until the news finally came out setting off a flurry of speculative reports. The Ministry of Transport, which is responsible for civil aviation, said permission for landing at the capital airport was granted after the pilot informed the tower that the plane was running out of fuel.

“The decision to grant the plane permission to land came in line with Chicago Agreement on International Civil Aviation in order to avoid a risk of falling,” said the ministry in a statement on 15 November.  It said the pilot was instructed to land on a runway in the airport used by the army. The plane then parked in an area under the Ministry of Defense’s control and weapons were seized, the ministry said.

Both the centeral government and the Kurdistan Region’s authority said they are conducting an investigation into the case. Neither Moscow nor Prague, however, reacted to the news. Also, the US military which is participating in defending the Baghdad airport and participate in air control of the Iraqi airspace made no mention of the incident.

Yet, in another version of the story widely circulated on social networks and TV programmes, the weapons in the plane were sent to a prominent Suleimaniya-based Kurdish businessman who is closely connected to the PUK, which is headed by Iraq’s former President Jalal Talabani.

According to these reports the businessman, who is known to be a hugely rich man who has made his fortune in illicit deals and contracts, is also accused of conducting trade with the IS terror group. A well-known Iraqi analyst told the Baghdadiya television this week that the Kurdish businessman was also responsible for supplying IS with at least one shipment of pick-up vehicles now used by the militants in fight against Iraqi soldiers and the Kurdish forces, known as the Peshmergas.

Another Iraqi television network, Al-Sharqiya reported on its website that “several officials in a big a Kurdish-owned mobile company, their sons and a middleman who are close to one of the main (Kurdish) parties are suspects” in the plane case.

Conspiracy theories abound that the same entrepreneur runs investment portfolios of Kurdish parties and have business relations with top officials in Kurdistan and the Baghdad cenetral government.

The shadowy role of businessmen in Iraq has grown since the US invasion in 2003. Many of these businessmen were involved in scams in the US reconstruction projects following the invasion and before that in the UN-led oil-for-food scheme during Saddam Hussein’s era. Billions of dollars are believed to have been skimmed in the two programmes and went mostly into the pockets of these businessmen and corrupt politicians.

Since it is hard to confirm these reports, eyes are now turned toward the Iraqi authorities and the KRG to unveil the secrecy surrounding the plane, who was ordering the shipment and which is its final destination. The allegations are so serious that prompted Kurdish Prime Minister Nechervan Barzani to tell reporters that “it is considered high treason.”

The disclosure comes at a time when Baghdad’s authorities and the Kurdish government are gridlocked over oil, budget and weapons delivery to the Peshmergas. The Obama administration has been putting pressure on both sides to resolve their disputes and work together to fight the Islamic State terror group.

The Baghdad government suspended allotments of Kurdistan in the state budget, including the Peshmergas salaries after its government started exporting oil produced in their region independently. Under an interim deal the central government agreed last week to will pay $500 million to the KRG, from the state budget while the Kurds will let the Iraqi government receive 150,000 bpd of the oil produced by the Kurds.

On Saturday, Hawal, a Kurdish news outlet, said the Peshmergas are refusing to take part in the fight against IS unless their full salaries are resumed. It quoted Dleir Mustafa, Deputy Head of the Peshmerags Committee at the KGR parliament, as saying that another precondition for the Peshmergas to fight IS is to allow weapons delivery direct and not through the Baghdad government.

Since IS captured Mosul and several other key Sunni-populated cities in June, reports emerged of Kurdish oil traders smuggling oil from IS controlled areas in Iraq and Syria into neighbouring as far as Afghanistan. According to Western intelligence reports the smuggled oil is sometimes sold for a price as low as US $20 per barrel.

The US Treasury Department estimates that IS takes in millions of dollars a month from oil sales. Other estimates range between US$274,000 to three US$ million a day. Trafficking might have been cut down by US-led coalition air strikes on oil production and refinery targets in IS territory.

Last week KRG Interior Minister Karim Sinjari disclosed that Kurdish security forces have captured 11 individuals charged with smuggling oil with IS and for investigation. Turkish officials have denied or downplayed reports about smuggling IS’s oil through Turkey.

Hawal, the Kurdish news service, reported last week that large amounts of money are being transferred through the Kurdish controlled areas to towns taken by IS. It quoted Nouzad Barzanchi, head of the Security Department in Kirkuk as saying transactions are being made to people in Mosul and Shirqat which are under IS control. Baghdad media have reported that several bureaus in the capital are being investigated for transactions made to Jordan, the United Arab Emirates and France which the Iraqi intelligence believes went to beneficiaries connected with IS.

Some of the money which is being transferred through licensed exchange bureaus are believed to be payments for other smuggled goods such as wheat, barley and cattle confiscated from farmers and raisers.

Corruption in Iraq has been endemic since the US invasion nearly twelve years ago. Iraqi state officials have been acting as enablers for corrupt deals in a number of ways involving a range of businesses. In many cases there have been reports of corrupt professionals and army officers who are selling arms or intelligence to IS and other terrorist groups which are later used in attacks against government offices or security forces.

Like many previous cases of corruption before we may not know the secret behind the Russian plane. Yet, the revelations of the oil-for-weapons deal have unveiled a trio of deeply corrupt politicians, terrorists and dubious businessmen who are not only losing the country’s significant proportions of its wealth, but they band together to destroy it.

Iraq-Foreign Policy

Rhetoric in foreign affairs

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Rhetoric in foreign affairs

Iraq’s ability to forge an effective foreign policy is once again in question, writes Salah Nasrawi

For much of the last 12 years, Iraq’s diplomacy in the post-Saddam Hussein era has been busy marketing the idea that a “New Iraq” was at peace with its neighbours and harboured no intentions of interfering in their internal affairs.

It was a message which former Kurdish foreign minister Hoshyar Zebari never got tired of taking around while Iraq was gripped in bloody violence that was fuelled in part by its neighbours’ meddling in its domestic affairs.

With a civil war raging, aided by widespread regional turmoil and its neighbours’ rivalry, a new Iraqi foreign minister is now adjusting this indecisive foreign policy into a narrative that Iraq and its neighbours are linked by geography and good neighbourliness whose amity has no end.

Putting Iraq’s past foreign policy blunders and new diplomatic niceties aside, however, the question now is whether such rhetoric is the right foreign policy approach for a country that faces existential challenges, or if is just a hands-off approach that reflects the inability to lay out a precise vision to respond to such threats.

Ever since he was named foreign minister in the national unity government of Shia Prime Minister Haidar Al-Abadi in September, Ibrahim Al-Jaafari has been trying to reach out to Iraq’s Sunni neighbours whose relations with Baghdad were strained in the years of former prime minister Nuri Al-Maliki’s rule.

To that end, Al-Jaafari has been pushing the idea of geographical proximity as a means of improving relations with Iraq’s immediate neighbourhood.

Many of Iraq’s Sunni neighbours had accused Al-Maliki of entertaining sectarian pressures by excluding Iraqi Sunnis from power, while Al-Maliki fired back by blaming them for fuelling the violence by supporting the Sunni insurgency.

Such accusations soured Iraq’s relations with most of its Sunni neighbours and reflected badly on Iraq’s ability to restore security.

Given that he is a self-proclaimed Shia advocate and a former leader of Al-Maliki’s Daawa Party, debate has intensified over the likely direction of the country’s foreign policy under al-Jaafari.

One of his main tasks is to find ways to persuade Iraq’s Sunni neighbours that Iraq’s foreign policy is not governed by his own beliefs or sectarian fixations, but is oriented to meeting the demands of the country’s needs.

Al-Jaafari’s success in leading the country’s diplomacy will be crucial in underpinning the broad international coalition’s fight against the Islamic State (IS), which has seized large chunks of territory in Iraq and declared an Islamic caliphate after a blitz in June.

But while reaching out through conciliatory gestures may help in fence-mending diplomacy, these can blur real foreign policy perspectives and send the wrong messages to the targeted parties. In Iraq and its neighbours’ case, both sides need more tempered diplomacy, not fruitless rhetoric.

During his first tour of neighbouring countries, Al-Jaafari visited Kuwait and Turkey this month, carrying his soft-style diplomacy to them and seeking their backing for Iraq’s new government.

His message was that Iraq and its neighbours should rely on geographical affinities to overcome their differences and reconcile their sometimes conflicting interests.

In Ankara, Al-Jaafari did not stop preaching his notion of “geographical closeness” to the media after each meeting with Turkish leaders. “We are determined to keep relations with Turkey strategic and sustainable like our geography,” he told reporters after talks with his Turkish counterpart Mevlut Cavusoglu.

To underline his idea of geographical solidarity, Al-Jaafari, who is known for his flowery language, said that Turkey should work together with Iraq through “mutual interests and solid strategies” to “make our societies and our interests adapted to the respect for this reality”.

The reality, however, is that Turkey nailed its strategic interests to a larger role in regional politics long ago, and it is not likely to be outmaneuvered now by Al-Jaafari’s diplomatic niceties.

There also seemed to be an insufficient response to the deep rifts between Baghdad and Ankara over a host of domestic and regional issues and the turmoil on their borders.

In Kuwait, Al-Jaafari added a historical dimension to his geography-based approach in foreign policy. Again, his logic was oversimplified because it ignored Kuwait’s growing fears of Iraq’s ruinous war and the latter’s potentially devastating impact on the tiny emirate.

Al-Jaafari has been sending out a similar message to Saudi Arabia. “We can’t change our geography,” he said in one of his recent statements about his plans to visit Riyadh. “We are bound with the kingdom by moral and materialistic ties,” he declared.

If all this is meant to be Iraq’s new vigorous diplomacy, it seems to be a very modest approach, if not poor salesmanship in conducting foreign policy with countries that have long been at loggerheads with Iraq over many bilateral and regional issues.

What Al-Jaafari’s diplomatic signalling seems to be ignoring is that since the fall of Saddam’s Sunni-dominated regime, Iraq’s neighbours’ concerns have stemmed largely from who is in a leadership position in Baghdad rather than from simple geopolitics.

The real cause of the worries of these neighbours, notably Saudi Arabia and Turkey, is the Iraqi Shias and their alliance with Iran.

As Iraq’s crisis is increasingly highlighting, there is a need for a new set of arrangements and structures that can deal with the regional issues that are now threatening the collapse of the post-World War I Middle East map. With this in mind, Al-Jaafari’s vision of geographical closeness seems to be nothing but diplomatic talking.

On the other hand, many Iraqis have expressed dismay at Al-Jaafari’s failure to speak out on more pressing issues with Iraq’s neighbours, like terrorists coming across their border or funds sent to IS and other radical groups. They believe that this negligence risks showing weakness by putting diplomatic niceties ahead of strategic concerns.

Indeed, many Iraqis were stunned to hear Al-Jaafari telling reporters in Kuwait that “we cannot judge a country because of one or two terrorist infiltrators.” In addition, some of Al-Jaafari’s statements about the US-led international coalition that is helping in fighting IS have also raised eyebrows.

Since he assumed office he has repeatedly said that the international coalition against IS was not Iraq’s idea. His other assertion has been that the coalition’s military operations should be limited to the airstrikes requested by the Baghdad government. He has also accepted that “Iran is a key player in Iraq.”

While these could be ideas that reflect the stance of the Shia-led government in Baghdad, they cannot amount to a national strategy. Some of the remarks seem to be in sharp contrast with Kurdish and Sunni demands for a larger role for the international coalition in the war, including by sending in combat troops.

Post-Saddam Iraq was born without a foreign policy, and Washington used its diplomatic and political leverage to urge foreign states to recognise the newly US-installed government in order to give it a sort of legitimacy and to reintegrate Iraq into the regional order.

Under Zebari, the Foreign Ministry had difficulties forging a unified national foreign policy as the country’s sectarian and ethnic communities remained split over state and nation building. Meanwhile, Al-Maliki tried to outmaneuver Zebari and put himself in charge of foreign policy.

The Kurdistan region in the north of Iraq established its own diplomatic representative offices abroad, and Zebari was accused of entertaining a Kurdish agenda. Communal leaders and politicians felt free to express opinions or try to influence the formation and execution of foreign policy, and foreign visits and meetings with foreign government officials by Shia and Sunni leaders were routine.

The divide had political, economic and security implications for Iraq’s neighbours and the broader Middle East. Many of the country’s neighbours poked their noses into Iraq’s affairs, and their interference took different forms, including by influencing the composition of the Iraqi leadership. The interference also raised questions about how Iraq’s diplomacy should respond to violations of sovereignty and independence.

There are no documents that provide first-hand knowledge of the basic principles of Iraq’s foreign relations or national security policies since the US-led invasion in 2003. Zebari, who spent nearly nine years in his post, ironed out a foreign policy approach which was largely intended to appease Iraq’s neighbours.

A statement posted on the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Website outlines the goals of Iraq’s foreign policy as “actively and successfully working to protect Iraq’s security and promote stability and preserve the unity and harmony of society and strengthen the foundations of democracy within the framework of sovereignty, unity and equality among all citizens.”

Yet, the document falls short of laying out a solid foreign policy strategy that meets key challenges such as terrorism and foreign interference in Iraq’s affairs. Part of Iraq’s foreign policy failures were due to mismanagement under Zebari, who critics blame for avoiding inter-agency coordination and turning the ministry into a nest of politically appointed diplomats and cronies.

Realising how dysfunctional the Foreign Ministry he had inherited had become, Al-Jaafari is widely expected to overhaul the diplomatic service and reorient the country’s foreign policy strategy.

Coming from outside the foreign service and lacking international-relations expertise, he needs to do a lot of work in redesigning and managing Iraq’s foreign policy not only to boost its regional and international standing, but also and most importantly to meet the country’s existential threats.

But first and foremost he should realise that diplomacy is not merely sound bites. It is instead the full range of practical measures, and public and private debate, that a state can employ to achieve its ends.