Tag Archives: Iraq

Iraq-Corruption

Iraq tightens its belt

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Iraq tightens its belt

The people of Iraq will face severe hardships under the country’s new austerity budget, writes Salah Nasrawi

With oil prices plummeting and the economy squeezed by inefficiency and corruption, Iraq’s parliament has approved a belt-tightening budget. The step is widely seen as having significant ramifications for the country’s volatile domestic politics and the war against the Islamic State (IS) terror group.

Iraq’s 328-member House of Representatives endorsed the country’s 2015 budget last week. The budget approval followed weeks of squabbles over cuts, allocations and what oil price the government should base the budget’s projected revenues on.

The lawmakers approved a cut of nearly three per cent in spending, bringing the total expenditure in the budget to $99.6 billion, down from the $102.5 billion the cabinet had initially proposed in the draft.

Before sending the bill to parliament for ratification, ministers warned that this would be an austerity budget, slashing the country’s bloated public sector and freeing up funds for military spending as Iraqi forces battle IS.

Iraq’s government had originally forecast a $125 billion budget for 2105, but faced with still-falling prices for its oil exports it was forced to slash this by some 20 per cent.

The new budget is based on a price of $56 for a barrel of crude, lowered from $70 and then $60 a barrel in earlier drafts. The expected budget deficit will still be around $19.1 to $21.1 billion, however.

One of the main hurdles that delayed the budget’s endorsement were objections from some Shia members to an oil-export deal struck in December between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government.The Shia MPs said the deal would unfairly benefit the Kurdistan Region at the expense of the Shia-populated oil-producing provinces in the south.

Sunni lawmakers also threatened to boycott the vote because the budget did not include funding provisions for a national guard, a new security force to be set up to fight IS and police Sunni-populated provinces.

Many lawmakers also objected to the oil price assumption in the budget, saying it was unrealistic as market prices had slipped below $50 a barrel with no concrete indications that they would rebound in the foreseeable future.

The reduction in oil prices is expected to strangle Iraq’s economy at a time when the country needs a boost in resources to cement its fractured national unity and sustain the war against terrorism.

While the government said it would not cut salaries or pensions, other reductions in the lavish spending of oil money, such as generous allowances, travel and office expenses, were announced.

But the bulk of the funds to cover the deficit will come from taxation, borrowing and withdrawals from the country’s reserves, estimated at $75 billion. While the Central Bank is expected to provide funds from its reserves, the government said it would also issue bonds in foreign currencies.

Under the provisions of the budget the government will be able to meet part of the deficit by introducing new taxes, levies and duties. Obligatory saving accounts are also to be opened for senior government officials to deposit part of their salaries.

Since the fall of the regime of former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein in the US-led invasion in 2003 Iraq’s parliament has had difficulty passing annual budgets in regular order. Wrangling over budgetary allotments are routine, and last-minute deals usually come at the expense of a solid fiscal plan.

Worse still, Iraqi governments throughout this period have failed to present their final revenue and expenditure accounts for review and endorsement before passing the next annual budget.

Last year, parliament was unable to approve the state budget because of a dispute between the central government and the autonomous Kurdistan Region over independent oil exports from the region.

The crisis allowed former prime ministerNuri Al-Maliki to use budget advances and emergency provisions, circumventing the checks and balances enshrined in the constitution to ensure limits imposed by parliament are respected.

As a result, billions of dollars in unchecked spending are now unaccounted for. Lawmakers have said that Iraq’s state coffers were nearly empty when the government of Prime Minister HaidarAl-Abadi took office in August. Iraq’s economy has been hard hit by decades of war, international sanctions and inefficiency.

But the country’s current economic ills are largely due to the abysmal economic policies of post-Saddam governments. Instead of working to rebuild the economy and sustain growth in basic sectors, they relied heavily on oil revenues to bankroll the budget.

Though Iraq is the second-largest producer of crude oil in OPEC, the oilproducers’ organisation, the country’s economy is in a shambles due largely to mismanagement, poor public spending and rampant corruption.Some 70 per cent of the budget has been going to pay for food imports, energy subsidies and funding an inflated bureaucracy and ramshackle armed forces.

Government policies are mainly responsible for the decline in productive sectors.Agriculture has been neglected, and less than 15 per cent of the country’s total area is now being cultivated. The agricultural sector, which used to employ one third of the work force, now accounts for less than four per cent of the country’s GDP.

The manufacturing, construction and electricity industries are in tatters and account for only eight per cent of national wealth. Thousands of state-owned industries andsubsidised factories have shut down because of a lack of electricity and poor maintenance.

Iraq’s banking system is largely dysfunctional, and without an overhaul, analysts say, the economy has little hope of competing with its oil-rich neighbours. Iraq has failed to invest in sovereign wealth funds, unlike oil-exporting countries in the Gulf, whose investments are now being used to cover budget deficits and public spending.

Corruption comes at the top of the reasons behind the depletion of Iraq’s coffers. According to some lawmakers, some $750 billion has been lost in corruption, waste and inefficiencies over the last ten years.Though Al-Abadi promised to combat corruption in his policy statement to parliament when he took office, there have been no signs that his government has taken concrete steps to bring corrupt officials to account or recover stolen money.

One day before the parliament passed the 2015 budget, a report by the World Bank warned that Iraq faces “a crisis which will have important implications for the welfare of its people.”The report said that about 20 per cent of Iraq’s population lived below the poverty line in 2012 and a significant portion of the Iraqi people was vulnerable to falling into poverty.

It said “poverty declined only modestly” since 2012 and “deep deprivations in non-monetary dimensions persisted.”The report painted a grim picture of Iraq before the current crisis. It said close to half the population had less than primary level education and almost a third of children aged up to five years old were stunted.

The report said over 90 per cent of households in Baghdad and the central and southern provinces received less than eight hours of electricity a day, a third of men and 90 per cent of women aged 15 to 64 were neither employed nor looking for work, and more than 60 per cent of the calories consumed by the poor came from a nationwide food subsidy programme.

“Addressing this crisis will take time and concerted effort,” the report said.

Looking forward, there are real concerns that the new belt-tightening budget will have serious impacts on the lives of most Iraqis. Moreover, there are concerns that the combination of falling oil prices and the austerity measures will have adverse implications for the country’s stability and hurt efforts to fight IS extremists.

This article appeared first in Al Ahram Weekly on Feb.5, 2015

Iraq-Inquiry

A botched inquiry?

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A botched inquiry?

People across the Middle East have a stake in the UK’s Chilcot Inquiry into the causes of the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, writes Salah Nasrawi

When former British prime minister Gordon Brown set up a panel in 2009 to look into the UK’s involvement in the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq many Iraqis hoped that they would finally hear the truth about the invasion that left their country in ruins.

Britain, after all, was the US’s main ally in the war and its then prime minister Tony Blair was a key supporter of then US president George W. Bush, who still insists that the invasion was the “right decision” despite the hundreds of thousands killed and the numerous regional conflicts it has unleashed.

Nearly six years later the report of the UK’s Iraq War Inquiry has still not been made public, even though it was reportedly finalised in 2011. Last year it was disclosed that a deal had been reached between London and Washington to block essential documents in the inquiry, including critical pre-and post-war communications between Bush and Blair.

A new hurdle came this month when the inquiry panel, known as the Chilcot Commission after its chairman Sir John Chilcot, decided not to publish the long-awaited report, which will now be delayed until after the British general elections in May.

The delay has raised suspicions of a whitewash. The British Independent newspaper described it as “one of the most bitterly controversial episodes in recent British history.”

The leaders of both the ruling Conservative Party and the opposition Labour Party have been accused of a cover-up of what has been called the war of destruction on Iraq.

Deputy Prime Minister and Liberal Democrat leader Nick Clegg has suggested the delay of the report is an attempt to “sex it down.” Others have called it a scandal and urged voters to sign a petition calling for the publication of the report before the elections.

The criticisms go beyond the delay in the publication to include the alleged incompetence of the Chilcot Commission and the political calculations that have coloured its investigations, including caving in to pressure from the British and US governments.

What gives weight to charges that the inquiry process has been manipulated is the reluctance of both Prime Minister David Cameron and Labour leader Ed Miliband to push for publication of the report.

Both have been apparently engaged in an elections blame game. For many in Britain who have been demanding to know the reasons that pushed their government to submit to Bush’s whims, the postponement of the report has not been good news. They consider it to be a setback for justice, democracy and transparency.

For Iraqis, however, the war is history that cannot be forgotten. For 12 years, Iraq has been reeling in the apocalyptic aftermath of the invasion and occupation. For most Iraqis, these have been years of terror, grief and destitution. Their country now stands at a crossroads, with increasing fears that it will ultimately fall apart.

The majority of Iraqis do not need to know when Blair made commitments to Bush about the UK’s involvement in the invasion and its aftermath. But they expected the truth to be made public and the Chilcot Commission to disclose information about who did what in the plundering their country.

One of their expectations was that the commission would open a window of opportunity to expand the inquiry from merely probing Britain’s involvement and Blair’s secret deals with Bush to include the entire war and its devastating consequences.

Bereaved Iraqi victims of abuses committed during the war and the subsequent occupation also hoped a credible report would help them take those responsible for war crimes committed during the invasion and the occupation to court.

Hundreds of thousands of Iraqis were killed or wounded in the catastrophic occupation, while millions were forced to leave their homes and seek refuge abroad or within Iraq because of the sectarian violence triggered by the invasion.

Unknown numbers of Iraqis have been exposed to a range of environmental and chemical hazards caused by the allies’ use of weapons that carried potential health risks. The destruction of Iraq’s infrastructure has been immeasurable, along with the economic losses.

Other peoples in the Middle East also have a stake in the Chilcot report. The invasion of Iraq unleashed the turmoil that has culminated in the stunning advances of Islamic State (IS) forces in Iraq and Syria and the wave of religious radicalism it has unleashed in the region.

This threat of terrorism, which has hit Europe recently, should be underscored because Western politicians such as Blair still try to distance themselves and their policies from the snowballing problem and blame it on Muslims.

Last week, Blair claimed that a “closed-minded view of the world” was perpetuating what he termed a “culture of hatred.”

“At some point we have got to understand this extremism has grown up over a long period of time and over decades. Its roots are deep within a perversion of the religion of Islam,” Blair told participants at the Davos Economic Forum in Switzerland.

The outcome of the investigation should also have an impact on the US-led coalition which is fighting IS in Iraq and Syria. Iraqis are entitled to know that the war which the international coalition is fighting against IS is not driven by another conspiracy, and will not turn into an exercise in destruction like the one waged in 2003 to topple the regime of former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein.

As the recent exchange of blame over the efficiency of the coalition’s military aid in the war against IS has shown, the Iraqi government has little confidence in the coalition, something which makes observers believe it is undermining the campaign.

If the report of the Chilcot investigation is curtailed, the world will never know the truth of the secret deals between Bush and Blair that paved the way for the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and those responsible for Iraq’s misery will continue to escape being brought to account.

This article appeared first in Al-Ahram Weekly on Jan, 29, 2015

Iraq-Future

Is Obama’s strategy failing?

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Is Obama’s strategy failing?

The collapse of the US-led coalition against Islamic State forces in Iraq could only be a matter of time, writes Salah Nasrawi

When US President Barack Obama’s envoy to the US-led coalition against the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq, retired US general John Allen, visited the country last week, his discussions with government leaders were not short of moments of frankness.

Allen was told by the country’s Shia and Sunni leaders that the coalition needs to do more to help Iraq defeat the terror group that has seized large areas in the north and west of the country and in neighbouring Syria.

Shia Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi told the American official that the US-led coalition should “increase the tempo of the effective air strikes on IS positions.” He also called for US-sponsored training of the Iraqi security forces to be expanded, according to his office.

Sunni Parliamentary Speaker Salim Al-Jabouri was even more vocal in his criticisms. “Until now our feeling has been that the international support is not convincing,” Al-Jabouri was quoted by Reuters as telling Allen.

The grievances listed by Iraqi leaders included ineffective air strikes against IS, poor coordination with the Iraqi military command, limited combat training of Iraqi soldiers, and a lack of intelligence and weapon supplies. But their main concern remains the political strategy of the US campaign against IS.

As expected, leaders of the Kurdistan Regional Government in the north have remained fully behind the international coalition, though they continue to complain about shortages of military supplies.

After the blitzkrieg carried out by IS in Iraq last June, Obama declared that US warplanes and an international coalition he had assembled would conduct a systematic campaign of air strikes against the militants while Iraqi ground forces went on the offensive.

Obama ruled out any direct combat involvement by US soldiers in Iraq, but promised a military package of aid that would include weapons deliveries, intelligence and training.

What began to be called the Obama Strategy for Iraq also entailed a political approach that called for national reconciliation among the country’s communities. The plans was to end Sunni exclusion by the Shia-led government and give the Sunnis an autonomy that included the policing of their own areas after taking them back from IS.

Obama made it clear that the US would take action against IS in Syria by training and arming the moderate opposition to President Bashar Al-Assad to enable it to fight IS militants and expel them from Syria.

Last week’s unexpected criticisms by the Baghdad government came as doubts started to emerge in the US media about the air strikes that the US and its allies have been conducting against IS targets in Iraq and Syria.

Critics of the air strikes point out that most of the territories the militants have captured since their major onslaught in mid-June, including major Sunni-populated cities, are still under IS control. In Syria, IS continues to gain ground and threatens key cities like Aleppo and Homs.

Though the US and its allies have continued pounding IS targets, the IS advance in Iraq has been largely contained by Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia militias and the Iraqi security forces. Kurdish Peshmerga fighters have also retaken territories that they claim belong to the Kurdish region.

Before leaving Baghdad last week, Allen attempted to respond to Iraqi concerns. He said the coalition has made “important progress” and reiterated Washington’s commitment to helping Iraq in the war against IS, including by carrying out air strikes, supplying weapons and training Iraqi troops.

Allen urged Iraqis to show “patience” and made it clear that “the pivotal battles” to defeat the terror group have not yet come. He reiterated Washington’s position that the defeat of IS does not depend solely on military success and urged Al-Abadi to deliver on his promise of “security reforms, advancing national reconciliation, and revitalising Iraq’s ties with its neighbours.”

The Obama Strategy is also irking some US Arab allies. The Arab media have been reporting a dispute between the United States and its Arab coalition partners over the anti-IS strategy in Iraq and Syria. On Saturday, the pan-Arab newspaper Al-Quds Al-Arabi reported from Amman that Arab US allies would now prefer an Arab-Islamic alliance to go after IS instead of the US-led coalition, which also includes Western powers.

The paper quoted Arab Gulf officials as saying that many Arab partners believe that Washington does not seem to be “serious in conducting radical operations to uproot IS, or at least weakening it on the ground.”

Some countries, including Saudi Arabia, want to include Yemen in the coalition’s mission and engage it in the fight against the Shia Houthis, who have taken control of the capital Sanaa. Other reports suggested that Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies are concerned that a deal between Washington and Iran over its nuclear programme might affect Washington’s response to Tehran’s ambitions in Iraq.

Syrian opposition forces are also expressing increasing frustration with the Obama Strategy. Burhan Ghalyoun, a former leader of the opposition Syrian National Council (SNC), slammed Obama’s strategy in an interview with the Al-Arabiya TV network, saying that the plan to train moderate Syrian opposition forces is “a delaying tactic.”

The Obama approach is also coming under fire in Washington. Republican leaders have criticised Obama’s reluctance to engage militarily with IS. They have also questioned his “Iraq first” war, which they charge has enabled IS to make gains in Syria without weakening it in Iraq.

From the beginning, the Obama anti-IS strategy has come under fire for being weak and lacking in focus. Critics have pointed to its military flaws, such as the use of limited air to defeat a formidable terror group that controls large areas and enjoys local support.

To date, eight months into the seizure of most of Iraq’s so-called Sunni Triangle, IS militants have been able to stave off offensives intended to dislodge them from the safe havens they have established. They have also lured more foreign fighters into their ranks and sent terror threats to countries as far away as Europe and the United States.

The failure of the American military to achieve victory over IS, or even to degrade its combat capabilities, has indicated that critics were right to discount aerial bombardment as an effective strategy to defeat the group.

Obama’s political approach has also been challenged for being naïve in the way it looks at the geopolitical complexities of Iraq and the region. Its main flaw lies in its dealing with IS as merely a terrorism issue, while ignoring the deep ethnic and sectarian conflicts that divide the region.

A closer look at the war in Iraq reveals that the Shia-led government is not managing the fight against IS in the way that Washington had intended. Baghdad may still need US air power, advanced weapons and good intelligence capabilities, but it has been fighting the war in its own way.

It has depended largely on Shia Iran to repel IS advances. Tehran has sent military advisors to help train and equip troops and allied militias to drive the IS militants out of territories occupied in central Iraq.

As the conflict has demonstrated, Baghdad has made up for the need for dedicated army and security forces soldiers by mobilising well-trained and battle-tested Shia militias in the fight against IS. After routing IS militants in cities and towns in the Baghdad belt and the mixed Diyalah province, the government is now deploying Shia militias in Sunni-dominated areas in preparation for a counter-offensive.

Last week, Kurdish media outlets said that the government dispatched “several brigades of Shia militias” to the highly volatile and disputed Kirkuk province, reportedly to protect towns populated by Shia Turkmens.

On Saturday, the London-based Al-Hayat newspaper reported that Shia militias had arrived in the Sunni-dominated Anbar province and that they were expected to fight alongside Sunni tribes allied with the government against IS.

Significantly, Baghdad has been reluctant to allow the Sunni tribes to form national guard units to fight IS militants and police their own areas after retaking them from the group. Plans to launch national reconciliation that would fully integrate Sunnis into the government have also foundered.

Both the Sunni forces and the Sunni inclusion were prerequisites for the US-led mission and for sustainable US support for Baghdad, accepted by Al-Abadi when he was nominated to form his partnership government in August.

What all this means, at best, is that the US-led coalition will remain the décor for Obama’s wishy-washy partnership with Iraq. At worst, it means that Washington will try to find an exit strategy in order to suspend the coalition and leave Iraq once again to its fate.

This article appeared in Al-Ahram Weekly on Jan. 22, 2015

 

ما بعد التجربة

Grand bargain in Iraq?

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Grand bargain in Iraq?

The choice for Iraq now is either to continue a costly war or to embrace an historic compromise, writes Salah Nasrawi

Soon after he took office in July, Iraq’s Shia prime minister, Haider Al-Abadi, vowed that his security forces, working together with Shia militias, would beat the Islamic State (IS) group “in record time.” IS has seized large swathes of land straddling the border between Iraq and Syria.

Al-Abadi, whose predecessor Nuri Al-Maliki’s policy of excluding Sunnis gave rise to IS, promised he would end Sunni marginalisation and bring back peace to the war-torn nation through a programme of national reconciliation. He pledged to include Sunni tribes in the fight against IS and reintegrate disgruntled Sunni groups into national politics.

At first glance, Al-Ababdi’s declared way of battling the group may seem no different from US President Barack Obama’s strategy of putting Iraqi forces in the lead in the fight against IS while providing them with air cover, weapons and military advice.

Ultimately, the United States hopes that after winning the war against IS and regaining the lost territories Sunni tribes and parties will be given responsibility for policing their areas. The US plan also envisages a sort of self-rule for the Sunni provinces of the country after IS is defeated.

But the two approaches seem to sharply differ on some fundamental points, and it is hard to see if either one of them will be successful.

The US plan aims to create a local Sunni force that will take charge of security in the territories regained from IS and operate in coordination with provincial authorities. The force, to be called the National Guard, will be formed from disfranchised Sunnis, including loyalists of former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein and other insurgents.

The Shia-led government, meanwhile, has called for the suggested units to be part of a cross-sectarian force controlled by Baghdad. It has also planned to give official recognition to the Shia militias that have joined in the fight against IS.

In essence, Iraq’s Shias are not prepared to help drive out IS from Sunni areas in order then to give them back to the Baathists and other Sunnis who have been fighting the government. Many Shias also envision the new force as being a potential Sunni army that could threaten their power.

The Iraqi Kurds, who maintain their own Peshmerga forces, are also openly hostile to any plan to allow Arab troops to share policing of the oil-rich Kirkuk province and other disputed areas captured amidst the IS-triggered chaos. On the contrary, the Kurdish Peshmergas have been occupying areas which they have taken back from IS.

Another key difference is the role of Iran in Iraq. While Washington has excluded Tehran from the US-led international coalition against IS, the Shia-led government in Baghdad relies heavily on Iran in its war against IS. Shia leaders insist that Iran’s role in fighting IS is indispensable.

Bitter as the reality may be, Iran-affiliated militias are doing the most to fight IS militants on the ground in Iraq. Iran is the most important supporter of the Baghdad security forces, providing the Shia-led government with weapons, intelligence and advisors. Propaganda pictures of the commander of Iran’s elite Al-Quds Force and a key player in Iraq, Qassem Suleimani, posing in battle against IS is clear-cut evidence of an Iranian-led coalition in Iraq.

Paradoxically, this means that there are two military alliances now fighting in Iraq, each with different goals and divergent agendas. The question now is not which one has a better chance of succeeding, but simply if the victory over IS will help the pill go down more easily in the Sunni provinces.

There is simply no getting round the fact that when the dust of this war settles, Iraq’s Sunni-dominated provinces will still have the vote.

As the past seven months have shown, the Sunni population has little motivation and many reasons to turn against IS, particularly in the absence of a viable and acceptable alternative.

Most Sunnis do not trust the Shia-led government, and they are sceptical about reaching a genuine power-sharing deal with Shia political groups. Also, the areas under the IS group’s control are predominantly tribal, and increasing social and tribal bickering and hostility is more visible than any unified enmity to IS.

Such a complicated situation also makes it much harder for any force from outside, such as the US-led international coalition, to retake areas from IS, owing to the difficulty of filling the void and forming new alliances with local communities.

On a larger level, Iraq is going through a crisis that is not simply one of a war against terrorism but also of the ethno-sectarian-based regime that the US occupation authority created after the invasion of 2003.

The Shias and Kurds are still haunted by Saddam Hussein and his brutal rule. The Sunnis, on the other hand, have developed a culture of insurgency driven by feelings of alienation in the post-invasion era that ended 80 years of Sunni rule in Iraq and led to the subsequent empowerment of the Shias.

In this political crisis, both the ends and means of the state have become objects of immediate struggle. A situation like this puts all the parties to severe tests of national identity, power and resource sharing, along with leadership and political adaptability.

Therefore, aiming solely at defeating IS, with the ultimate goal of bringing stability to the country, seems not only to be politically naïve but also counterproductive. The Sunni insurgency was of course a necessary condition for the rise of IS, but it was not only the security vacuum that allowed IS to exploit the situation.

Since the US-led invasion, Iraq’s Sunnis have felt excluded and marginalised. A lasting power-sharing agreement between the two Muslim communities has failed to materialise. This is why even if there is a military strategy that will defeat IS, the question remains whether or not Iraq can go back to being a unitary nation when there is no formula for a balanced and sustainable power-sharing.

Today, Iraq is really made up of three enclaves separated by geography and sectarian and ethnic identities. While the Kurds have taken advantage of the IS crisis to consolidate their semi-independent region, the gap between the Shias and Sunnis is growing wider, highlighting the negative trends that have served as a catalyst for the implosion of Arab-dominated Iraq.

Beating IS is unlikely to end this trend. To avoid Iraq’s collapse requires a much larger effort than the government or the outside world have so far pledged. Iraqis have to heal the wounds left by Saddam’s brutal legacy, the sectarian-based system orchestrated by the US occupation, and the blind rage and violence it has triggered.

In recent weeks the government has been talking about national reconciliation. Vice-President Ayad Allawi, entrusted by President Fouad Massoum to coordinate such efforts, announced on 21 December that he had outlined a blueprint for reconciliation, though past reconciliation attempts have failed dismally.

The Iraqis have reached a dead end in resolving their ethnic and sectarian disputes. The only alternative left is to fight a long and costly war that will end with the break-up of their country. But partitioning Iraq is not a solution as it will create three small, weak entities which will end up being annexed by their powerful neighbours or becoming their protectorates.

In a situation like this a historic compromise has to be found in order for all the communities to subdue competing sectarian and ethnic resentments, forestall the escalation of the conflict and fend off a Balkans-like scenario for the country.

It is now up to the Shias to make an offer the Sunnis cannot refuse. The Kurds should stop exploiting the Shia-Sunni divide to advance an independence that will be resisted by Iran and Turkey. The Sunnis should also shelve unrealistic demands and accept a generous autonomy that would link them with the Shias and the Kurds in developing a national identity broad enough to give them equal power in the country.

To help secure the long-term stability of Iraq and reunite its people, such a proposal would need to go beyond the immediate communal and regional agendas. It would have to be a grand bargain for a new Iraq.

This grand bargain would need to be a genuinely historic deal that would allow the rival communities to put their egos aside, abandon their past prejudices and seize the chance not only to save Iraq from IS, but also to preserve their country, one of the oldest in human history, for themselves and future generations.

Iraq-Future

Milestone year in Iraq

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Milestone year in Iraq
Violence and political deadlock exacerbated the chaos in Iraq this year, writes Salah Nasrawi

It has been another hard year for Iraq and it is not over yet. After suffering eleven tough years of political disputes and communal violence, Iraq entered 2014 with a major crisis that later escalated into a total turmoil.
With the country standing on a cross road, as civil war spirals, the question is whether Iraq will be able to cope with more turbulent years and their potential consequences or 2015 will be a decisive year for Iraq and its unity.
Early in the year violence soared when Sunni extremist insurgents seized large parts of Ramadi and Fallujah after government forces dismantled a Sunni Muslim protest camps. The crisis started in December 2012, when tens of thousands of Sunnis began protesting against what they saw as the marginalisation of their sect and demanded equal sharing in power and wealth.
By late December 2013, former Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki was claiming that a protest camp in Ramadi had been turned into the headquarters of the terrorist group the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, as IS was formerly known, and ordered a crackdown. As security forces backed by their Sunni tribesmen allies battled rebels in Ramadi and Fallujah, fighters attempted to take control of many Sunni–populated areas around Baghdad, unleashing a broader Sunni insurgency.
As the Shia-Sunni standoff soared, Kurdish relations with the Baghdad Shia-led government further deteriorated. The political Shia-Kurdish discord worsened after the two sides failed to resolve their lingering disputes over energy resources, budget allotments and territorial ambitions. The year has seen Kurds starting selling their oil independently from Iraq, a move widely considered as a further step toward Kurdish secession from Iraq.
In early 2014, however, Kurdish leaders started talking about breaking away from Iraq if their problems remain unsolved. Kurdistan President Massoud Barzani warned that the Kurds will seek independence if the new relationship with Baghdad does not stand the test of time.
It has long been assumed that the failure of Shia and Sunnis to resolve their disputes would create conditions conducive for Kurds to break away from Iraq. That moment came after IS advance in mid-June and its capture of large swathes of Iraq territories. Kurds swiftly used the conflict and moved to expand their control over areas along their provinces.
The surge in the Sunni insurgency and worsening of Shia-Kurdish disputes deepened the ethnic-sectarian divide a head of a crucial parliamentary election which was scheduled for April.
The indecisive election results plunged the country in another crisis as an alliance headed by Al-Maliki was declared as having received the largest number of seats in the parliament. Kurds, Sunnis and many Shia groups refused to allow Al-Maliki to have a third term in office accusing him of being behind the worsening political ructions and sectarian violence.
When Al-Maliki finally stepped down under pressure, Iraqis pinned their hope on his successor Haider Al-Abadi not only to repair the dysfunctional government of corruption, cronyism and incompetence left over by Al-Maliki but to save Iraq from falling into the abyss.
A dramatic turn of events came in mid-June when the IS terror group and allied Sunni militants captured the northern city of Mosul in a lightening offensive. Soon IS took several other Sunni cities and declared a Caliphate that also included territories in Syria and sought to expand in the Islamic world.
One of the consequences of the IS’s rise and its threat to Baghdad and Shia-populated cities was the resurgence of Shia militia forces which took arms to fight back. Though the militias were reportedly involved in sectarian violations, including abductions and massacres against Sunnis, their role has become formidable in spearheading the fight against IS.
The turbulence, meanwhile, deepened Iraq’s refugee problem as hundred of thousands had to leave their homes following the IS’s onslaught to escape violence and sometimes war crimes. According to the UN refugee agency some 1.9 million have been displaced this year by fighting and the advance of Islamic State, adding to 1 million previously displaced, and 190,000 who have left the country to seek safety.
By any account, 2014 is another turning point year in Iraq’s history since the US invasion in 2003. Indeed, Iraq is unraveling more than three years after the US troop withdrawal, with this year being the country’s most violent since 2006-2007, the peak of the sectarian strife that followed the invasion.
The conflict has also worsened the human right situation in Iraq as the country saw more grave rights violations perpetrated by IS and the Shia militias that have reportedly led to the deaths of thousands of people. More than 10.000 people were believed to have been killed this year in violence across Iraq while thousands others have been killed in fight with IS.
Aided by the US-international coalition, Iraq may eventually defeat IS. But a military campaign may take several years and could be costly. Also, It could do the opposite: prolong the war, guarantee more human suffering, and serve the interests of IS and Shia extremists.
While the cost of the war against IS will be enormous, the most urgent question remains what are the impacts and the consequences of the dramatic events in 2014 on the direction which the country will be heading. Since the US invasion Sunnis have deeply felt excluded and marginalized. The standoff has deepened the schism between the two Muslim communities. This is why even if a sort of military strategy will defeat IS, the question remains whether Iraq will go back again to be a unitary nation.
There is a general consensus that the war against IS will repair nothing and that a political agreement is needed in Iraq; one that will ensure the creation of a new political structure that will replace the hopelessly dysfunctional ethno-sectarian based political system created by the Americans for the post-Saddam era.
Iraq is crumbling not just because violence is playing havoc in the country, but also because there has been no breakthrough in the sectarian deadlock that has paralyzed its government for so long. Iraq is a failed nation and one main reason for its dysfunction is because it is pillaged by its own corrupt and inefficient leadership.
Unless there is a working system that guarantees competence and transparency in the government and inclusion within a just state that will deal with all Iraqis as equal citizens, there will be no peace or stability in the country.
The United States and many in the international community have made getting an Iraqi government that is inclusive and credible as a prerequisite to help Iraq in the war against IS. They have been insisting on a comprehensive national reconciliation that will end the ethno-sectarian divide in order to provide additional assistance to beat back IS.
To help secure long-term stability in Iraq and reunite its people, such a proposal would need to go beyond the immediate communal and regional agendas; indeed, it would have to be a new grand bargain for a new Iraq. The current system based on sharing power between Kurdish, Shia and Sunni elites is increasingly proving to be meaningless, as they continue to produce sectarianism instead of genuine democracy and the rule of the people.
Human history shows that nations emerge from conflicts. Iraqis are no exception and they can face the challenge of reestablishing ethnic and sectarian coexistence after the destructive conflicts that have befallen their country. The question, however, are current Iraqi leaders ready to relinquish self interests and greed for a historic compromise that will allow Iraq to be ruled by all Iraqis.
Iraq is now three enclaves separated by geography, sectarian and ethnic identities. While Kurds have taken advantage of IS crisis to consolidate their semi-independent region, the gap between Shia and Sunnis is ever widening, highlighting the negative trends that serve as a catalyst to the implosion of the Arab-dominated part of Iraq.
In a situation like this where a political vacuum keeps ethno- sectarian divides persist, a process of reconciling the stakeholders around a new balance of power is not enough and a historic compromise has to be made in order change Iraq’s lots and deliver a true national unity and a genuine comprehensive inclusive system.
For Iraq’s civil strife, 2014 was the year when competing communities carried their sectarian and ethnic resentments to a high pitch, but could it be a turning point to subdue their maximalist tendencies and push forward for accommodation.Much will depend on Iraq’s political elites who should give up their violent ethno-sectarian approach to power.