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Iranian pressure on Iraq

Iran appears to be pushing Iraq closer to the rejectionist camp in a new contest for regional power, writes Salah Nasrawi

When the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, many American supporters of the war argued that moving against former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein earlier rather than later would create the conditions for a new and more realistic Middle East peace process.
That grandiose hypothesis never came to pass, and now there is compelling evidence that Tehran, which has been increasing its influence in Iraq following the US withdrawal last year, is pushing its allies in Baghdad’s Shia-led government against Israel, Iran’s arch-enemy.
Iran’s new strategy in Iraq seems to be designed to push Iraq into the rejectionist front that urges permanent hostilities against Israel, in order to replace the tottering regime of President Bashar al-Assad in Syria.
Other members of the camp are the Lebanese Shia Hizbullah group and radical Palestinian factions such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad.
Last week, the visiting Iranian speaker of parliament, Ali Larijani, broke significant new ground in Iran’s ambitions in Iraq. During talks with senior Iraqi officials and top Shia clerics, Larijani emphasised the need for Iraq to back Iran’s bid for regional power.
“Iran and Iraq are among the key influential countries in the region, and they should have unified visions and positions vis-à-vis events in the region,” said Larijani while in Baghdad.
Upon his return to Tehran, Larijani said that all the Shia clerics whom he had met in Iraq “are aware of Tehran’s key role in regional developments, especially in Gaza,” adding that they considered “Iran to be the main cause of the Gazans’ victory over the Zionist regime” during last month’s eight-day Israeli assault on Gaza.
Iraq and Iran fought a war in 1980-1988 that cost the two nations some one million casualties, but Iran tightened its grip on its strife-torn neighbour following the US-led invasion of the country in 2003 by backing Iraq’s Shia political parties, which were sheltered in Iran under Saddam’s regime.
Since the downfall of Saddam’s regime in 2003, Iran and Iraq have enjoyed a good economic relationship. Iran’s exports and investment in Iraq are estimated at $10 billion, second only to Turkey, and reports suggest that the country plans to double its investment in Iraq to $25 billion next year.
Iran’s influence in Iraq also covers political, military, religious and social ties.
Since the American departure last December, Iran has managed to protect its core alliance and increase its standing with Iraq’s Shia political groups, which dominate the government in Baghdad.
In October, Iranian Defence Minister Brigadier-General Ahmed Vahidi said the countries had signed a bilateral defence cooperation agreement.
During his visit to Baghdad, Larijani appeared to be using Iran’s massive influence in Iraq to shape the country’s policies on several key issues, including Israel’s recent war on Gaza, which has been ruled by Hamas since 2007.
Iran is Hamas’s strongest regional ally and the main supplier of weapons to the Palestinian factions.
More than 1,200 rockets believed to be manufactured or shipped by Iran were fired from Gaza during Israel’s war on the Strip last month. The weapons included Fajr-5 rockets believed to have been used by the Palestinians factions to hit Israeli cities during the eight-day war.
Iran prides itself on this missile, described by its media as a two-stage weapon system appropriate for asymmetric wars, such as the one Hamas and Israel fought last month.
Iraqi officials have not publicly commented on the new Iranian resolve to nudge Iraq closer to the rejectionist front in anticipation of the collapse of the Al-Assad regime, but Tehran has received sympathetic hearings from Iraqis in Shia theological institutions and in parliament.
Mohamed Bahr Al-Ulloum, a top cleric in the Najaf theological seminary, last week thanked Iran for what he called its military assistance to the Palestinian resistance groups during the recent Israeli offensive in the Gaza Strip.
Shia lawmaker Jawad Al-Bazouni said “Iran’s Fajr-5 missiles restored the Arabs’ and Muslims’ dignity.”
These statements echoed those of Hizbullah leader Hassan Nasrallah, who urged the Arab states during the war to use all political means possible, including raising oil prices, to end the Israeli attacks on Gaza and suggested that these could be as effective as military action against Israel.
Beyond the rhetoric, however, Iran seems to be making headway. 
At a press conference with Larijani, Iraq’s parliamentary speaker Osama Al-Nujaifi said he was planning a meeting of the heads of parliaments in neighbouring countries in Baghdad soon to address regional issues.
Larijani praised Iraq’s proposal and suggested that regional governments “should take this initiative as an opportunity to solve the Gaza crisis.”
Meanwhile, Al-Nujaifi traveled to Gaza last week taking with him $2 million in cash donated by the Baghdad government to the Palestinians.
His trip came hard on the heels of a visit by Iraq’s foreign minister, Hoshyar Zebari, who headed an Arab delegation to Gaza to show solidarity with the territory.
The head of the pro-government Iraqi Journalists Syndicate, Moaed Al-Lami, also travelled to Gaza, while an Iraqi football team plans to hold a friendly match in the Palestinian territories soon.
Such visits are considered to be landmarks because Iraqi Shia officials have previously shied away from the Palestinians, whom they had previously accused of supporting Saddam and hailing him as a hero.
Of even greater significance is the fact that Iraq has called for the holding of a meeting of the Arab states’ chiefs of staff over the ongoing Gaza violence.
Arab League Secretary-General Nabil Al-Arabi said Iraq had suggested the meeting to “discuss the risks the region is exposed to amid the Israeli aggression on Gaza”.
Ahead of an Arab foreign ministers meeting on the Israeli onslaught on Gaza last month, Iraq’s envoy to the Arab League, Kais Al-Azzawi, announced that Baghdad would invite the Arab states to use oil as a weapon to press for a halt to the Israeli attacks on Gaza.
He later withdrew the remarks, apparently after other Arab governments objected.
Iran has also used its growing influence in Iraq to shape the country’s policies on Syria, including efforts to breathe new life into the struggling Al-Assad regime.
Tehran is Al-Assad’s strongest regional ally, and it stands to lose considerable influence in the region if the regime falls.
Iraq is believed to have allowed Iran to transport arms to Syrian government forces through Iraqi airspace, despite US demands to stem the shipments.
American officials told the New York Timeson Saturday that Iraq continued to allow Iranian aircraft carrying weapons through its airspace to Syria in defiance of the American concerns.
For his part, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki said that his country was unable to search all Syria-bound Iranian planes that fly through Iraqi airspace. Iraqi minister of transportation Hadi Al-Amiri, whose ministry is responsible for the inspections, warned that the goal of the US efforts was “to weaken the armies of Iraq and Syria in line with Israel’s interests”.
Al-Amiri, also secretary-general of the Badr Organisation, a pro-Iran Shia militia, cautioned that “a serious and clandestine plot is underway to weaken and target the two armies of Syria and Iraq.”
One reason for Iran to step up its pressure on Iraq to join its crumbling rejectionist club appears to be the rapid and drastic changes in Middle East geopolitics triggered by the Arab Spring.
In the latest conflict in Gaza, Iran watched warily as the new Islamist president of Egypt, Mohamed Morsi, reaped the returns of long-term investments in Hamas.
Iran believes that while Morsi is taking advantage of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to improve his Islamist movement’s standing with the United States and become a major Middle East player, it is losing influence among the militant Palestinian factions and probably its long-standing alliances with them.
In the absence of the Al-Assad regime in Syria, Iran hopes that Iraq’s predominantly Shia government will be a new key Arab ally in the region.
Unfortunately for Iran, its endeavour to push beleaguered Iraq into the Israel-Palestine conflict doesn’t make sense. Furthermore, in a new Middle East shaped by the Arab Spring old-style political gambits are becoming increasingly irrelevant.
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Widening divisions in Iraq

The Iraqi Kurds and the country’s Shia-led government have postponed their fight over disputed areas, but the divide is sharpening, writes Salah Nasrawi

The political divide in Iraq is widening as Kurdish leaders continue their criticism of Shia Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki despite efforts to defuse tensions following a military stand-off along the frontier with the Kurdish provinces in northern Iraq.
The row underscores a bitter falling-out between the Kurds and the Shias whose political coalition has been in power since the removal of the Sunni-led regime of former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein in the US-led invasion in 2003.
Tensions between Baghdad and the autonomous Kurdistan region in northern Iraq have risen after Al-Maliki formed a new military command covering disputed territories in September in order to address the deterioration in security in the areas, which have been the scene of terrorist attacks in recent months.
Last week, the Kurdish region sent reinforcements to these areas, where its troops are involved in a stand-off with the Iraqi army and security forces. Kurdish military commanders later said that their Peshmerga military forces were fully prepared to defend the region against any assault by government troops.
On Monday, senior military officials from both sides reached a preliminary agreement to pull back their forces to their “previous positions” and “reactivate joint security committees for coordination in the disputed areas.”
A statement from the office of Al-Maliki, who is also the commander-in-chief of the Iraqi armed forces, said the two sides had agreed to “start pacifying the situation.”
The deal was brokered by Iraq’s parliamentary speaker Osama Al-Nujaifi after talks with Kurdish President Massoud Barzani on Friday. Washington has also reportedly intervened to end the stand-off and ease tensions, with news agencies reporting that Monday’s meeting was attended by Lieutenant-General Robert Caslen, head of the US military mission in Baghdad.
The agreement was probably good enough to de-escalate the stand-off, but it has left open the future of the Dijla Operations Command that triggered the dispute over the areas the Kurdish region wants to incorporate over the strong objections of Baghdad.
These areas, larger in size than the three provinces of Kurdistan and including the oil-rich province of Kirkuk, have been policed by Kurdish security forces since the US invaded Iraq.
Hours before the agreement was signed in Baghdad, Nechirvan Barzani, premier of the Kurdistan Regional Government, said the Kurds would not accept any solution that placed Kurdish security forces in Kirkuk under the new command.
Other Kurdish leaders were even more sanguine, with Kurdish President Jalal Talabani reprimanding the commander of Iraq’s ground forces, General Ali Ghaidan, for sending troops to the disputed areas.
Kurdish news outlet Rudaw quoted a senior Kurdish official on Monday as saying that Talabani had threatened Ghaidan, also commander-in-chief of the Dijla Operations Command, to be put on trial if he did not withdraw the Iraqi troops from the disputed areas immediately.
Also on Monday, Barzani was quoted by Al-Jazeera.net as saying that Kurdistan would win any war with Baghdad, if one ever broke out. Al-Jazeera said that Barzani had also accused Al-Maliki of planning to invade Kurdistan.
“Al-Maliki’s expiry date has come, and it is impossible to work with him any longer,” Al-Jazeera.net reported. “He is procrastinating, outmaneuvering and violating all the agreements,” Barzani added. “He says something and then does the opposite.”
Another Kurdish leader said that the Peshmergas would “fight in defence of their gains and the experiment of the region of Kurdistan. The people of Kurdistan will never be subjected again to the mercy of dictatorship and chauvinism,” Braham Saleh told a gathering in Kurdistan on Monday.
The latest flare-up began last week when Iraqi troops clashed with Kurdish soldiers belonging to Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan Party (PUK) in Tuz Khurmato some 150km south of Erbil, the Kurdish provincial capital.
The clashes left one civilian dead and several wounded, including two PUK fighters and 13 Iraqi security men.
Following the skirmishes, Barzani urged Iraqi Kurds to be prepared for “any unwanted eventualities”. Soon afterwards, Kurdish troops and tanks were dispatched to the disputed areas.
Kurdish military officials said the reinforcements would hold their positions unless Iraqi forces made a move. Mahmoud Sankawi, a Peshmerga military commander, said his troops were prepared to confront those he described as “occupying forces”.
The reinforcements and the rhetoric prompted Al-Maliki’s office to warn the Peshmergas “not to change their positions or approach the [federal] armed forces.”
The Iraqi army and the Peshmergas have previously come close to military confrontation, only to pull back after reaching an understanding through intermediaries.
In August, Washington intervened to help end a stand-off between Iraqi troops and Kurdish forces that were on the verge of a confrontation over policing the border with Syria.
The Kurds charge that the Dijla Operations Command is a threat to them and an attempt by Al-Maliki to seize control of the disputed territories.
For his part, Al-Maliki says the command is necessary to keep law and order in three of Iraq’s most volatile provinces, Diyala, Kirkuk and Salaheddin, which border Kurdistan.
However, the conflict illustrates how far relations between the old allies have deteriorated, testing Iraq’s federal union nearly a year after the US withdrawal.
Relations between the country’s Kurds and Shias have also worsened over other long-running disputes. Tensions rose after Al-Maliki started showing signs of wanting to expand his power base, and a row erupted in December after Iraqi Vice President Tarek Al-Hashemi fled Baghdad for the autonomous Kurdish region, in order to avoid prosecution at the hands of the Shia-led central government on charges of terrorism and running death squads.
Iraqi Kurdistan has signed oil deals with major multinational companies that the Baghdad authorities have described as illegal, and trouble seems to be brewing again about Iraq’s so-called “disputed territories”.
Earlier this year, Barzani described Al-Maliki as a “dictator” and demanded that he be removed from power. Shia leaders have also sparred aggressively with Barzani, with one of Al-Maliki’s closest aides accusing the Kurdish leader of being a “a real danger” to Iraq.
Yassin Majid also said that Barzani “wants Erbil to hold a political role at the expense of Baghdad”.
On Saturday, Barzani turned down an invitation from Shia cleric Muqtada Al-Sadr to meet with Al-Maliki to discuss the situation. In a statement posted on the Kurdistan Regional Government’s website, Barzani’s spokesman said he had refused because the matter was not personal, but rather a result of Al-Maliki’s “constant lack of commitment to the constitution”.
The political crisis and military stand-off have thrust the Kurdish-Shia alliance into the light of the day and in doing so has deeply unsettled much of Iraq. If the conflict is not handled carefully, there is the potential for clashes between the military forces under the two’s command.
“The Kurdish-Shia alliance is a lie. There was such an alliance during the opposition against Saddam, but it ended with the downfall of his regime,” said Sami Al-Askari, a senior member of Al-Maliki’s Daawa Party.
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                              في الصميم
                       تحليلات ومتابعات
               هل نرى العراق قريبا دولة ممانعة؟
                                                        صلاح النصراوي
البدابة كانت الاسبوع الماضي حين زارها وزير الخارجية هوشيار زيباري ثم تلاه رئيس مجلس النواب اسامة النجيفي ولحقهم بعد ذلك في غضون ايام نقيب الصحفيين مؤيد اللامي…المسؤولون العراقيون بدؤا يصلون الى غزة الفلسطينية تباعا ويصلون معها حبال ود انقطعت منذ زمن بعد ان اعتبروا اهل القطاع مؤيدين لنظام صدام حسين ضد النظام الجديد.
والسؤال هو مالذي حصل وجعل المسؤولين العراقيين يتذكرون غزة ومعاناة اهلها فجأة ..هذا طبعا بغض النظر عن التبرير المعلن وهو التضامن مع غزة بعد الاعتداءات الاسرائيلية الاخيرة.
زيارة رئيس مجلس الشورى الإيراني علي لاريجاني الحالية للعراق والمباحثات التي يجريها مع المسؤولين العراقيين توفر بعض الاجابات عن هذا التساؤل بشأن التغير المفاجئ في السلوك العراقي تجاه غزة.
في بغداد اعلن لاريجاني ان جزءاً من مباحثاته مع المسؤولين العراقيين يتركز على سعي بلاده الى الاتفاق مع العراق على دعم المقاومة الفلسطينية، وهو مايعني بلغة الايرانيين اكبر طرف في تيار الممانعة، منظمتي حماس والجهاد الاسلامي.
لاريجاني اعلن ايضا بعد ان اعرب عن سعادته “مما جرى في غزة من قصم ظهر اسرائيل” بانه اتفق مع زميله رئيس البرلمان العراقي اسامة النجيفي على “التنسيق مع اتحادات البرلمانات الاسيوية والاسلامية من اجل دعم القضية الفلسطينية.”
وتابع لاريجاني في كشف المستور بقوله “هنالك جهد من قبل العراق وايران لتطويق وحل الازمات في المنطقة”، مضيفا أن “المستقبل سيشهد انعقاد اجتماع في بغداد لرؤساء البرلمانات العربية والاسلامية.”
ومضى لاريجاني بالقول “إن العراق وإيران من الدول الكبيرة في المنطقة ولهما تأثيرهما، ولا بد من توحيد الرؤى والمواقف إزاء ما يحدث في المنطقة.”
النائب عن التحالف الوطني الشيعي جواد البزوني كان اكثر وضوحا حين صرح بان  “صواريخ “فجر” الايرانية التي قدمتها إيران الى فصائل المقاومة الفلسطينية “اعادت الهيبة للامة العربية والاسلامية تجاه العدو الاسرائيلي، وليس لفلسطين فقط.”
وقال البزوني في تصريح نقلتها عنه وكالة انباء فارس الايرانية الاربعاء ان “تلك الصواريخ اعادت للامة هيبتها واثبتت انه لا توجد قبة حديدية مثلما يزعم العدو الاسرائيلي”، داعيا الى ان تستثمر تلك القوة وان يكون هناك دعم للفصائل الفلسطينية من اجل حفظ التوازن.
ودعا البزوني الى “دعم المقاومة ضد الكيان الاسرائيلي على طول الحدود ليس فقط في فلسطين بل في لبنان وسوريا.“
تحليل هذه التحركات والتصريحات يصب في اتجاه واحد وهو مسعى العراق لتوثيق علاقاته مع غزة حماس.والسؤال لماذا يفعل العراق ذلك الان وفي هذه المرحلة التي تفقد ايران شيئا فشيئا حلبفها الرئيسي في جبهة الممانعة.
طبيعي ان يكون السؤال هو هل تحاول طهران ان تستبدل بغداد بدمشق كبوابة عربية في الجبهة التي نساها الناس منذ ثورات الربيع العربي العام الماضي؟ والسؤال الاهم هو هل بغداد مؤهلة لذلك؟

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Genocide and the Kurds

Iraq’s Kurds want the world to recognise the mass murders their community suffered under the former Saddam regime as genocide, writes Salah Nasrawi
Nearly 25 years after the gassing of Kurds in Iraq‘s northern town of Halabja, Iraqi Kurds have begun a worldwide campaign for the massacre of their people during Saddam Hussein’s era to be formally recognised as genocide.

The move comes as tension rises between the semi-autonomous Kurdistan Region of Iraq and the central Baghdad government amid speculation that Iraq’s fragile ethnic federation could be in trouble and signs of increasing Kurdish frustration with the union.

A delegation from the Kurdistan Regional Government started a visit to the UN headquarters in New York this week in a bid to solicit support from UN member states to its request.
Kurds around the world have also started a campaign to press governments and parliaments to do the same.
The campaign hopes that official recognition will be the first step towards the UN bringing formal charges against individuals at international tribunals. It could also heighten Kurdish nationalism and give the Kurds a shot at fulfilling their dream of getting international recognition for an independent Kurdistan.  
The Kurds accuse the former Saddam regime of using chemical weapons against them in the 1980s in an attempt to put down Kurdish demands for autonomy within Iraq.
In the most notorious attack, they say, regime warplanes dropped chemical bombs on the town of Halabja in March 1988, killing some 5,000 men, women and children.
Some 715 victims of the attack are believed to be still alive, many of them suffering from serious aliments, including cancer.
Campaigners also say that many other innocent people were murdered as part of a sustained campaign to wipe out Kurdish villages in Iraq in 1987 and 1988 near the end of the eight-year Iran-Iraq War.
There is an agreement that hundreds of thousands of Kurds died in the decade-long conflict, during which the Kurds were fighting the Iraqi army for self-rule. Some Kurds were deported from their villages, and others were sent as far as southern Iraq.
After the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, Saddam was convicted of crimes against humanity and other crimes during the 1987-88 crackdown on the Kurds. However, he was not tried on charges of genocide.
Article 2 of the 1948 UN Convention on Genocide describes it as the carrying out of acts intended “to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group”.
Many legal experts believe that genocide may be hard to prove under this definition because there must be an intention to destroy a particular group.
Last year, in a non-binding decision the Iraqi parliament recognised the killings in Halabja as genocide, but the atrocity has not been recognised as such by the Baghdad government. The Kurds are now considering going to Iraq’s supreme court to obtain this recognition.
The dispute about whether the killings in Halabja were genocide centres on the question of whether they were systematic, premeditated and orchestrated.
The Kurds believe they were, but a number of Iraqi and foreign observers have questioned this assertion.
Even now, few people know what happened in Halabja on 16 March 1988. Some key elements of the events remain disputed, but what is known for certain is that Halabja, a small town of a few thousand people on the Iranian border, was bombarded with poison gas.
No one is in a position to answer with any certainty the multiple questions about all the circumstances surrounding the tragedy.
A US government report suggested that it might have been Iran, and not Iraq, that carried out the killings in Halabja.
The United States Defense Intelligence Agency investigated the allegations immediately after the event and produced a classified report that asserted that it was Iranian gas that killed the Kurds.
The agency said that each side had used gas against the other in the battle around Halabja. However, the condition of the dead Kurds’ bodies indicated that they had been killed with a cyanide-based gas, which Iran was known to use, according to the report.
The Iraqis, who are thought to have used mustard gas in battle, are not known to have possessed cyanide agents at the time, the report concluded.
However, the Kurds and their supporters in the media blamed this conclusion on the then Reagan administration in the US’s indifference and its attempts to get closer to Saddam, then seen as a friend of the United States.
They say that the agency report allowed the Saddam regime to use the US statements to deflect criticism against it.
Critics also say that a UN team that investigated the claims also failed to pursue evidence of Iraqi chemical weapons attacks on Kurdish refugees that it saw during a visit to a town in Iranian Kurdistan, claiming that the issue was not within the mission’s terms of reference.
Observers also differ on the circumstances that led to the battle of Halabja and the role of the Kurdish peshmergas fighters in the tragic episode.
Officials from the former Saddam regime have always said that Kurdish fighters belonging to Jalal Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan Party led Iranian Revolutionary Guards into the town, putting the Kurds’ lives in danger since the town was facing an imminent Iraqi counteroffensive.
A closer look at events during this chapter of the Iran-Iraq war reveals an Iranian role in the tragedy of Halabja, since as the War wound down in 1988 the Iranian military unleashed a major offensive on the northern front, trying to take territory and build up a bridgehead inside Iraq for further infiltration inside Kurdistan.
The present writer was in the northern war zone in the days before the attack on Halabja, while covering the battles for the Associated Press.
In interviews with commanders of Iraqi army units based in the Sharazour Valley near Halabja only two days before the gassing in the town, mention was made of an imminent Iranian offensive to capture the Valley, which opens onto Suleimaniya, Kurdistan’s second-largest city.
According to these commanders, the other major goal of the Iranian offensive, codenamed Wa Al-Fajr-10, was to capture the strategic hydro-electric dam of Darbandikhan, the main source of electricity for Baghdad, just south of Halabja.
In a report filed from Darbandikhan on 14 March, 1988, several Kurdish civilians were quoted as saying that they had been injured by Iranian chemical weapons in attacks on their villages on the border with Iran.
Jafer Barazanchi, the then regional governor who now lives in Kurdistan, said that a “mass evacuation” of Darbandikhan’s population was being considered out of fears of a further Iranian thrust deeper inside Iraq.
The Iranians seized Halabja on 15 March, and the development was serious enough to prompt Iraqi officers to remove journalists from the battlefield.
No news was heard about Halabja until a few days later, when Iran flew a group of Western reporters already in Tehran to the site to show them hundreds of dead bodies in Halabja’s deserted streets that it said had been left by Iraq’s use of poison gas against the town.
There has been no Iraqi government response to the Kurds’ demands for recognition of the Halabja gassing as genocide, and the country’s Shia-led government may be reluctant to support an effort that may lead to the finger being pointed at its allies in Shia Iran.
However, Saddam loyalists have launched their own campaign to discredit the Kurdish bid and deny that the Iraqi army carried out the atrocities.
Several former Saddam regime officials have written to deny the charges and blame Iran for the atrocities. They include Jafar Dhia Jafar, head of Saddam’s nuclear programme, General Hossam Mohamed Amin, a senior official in Saddam’s weapons programme, and Ambassador Muafak Jassim Al-Anni, in charge of the US desk at Saddam’s Foreign Ministry.
No country has yet formally recognised the killing of the Iraqi Kurds in 1988 as genocide, and it is unlikely that the UN or other international organisations or countries will do so, at least for now.
The Kurds seem to think that recognition of genocide may provide them with an opportunity to advance their national ambitions and put these on the international agenda.
While many Iraqis assent to the Kurds’ right for the atrocities to be condemned and fully exposed, others argue that investigating what happened in the Kurdish region during the former regime will open further wounds and should be left to historians.
However, a proper and thorough investigation of the atrocities may be needed in order to prevent any recurrence and to deny impunity to those that carried them out.
In the case of Halabja, it is vitally important to determine not only who the real perpetrators of the massacres were, but also who supplied them with the weapons to carry them out.

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                                                     صفوة القول (15)
                                     مختارات من اراء وقضايا                 

                                           قمة الرياض في مواجهة حرائق المنطقة
                    
                                                                                           صلاح النصراوي
نشرت في جريدة الحياة 2007-3-15
ليت بإمكان القمة العربية المقبلة المقررة أواخر هذا الشهر في الرياض ان ترتقي فعلاً، كما تأمل الشعوب العربية، جميعا الى طموحاتها، وتستطيع أن تنجز ما عجزت عنه القمم العربية السابقة، في التصدي الى معضلتين أساسيتين طالما واجهتهما منظومة العمل العربي المشترك وخصوصاً خلال الستين عاما الاخيرة، وهما مواجهة التحديات الخارجية والتصدي للأزمات الداخلية. بعض هذه التمنيات تعود الى ميزة المكان الذي ستعقد فيه القمة والدور المتوقع ان تلعبه المملكة العربية السعودية بحكم الدور التقليدي البارز الذي تلعبه في السياسة العربية، بينما يعود البعض الآخر الى مناخ اليأس الذي يسود المنطقة بسبب الاوضاع والتحديات التي تواجهها والرغبة بالتشبث بالأمل التي ستظل تراود الشعوب العربية في هذه المرحلة العصيبة التي تعيشها دولها ومجتمعاتها.
غير أننا إذا اردنا فعلاً ان نرسم توقعات معقولة، بحكم الضرورة والتجربة التي نعيشها منذ اول مؤتمر قمة عربي عام 1964، لا بد ان نتريث قليلا وننزل من سقف التمنيات الى ارض الواقع المر، لنتبين ما الذي يمكن ان تنجزه هذه القمة بينما المنظومة العربية تمر بإحدى اكثر المراحل خطورة في تاريخها. هذا يتطلب أولاً عدم تحميل القمة، وخصوصا في رمزها المكاني، أي دولتها المضيفة، اكثر مما تحتمل، في ظروف يدرك الجميع، ليس فقط شدة صعوبتها، بل ايضاً، مسؤولية اطراف عربية اخرى، عما وصلت اليه الامور في عالمنا العربي من ترد، ومسؤوليتها ايضا عن العمل الجدي للخروج من هذه الحالة. كما يتطلب، ثانياً، الاقرار بأن القمم العربية منذ اطلاقها لم تكن سوى منبر لصوغ خطاب تعبوي او اتخاذ مواقف متواضعة الانجاز، تجاه معضلات كبرى واجهت العالم العربي في مراحل معينة، وليست آلية صلبة ترتكز على رؤية استراتيجية بعيدة المدى، للتحديات القديمة والمستجدة التي يواجهها هذا العالم.
والواقع ان هذه القمة ربما تكون الاولى التي يواجه فيها العالم العربي جملة من القضايا والمشكلات والازمات الداخلية والخارجية المتشابكة والمترابطة، بطريقة لم يواجهها العرب عبر تاريخهم الحديث، مما يضيف الى حجم التحدي الذي عليها مواجهته لتفكيك هذه الازمات، والتي لم تعد تواجه الدول والحكومات فقط، بل اخذت تنحو منحى مجتمعيا داخل النسيج الشعبي العربي، الذي بقي متماسكا الى حد كبير خلال كل النكبات والنكسات التي مرت، واصبحت الآن تهدد كيانه بمخاطر الفتنة والتفتيت. فنظرة الى حزمة القضايا الرئيسية التي ستتبوأ جدول اعمال القمة ستوضح، ليس فقط الى اي مدى أصبح العالم العربي غارقا في الازمات، بل الى حقيقة ان هذه الازمات تحورت تماما، مثلما يتحور اي فيروس مرضي، وأخذت تهدد بالاستيطان داخل حجرات البيت العربي ذاته.
إن أي نظرة الى القضايا الكبرى التي تواجهها المنطقة، بدءاً من الصراع العربي – الاسرائيلي، ومروراً بالأزمتين العراقية واللبنانية، وانتهاء بشبح امتلاك ايران لسلاح نووي وطموحات فرض هيمنتها على المنطقة، تؤكد ليس فقط الارتباط الاقليمي البنيوي المستجد الذي أصبح يربط بين هذه القضايا، ولكن ايضاً امتداداتها السلبية سواء بشكل مباشر، أم عبر تفرعاتها وتجلياتها، وخصوصاً السياسية والايديولوجية والطائفية، الى داخل المجتمعات العربية نفسها، ما يزيد من عبء مواجهة كل من هذه القضايا، سواء من خلال حصرها في نطاقها الضيق، او باعتبارها تحديات خارجية مفروضة تواجه المنظومة العربية برمتها، وليس ركناً من أركانها فقط.
كما أن نظرة الى طبيعة الازمات في فلسطين ولبنان والعراق تبين ان الصراع لم يعد مع قوى الاحتلال والهيمنة الخارجية فقط، بل تدنى الى صراعات بين القوى المحلية والعربية والاقليمية، قالباً معادلات التناقضات التقليدية في المنطقة، ومبرزا الثانوي منها على الرئيسي، حتى اخذ ينحدر شيئاً فشيئاً، الى مستوى شديد الفئوية والطائفية. فالصراعات الحمساوية – الفتحاوية في فلسطين وصراع الموالاة والمعارضة في لبنان انضمت الى حرب الطوائف الدامية في العراق، باعتبارها تعبيرا فاضحا عن الصراع على السلطة وعلى القرار الوطني، بعد أن كان المفترض فيها ان تبقي على الصراع كونه كفاحا من اجل التحرر والاستقلال وتأكيد الذات الوطنية. واذا كانت كل هذه الازمات أخذت مداها السياسي والاعلامي المدوي، فإن المعارك الدامية بين الحكومة اليمنية والحوثيين هي دليل آخر على نوع الصراعات الكامنة في المنطقة التي يمكن ان تخرج عن السيطرة وتتحول الى بؤرة اخرى من بؤر التوتر الطائفي فيها.
ولم يقتصر الأمر على ذلك بل إن هذه الصراعات اتسعت واضحت الآن تتميز ببعدين في منتهى الخطورة، اذا لم يسارع الى تجاوزهما، الاول هو البُعد المذهبي سواء كان مكشوفاً ام مستتراً، والثاني، امتداد التدخلات عبر الحدود، سواء لاسباب مذهبية او سياسية او مصالح جيوستراتيجية. واذا كانت هذه التدخلات تتجلى في اوضح صورها في العراق، حيث لم يعد بالامكان اخفاء الاستقطاب الحاد الذي يعكسه الاقتتال الطائفي الشيعي – السني هناك على مجمل اوضاع المنطقة، فإن الوضع اللبناني ايضا كشف بدوره عن درجة معينة من هذا الاستقطاب، لا بد أن يتسع إذا فشلت الجهود الرامية لحل الازمة اللبنانية. وبدورها فضحت الأزمة الداخلية الفلسطينية مدى عمق التأثير الخارجي المتعدد الاقطاب، لا على مسار عملية السلام مع اسرائيل فحسب بل على الوضع الفلسطيني ذاته الذي أصبح منذ فوز «حماس» في الانتخابات الاخيرة رهينة التجاذبات الاقليمية ورهانات قواها النافذة.
هناك عامل مشترك يجمع بين كل هذه الازمات الكبرى في المنطقة، وهو ايران، والذي اذا اضفنا اليه ازمة ملفها النووي، فإنها تشكل الهاجس الاكبر الذي على المنطقة برمتها، وليس المنظومة العربية وحدها، مواجهته بطريقة خلاقة توازن بين حاجات الاستقرار والامن الاقليمي، وبين المصالح الوطنية والقومية لدولها، وكذلك الهوية الاسلامية لمجتمعاتها، التي شكلت بوتقتها الثقافية والحضارية على مدى أربعة عشر قرناً. وما يضفي على الهاجس الايراني ابعادا اكثر درامية، المخاطر المحدقة بالمنطقة جراء الاحتمالات الجدية القائمة بشن الولايات المتحدة او اسرائيل ضربات، او حرباً محدودة ضد ايران، الأمر الذي سيضع العرب أمام تفاعلات سياسية وامنية تمس صميم نسيجهم الديني والثقافي والاجتماعي، ربما تفوق في مداها خبرة منظومتهم السياسية وتجاربها على مقاومتها، او حتى الصمود امام رياحها الراعدة.
واذا كانت ايران، سواء من خلال مواقفها السياسية المعلنة، او نفوذها او امتداداتها، هي اللاعب البارز في معظم ملفات المنطقة الآن، فإن السؤال هو كيف ستستطيع القمة العربية بلورة موقف عربي موحد لمواجهة هذا التحدي الجديد، بمنطق ومنهج وتصورات ورؤى، توقف أي امكانية لتحول الهواجس من ايران وطموحها في أن تتحول الى قوة اقليمية، الى صراعات داخل البيت العربي. هناك حاجة أساسية لاستراتيجية عربية تقوم على مسارين أساسيين أولهما التعامل مع ايران بمنطق الدولة التي لديها مصالح واهداف قومية ترنو الى تحقيقها، وليس بمنطق هويتها المذهبية الشيعية. هذا المسار ليس ضرورياً لعزل ايران عن التوترات المذهبية في المنطقة وكبح جماح تعاظمها وتحولها الى عامل تغير جيوبولتيكي، بل الاهم من ذلك، لتأكيد الهوية الوطنية للشيعة العرب وانتمائهم الى بلدانهم كجزء من نسيج مجتمعاتهم الوطنية.
أما المسار الثاني فيقتضي تفكيك ملفات الأزمات الكبرى التي تواجهها المنطقة بطريقة تحد من ربطها، بعضها بالبعض الآخر، ومن وجود ايران كقاسم مشترك بينها.
ما نجده اليوم هو غياب هذه الرؤية الاستراتيجية العربية تجاه إيران والهواجس التي تقوم حول ادوارها في ملفات الأزمات العربية، ووجود هذه الاستراتيجية سيبقى المعيار الذي يحدد نتائج القمة الحالية. وهذا يتطلب أولاً: اقناع ايران بضرورة قيام علاقات ومصالح على اسس من الشراكة والجوار والاحترام المتبادل، وثانياً: الحذر من الوقوع في شرك الفخاخ التي تنصب لكل من ايران والعرب من قبل قوى خارجية يهمها نشر الفوضى في المنطقة لاهدافها الخاصة، وثالثا: عدم الاكتفاء برد الفعل او ترك زمام الأمور للطائفيين والمتشددين الذين لا يقفون امام طموحات ايران، بقدر ما يمنحونها من أوراق اضافية ضاغطة، بسبب ما يذكونه من التعصب ونيران الاحقاد المذهبية.
قمة الرياض التي تعقد والحرائق تشب، او تكاد، في العديد من اجزاء المنطقة حولها، قد لا تأتي بالعصا السحرية التي تطفئ نيرانها بطرفة عين، لكنها تبقى بالتأكيد مؤهلة كي تضع لبنات بناء الجدار الذي يواجه العاصفة التي تحاول ان تذريها الى أجزاء اخرى.