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Iraq-Iran-Militias

More than just IS

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This article appeared in Al Ahram Weekly on April 2, 2015.The paper went to print before the Iraqi military started its operation to root out IS militants from Tikrit in collaboration with the Shia militias. The participation of the militias highlights the challenges to the overall campaign against IS and US-Iranian competition in Iraq which the article aimed to pinpoint.

More than just IS

 As Baghdad prepares to retake Mosul from Islamic State forces, Tehran and Washington seem to be locked in a race for prestige in Iraq, writes Salah Nasrawi

 On 25 March, US bombers launched their first airstrikes against Islamic State (IS) targets in Tikrit, coming off the sidelines to help Iraqi government forces fighting to retake control of the city from the terrorist group.

US president Barack Obama approved the bombardment after a request from Iraqi prime minister Haider al-Abadi on the condition that Iranian-backed Shia militias that have been fighting alongside the Baghdad government troops move aside.

But the US decision to give air support to the Tikrit offensive, the biggest collaboration so far by the US-led coalition with the anti-IS campaign in Iraq, could define the US role in Iraq for years to come and shape its regional struggle with Iran.

The Americans stayed away from the Tikrit campaign when it started four weeks ago, largely because the United States has been refusing to take part in the operation which was launched without consultation with Washington. They insisted that they could only help if the operations were coordinated by the joint Iraqi-US military centre in Baghdad.

Prior to the Tikrit campaign, US officials leaked reports to the American media about the Iraqi military operation in Tikrit, saying that it had no clear targets. The reports also stirred doubts about whether government forces could beat the IS militants in street battles.

Though the Iraqi forces have regained a string of towns and villages near Tikrit from IS, the leaks also claimed that Iraqi short-term tactical victories would not be enough to defeat the group.

A main US criticism of the Tikrit campaign was its heavy reliance on the Shia militias. The latter’s track record of sectarian violence was highlighted in the American media with warnings that their involvement in more offensives threatened to drive more Iraqi Sunnis into the arms of IS.

It may be no coincidence that several human rights groups also released critical reports about abuses by the Shia militias during the Tikrit offensive. Most of these reports highlighted what they termed “violations of the laws of war” against Sunnis in the wake of the IS retreat from the towns.

These and other media reports carried disgruntled messages to al-Abadi, who is also commander-in-chief of the Iraqi armed forces, from Washington which has been leading an international coalition against IS since the terror group made stunning advance in northern Iraq last June.

Al-Abadi has also been under pressure from Brett McGurk, deputy leader of the US-led coalition, and Stuart E. Jones, the US ambassador to Iraq, who have been meeting with him regularly to press him to request coalition airstrikes and sidestep the Shia militias.

But when al-Abadi showed reluctance to heed the US warnings, knowing that he cannot tear up the Iraqi rule book without the green light from Iran, US officials went public to make their point about the offensives.

General Martin Dempsey, the chairman of the US joint chiefs of staff, told lawmakers on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the operation to reclaim Tikrit was dominated by 20,000 Shia militia forces, which far outnumbered the 3,000 Iraqi troops also taking part in the assault.

Dempsey expressed concern about what might happen after the Shia militia forces took control of the Sunni-dominated city. The Obama administration has been pushing al-Abadi to form a Sunni National Guard to police their areas after the IS withdrawal.

After a recent trip to Iraq, Dempsey said he had seen a “plethora of flags” while flying over the country, but only one official flag of Iraq.

Iran showed its anger over the US joining forces with Iraq in the fight for Tikrit and in forcing the Iran-backed militias to stand down. The Iranians have orchestrated their own propaganda effort to discredit the US-led coalition in the anti-IS campaign.

On Monday, Iran’s Revolutionary Guard said a US drone strike had killed two of its advisers in Iraq. Iran’s controlled media outlets have been reporting airstrikes by coalition warplanes against Iraqi troop positions. Some of these outlets have been selling blown-up reports about the US maintaining networks of supply lines with the terror group.

The United States and Iran have been in stiff competition since Iraq started its campaign against the jihadists who seized huge swathes of land in Iraq in the summer of last year. Iraqi Shia militia leaders have been saying that they intend to deprive Washington of victory and “glory” in Iraq.

But the political match seems to be more than a contest between Iran and the United States over who is taking ownership of the war against IS. Instead, it seems to be a power play over Iraq and even the Middle East as a whole.

For now, efforts to drive IS fighters from Tikrit have entered their second month. While most Iranian-backed Shia armed groups have boycotted the offensives in protest against the US-led airstrikes, Iraq’s military has proved to be ill-prepared to drive the militants back.

That could have a big impact on the liberation of the remaining territories from IS insurgents, especially Iraq’s second-largest city of Mosul. In February, US Central Command officials disclosed that the battle for Mosul would likely begin in April or May.

Yet, the disagreements over the militias’ role may have far-reaching consequences for Iraq’s fragile government. Al-Abadi seems to be caught in a US and Iranian double-pincer that could not only cost him his job but also the country’s stability.

Since the militias were ordered to step aside, relations between al-Abadi and their leaders have sunk very low, and some of them have even accused the prime minister of hampering the liberation of Tikrit by capitulating to the American conditions.

Others have accused al-Abdi of “selling off” the Shias to the Americans.

On Monday, Hadi al-Amri, a key leader of the Popular Mobilisation Forces, the name given to the militias, warned that his fighters “will not fire a single bullet” unless the US airstrikes stop.

This is a vital moment for al-Abadi, and it provides his government with possibly its greatest challenge since it was formed in August last year. While the row has brought al-Abadi to the brink of a conflict with the Shia militias, any caving in to the militias will be disturbing to the Iraqi Sunnis and the Americans.

Sunni leaders in Mosul have insisted that the liberation of their city should be carried out without involvement by Iran or the Shia militias except Iraqi volunteers and forces from the Iraqi army.

Tribes in Anbar, another Sunni-dominated province awaiting liberation from IS, have also resisted the participation of the Shia militias in the operations.

Meanwhile, Washington has intensified pressure on al-Abadi’s serving as the putative defender and protector of the Iraqi Sunnis.

On Sunday, US vice-president Joe Biden called al-Abadi to remind him of the importance of “the protection of civilians and of ensuring all armed groups act under the control of the state.”

According to a White House statement, Biden reiterated Washington’s demand that the Iraqi government enable fighters from Sunni provinces to participate in reclaiming their own territory from IS.

Washington is expected to increase the pressure ahead of a visit to the White House by al-Abadi in mid-April to discuss US military cooperation with Iraq in the joint fight against IS.

Moreover, the Tikrit offensive and the widely expected campaign to retake Mosul could have an impact on wider regional conflicts involving Iran with the Sunni Arab world, if Shia militias resume their participation in the anti-IS campaign.

Sunni Arab nations led by Saudi Arabia accuse Iran of fuelling the conflict in a number of countries across the Middle East, including Iraq.

The Mosul operation is specifically sensitive to neighbouring Turkey, a largely Sunni populated nation which maintains close ties to Iraqi Sunnis.

While Turkey is concerned about Iran’s role, many in the country emphasise historical affiliations with Mosul going back to the Ottoman occupation of Iraq.

Twelve years after the US-led invasion that turned Iraq into a playground for terrorists and foreign forces, the bickering over the war against IS is not about defeating the terror group as much as it is about regional power.

Arab-Politics

Caught up in Iraq

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Caught up in Iraq

Can Saudi Arabia stop Iran in Iraq, asks Salah Nasrawi

“Iran is taking over Iraq,” Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al-Faisal decried last week while slamming Iran’s “hegemonistic tendencies in the region.”  “We see Iran involved in Syria and Lebanon and Yemen and Iraq and God knows where. This must stop if Iran is to be part of the solution of the region and not part of the problem.”

The blunt words by the usually reserved Saudi top diplomat made waves with its most scathing criticism for Iran’s support to Iraq‘s Shia-led government and raised a host of difficult questions about the kingdom’s strategy in dealing with the region’s simmering crises.

Prince Saud broke no new ground on Saudi doctrine on Iraq. Since the overthrow of the Sunni-dominated Saddam Hussein’s regime in the 2003 US-led war Saudi Arabia has viewed Iraq as falling under Iran’s influence and remained reluctant to establish full diplomatic and political ties with the Shia-led government in Baghdad.

But Prince Saud strongly-worded remarks reflect the Sunni Arab powerhouse’s anxiety over Shia Persian Iran’s close and increasing involvement in the sectarian-divided and war-torn country.

Since the stunning territorial victory of the militants in June and their seizure of nearly one third of Iraq’s territories, Iran has escalated its role in Iraq, especially in building the Shia militias. It has mobilised its elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to build a massive and effective Iraqi Shia paramilitary force through funding, training and weapon supplies.

Iranian commanders are also spearheading the Iraqi attacks on the IS-held towns, providing tactical expertise to Iraqis. Major-General Qassim Soleimani, commander of the elite Quds Force, the IGRC’s special operations arm, is directly overseeing the offensives against IS.

Echoing fear of sectarian reprisals during operations to drive IS’s militants out of Sunni towns, Prince Saud had referred to the ongoing offensive in the Sunni-populated Tikrit as an example of the overt Iranian involvement in Iraq.

A combination of some 30,000 Iraqi security forces and the Shia Popular Mobilisation Units launched an offensive to retake Tikrit from the terror group this week. Tikrit, the hometown of former President Saddam Hussein, is viewed as a key foothold for a widely expected assault on Mosul, the IS’s self-declared capital.

Members of Iran-backed Shia militias who are part of the Popular Mobilisation Units have been accused of abuses against civilians in areas Iraqi forces have retaken from Islamic State. Human rights groups also are fearful the campaign in Tikrit could lead to atrocities.

Perhaps the most worrying sign to Saudi Arabia about Iran’s influence in Iraq remains rhetoric by Iranian leaders which reflect Tehran’s ambitions in Iraq.

On Sunday, Ali Younesi, a senior advisor to Iranian President Hassan Rouhani boasted that Iraq has already become part of Iran.

“Iran today has become an empire as it was throughout history and its capital now is Baghdad in Iraq, which is the center of our civilization and our culture and identity today as it was in the past.”

Right now Iran is only helping Iraqis in battling IS. Still, Saudi leaders are wondering how much influence will Iran have in Iraq if the militants are evicted from all of the country and if this cozy relationship between the two countries is anything to be concerned about.

In short, Saudi Arabia believes that by increasing its control over Shia communities in Iraq and the region and through the persistent expansion of its influence, Iran is pursuing a power politics of the national interest. This has created enormous problems to Saudi Arabia which finds its leadership role in the Muslim Sunni world is being challenged by Iran.

In order to confront Iran, Saudi Arabia has tried a four-pronged approach to influence events in Iraq, without much success.

First, Saudi Arabia believes that empowerment of Iraqi Sunni Arabs is key to not only to put an end to their exclusion following Saddam’s ouster but also to resist Iranian influence in Iraq.

Saudi Arabia has largely relied on its traditional checkbook diplomacy to cement close connections with Iraqi Sunni tribes and political and religious figures to bolster their capacity politically and financially.

However, despite its generous support no viable and credible Iraqi Sunni leadership has emerged. Until the Sunni minority develops a united voice and platform to engage with Shia majority, Saudi Arabia will find it difficult to effectively push for meaningful change in Iranian pro-Shia policy in the country.

Moreover, accusations that Saudi Arabia’s policy somehow plays a role in supporting jihadi-style extremism has undermined the kingdom’s ability in advancing the Iraqi Sunni’s interests.

Second, Riyadh had resorted to oil as a weapon to have more latitude over Iran and the Shia-led government in Iraq. As the world’s largest oil exporter, Saudi Arabia can threaten the Iranian and Iraqi economies if it chooses to keep production high and prices low.

One way to do that is to continue its hands-off policy toward falling oil prices to screw its arch enemies in the region, the Iranians and the Iraqi Shia government.

But while the lower oil prices have harmed Iran’s and Iraq’s economic short term prospects their governments have worked hard to repair the damage caused by falling revenues.

Still, there is no doubt that Iran will continue military and political backing of its Iraqi Shia allies in the confrontation with IS even if it has to grapple with economic difficulties caused by oil prices’ slump.

Indeed, Tehran is showing no signs of battle fatigue and it is probably ahead of the game in clash with Saudi Arabia over other regional disputes, such as Lebanon, Syria and Yemen.

Third, Saudi Arabia has been trying to block a possible rapprochement between Iran and the United States following a potential nuclear deal with Iran. Knowing that the deal is neither directly nor exclusively about the nuclear issue Riyadh has been seeking assurance from Washington that there will be no “grand bargain” with Iran.

Here again Riyadh’s choices seems to be limited. Although the Obama administration tried to ease the kingdom’s concerns about a “comprehensive” deal with Iran, a nuclear agreement now seems more likely.

The United States also does not seem to see to eye to eye with Saudi Arabia about Iran’s role in Iraq. Last week top US general Martin Dempsey said Iran’s involvement in the fight against IS in Iraq could be “a positive step”, as long as the situation does not descend into sectarianism.

The military chief also claimed that almost two thirds of the 30,000 offensive were Iranian-backed militiamen, meaning that without Iranian assistance and Soleimani’s guidance, the offensive on IS-held towns may not have been possible.

Finally, Saudi Arabia has been trying to build a broad regional Sunni bloc to curtail Iran’s and Shia’s rising influence. A great deal of this Saudi effort is to engage largely Sunni-populated Turkey in shaping this bipolar regional sectarian system.

Nevertheless, such an alliance will have vast implications on the regional balance of power and has the potential to reshape relationships throughout the Middle East. Turkey which has succeeded in staying away from regional sectarian polarization may find it counterproductive to be part of a Sunni bloc against its powerful eastern neighbour and the entire Shia world.

As many Turkish commentators wrote following a visit by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to Riyadh last month an anti-Iran or anti-Shia front will only escalate sectarian tensions in the region and has no benefit for Turkey and any other country.

In addition, such an alliance will put Ankara’s key strategic interests such the Kurdish issue and its relations with its vast Allawite minority at risks.

Any assessment of Iran’s role in Iraq since Saddam’s downfall will show that Tehran has exploited Iraq’s 12 year old conflict to weaken the country and create outcomes that are likely to give it leverage over its Sunni neighbors and deprive them of strategic advantages and create new sources of threat.

Yet, Saudi Arabia and other Iraq’s Sunni neighbours have equally failed to come up with a viable plan to stop Iraq’s ethno sectarian conflict staying on a steady boil to threaten regional stability.

Unfortunately, the prospect of sectarian rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia is expected to escalate, with sources of tension evident across the region. Nowhere this competition for power and influence is more evident than in Iraq which is expected to bear most of its devastating consequences.

This article first published in Al Ahram Weekly on March 12, 2015