How 9/11 changed the Arab world

How 9/11 changed the Arab world

Twenty years after the 11 September, the tragedy has wide-ranging geopolitical and humanitarian impacts on the Arab world, writes Salah Nasrawi.

Two decades ago at the beginning of the 21th century, the Arab world looked at a crossroad facing huge challenges and perspectives. The region was moving forward cautiously a decade after the Gulf war to remove Saddam Hussein’s forces from Kuwait and the signing of the Palestinian-Israeli peace agreement.

The new modus operandi had provided a degree of stability that so many had hoped would allow the Middle East to enter a new era of peace, stability, cooperation that could ensure a flourishing future for its people.

Yet, suddenly the lots of the Arab region had dramatically altered as the world watched on 11 September smoke billowing from the collapsed twin towers in New York and from the Pentagon in Washington by terrorist attacks swallowing almost 3000 lives in an instant and changing the world as we knew it.

The Bush administration had thrust of American power into the light of the day, and unleashed its global war on terrorism and with it invaded Afghanistan and Iraq and in doing so it deeply unsettled much of the world put particularly the Arab World, the geopolitical center of the Middle East.

While US leaders blamed the fateful 9/11 attacks on the al-Qaeda terror group and its leader Osama bin Laden, not Muslims in general, rhetoric, reactions and some political trends stoked Islamophobia and anti-Arabism.

Nowhere was that evident than in the Arab world where American power manifested by US counterterrorism strategies were mismanaged in the 11 September aftermath, creating new security, political, and social problems whose impact can be felt even today.

When faced with decisions to respond to the scourge which American commentators were quick to compare it to a new “Pearl Harbour”, President George W. Bush vowed that the United States “will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbour them” in the war he declared on terrorism.

As it became clear that nineteen hijackers of the commercial airlines and carried out the attacks on New York and  Washington came from Arab countries and acted under orders from bin Laden’s al-Qaeda group, it became evident the US relationships with the Arab and Muslim world seemed fated to change radically and permanently.

Driven by anti-Muslims hysteria, fight against terrorism has become the defining issue first for the US administration and then by Western governments. Anger and furry triggered by the 11 September attacks soon became the norms in how the United States and Europe engaged the Arab world.

From intense scrutiny and distrust that was unleashed after the attacks, visa restrictions, headscarves bans, abuse of “ostensible” religious Muslim symbols to physical assaults on Muslims, a toxic environment have prevailed ever since for Arabs in the United States and the West in general.

This discriminatory backlash shaped by the events of 9/11 and their aftermath had created multilayered unease in America’s political and cultural relationships with Arabs that deepened the mutual misunderstanding wrought by the traditional misguided and hostile US foreign policy choices in the Middle East.

Though the war on al-Qaeda which was made US top priority was meant to eradicate Islamic Jihad threats in the way that stopping Communism once was the Western grand strategy, the crusade has utterly failed as a more powerful terror terrorist organization the self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS) with worldwide appeal soon emerged.  

Despite twenty years of military actions by the United States and its international partners aimed at stamping out terrorism that have exacted major tolls on al-Qaeda and IS, the two groups have been able to adapt and expand in too many hot spots and put their violent extremism into action.

Perhaps the worst manifestations in the “war on terror” was the two wars that the Bush administration waged in Afghanistan and Iraq which resulted in dramatic geopolitical and humanitarian impacts that continued to have ripple effects across the region.

Less than a month after 11 September, 2001 US troops invaded Afghanistan in an attempt to dismantle al-Qaeda, the terrorist group that claimed responsibility for the attacks and remove the radical Taliban government harbouring it.

The Afghan war which came to an end last month was America’s longest war and one of US worst foreign policy gambles. Its death toll in Afghan national military and police amounted to 66,000 in addition to 47,245 Afghan civilians and 51,191 Taliban and other opposition fighters. Millions of Afghans were either war refugees abroad or internally displaced.

The financial cost of the war in Afghanistan was over $2 trillion, nearly $300 million a day according to some modest estimates while the violence continued to destroy lives and induced breakdown of security, public health, security, and infrastructure.

America’s stunning retreat from Afghanistan was widely seen as strategic miscalculation that has sweeping implications. The hasty withdrawal did not only affect Afghanistan but constituted a major defeat which dismayed key US allies and allowed US main global adversaries, China and Russia to seek reaping advantages.

Closer to the Arab world, the invasion of Iraq and the overthrow of Saddam regime in 2003 was more catastrophic when the occupation of an Arab powerhouse ended in a series of failures and epidemics of violence effecting much of the region more than Iraq and unleashing a perfect storm of political and sectarian conflicts.

 The United States and a coalition of allies invaded Iraq vowing to destroy Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and cut al-Qaeda’s links with Saddam’s regime which the Bush administration alleged dating back to the early 1990s, and was based on a common interest in confronting the United States. 

The Bush administration claimed that overthrew of Saddam would bring peace, prosperity and democracy into Iraq but the declared objectives for invading Iraq soon proved illusory and ever since, violence, civil warfare and economic pitfalls have wracked the country. Hundreds of thousands of innocent people were dead and wounded and millions others have been displaced and enormous resources have been squandered.

As a violent insurgency arose, Iraq laid in wreak wasted by terrorism which later hatched IS, a monster of Islamic extremism which managed to seize large swathes of Iraq for a while and expanded into a network of supporters in several countries with affiliates increasingly carried out attacks across the region and in Europe.

The group has re-established its clandestine intelligence network in parts of Iraq after it was kicked out of major cities and towns in 2017 and resumed conducting lethal attacks against government forces, village chieftains, and targets like oil pipelines and electricity grids.

The Iraq invasion also set off the chain of turbulent events in the region that led to empowerment of anti-regimes activists who triggered the Arab Spring nearly ten years later. It also had indirect connections to Iran’s growing influence in the region and allowed the Islamic Republic to expand its power and achieve its strategic objectives.

Fast-forward two decades, and the picture in many parts of the region doesn’t look very different. While terrorist groups are either active or lurking in hubs, extremism has not abated since 9/11 and is still posing ideological and security threats to the region.

The chaotic and humiliating US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the dramatic comeback of the Taliban is a likely boost to Islamic radicalism in the Arab world and could increase dangers of  terrorist groups proliferated in ways unimagined in 2001.

The 11 September attacks gave the United States an opening for a crusade conducted through sheer power, arrogance and vengeance. The Arab region, apart from the rest of the world, will continue to experience this blowback from the US-led international war on terrorism well into the near future.

Published in Al Ahram Weekly, 9/92021

What could the US-Iraq talks yield?

There are doubts and questions swirling on all fronts as US and Iraqi officials brace for talks to charter a new course, writes Salah Nasrawi

Next week the world will watch Iraqi and US officials meeting in Washington to hammer out agreements on how for the two countries going forward as Iraq is mired in political chaos and the Trump administration remains at a dangerous crossroad in the Middle East.

There have been plenty of speculations about the talks, their goals, and the purposes and the interests they serve. Questions also have been raised on whether adequate preparations have been made for the meeting.

The talks which have been dubbed a “strategic dialogue” is scheduled for mid-June and the future of the US military presence in Iraq is expected to top high on the table with an official agenda has yet to be worked out.

US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo who broke the news of the dialogue on 7 April said the talks were a US proposal and will cover “all strategic issues between our two countries.” He said that will also include “how best to support an independent and sovereign Iraq.”

Iraq’s former Foreign Minister, Mohammed Ali al-Hakim said his office had received a letter from the State Department “suggesting procedures for negotiations based on the concepts in the Strategic Framework agreement.”

Iraq’s new Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi discussed briefly the upcoming negotiations with Pompeo but his office disclosed no details about their brief telephone conversation following his endorsement by the parliament on 6 May.

While it is still hard to know exactly the possible approaches each sides will be taking to address the increasingly hard issues in the Iraqi-US relations, the talks will likely provide a perspective for the possible trajectory of their future ties.

Reading into Pompeo’s remarks and a statement by the US embassy in Baghdad, Washington seems to be setting a sort of guidelines for a strategic US-Iraqi partnership placed on a stable and long-term footing.

Under such a perspective, Washington is probably looking for a framework for its relations with Baghdad which is capable of maintaining the current level of cooperation and preserving a functional order for the future.

Moving beyond press-release diplomacy, however, multiple questions remain about how the Trump Administration can resolve serious issues that have been bedeviling US-Iraqi relationships and move the ball forward.

For a starter, the United States has to face up to Iran, the active regional power in Iraq after years of US policy failure which has turned the Islamic Republic to a key player in the country’s affairs and a Middle East powerhouse.

A major win for the United States in the upcoming talks will have to come directly from its efforts to apply concerted diplomatic, economic, and military pressure to constrain Iran and its allies in Iraq.

Washington should assume that this would be part of its “Maximum pressure” on Iran and that America’s confrontational posture is diminishing Iran’s influence in Iraq and would help to empower the anti-Iran forces and US Iraqi allies.

But in order to achieve that goal Washington should have a clear, comprehensive and functional strategy in Iraq in addition to another grand strategy in the Middle East and concrete plans to implement them.

Apart from lacking a viable strategy, miscalculations and political blunder by successive US administrations have created a geopolitical void in Iraq and the region that helped Iran’s influence to surge.

A critical first step towards creating some form of lasting US-Iraqi relationship is to help Iraq get back on its feet, a mission the United States has failed to fulfill after its invasion of the country in 2003.

American ME pundits have been making proposals to the administration with regard to the upcoming talks which focus primarily on the size of the US troops in Iraq which American negotiators should discuss with their Iraqi counterparts.

The discussions among the league of US Iraq’s experts is whether Washington should keep the same level of the combat assistance mission in Iraq, or maintain a small force of military advisers to help train and develop Iraqi military capabilities.

Yet, for the United States to help Iraq defend itself it should retake the responsibility it has abandoned in helping Iraqis rebuilding their state and their nation fractured by its own invasion and mishandling of its occupation of Iraq.

If Washington is keen to have a constructive “strategic dialogue” with Iraq it should start with engaging in state and nation-building efforts in Iraq, an obligation it has long ignored in favour of the “no strategy” and “non-decision” the successive US administrations have adopted in Iraq.

The upcoming talks should, therefore, focus on forging a stable strategic partnership — one that will not center on countering threats from extremism and Iran but helping Iraqis to fix the failed state that has become a breeding ground for terrorism and Iran’s intervention. 

A US approach in the talks should start with a new playbook for bilateral relations that seeks to upgrade the Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA) which was intended to shape “the legal, economic, cultural and security relations between the two countries.”

The 2008 agreement which states that the US should work to “support and strengthen Iraq’s democracy and its democratic institutions and enhance Iraq’s capabilities” suffers from both clarity gaps and mechanism on how to be put things in action.

For Pompeo’s words that the dialogue is to show “how best to support an independent and sovereign Iraq” to be meaningful, Washington should now seek a new assertive and reliable framework for this new phase of Iraqi-US relationships cohered into the outlines of a longer-term strategic cooperation.

For Iraq’s part, it is a time of choosing – continue to be a playground for regional tension, conflicts, international powers’ ambitions and terrorism or open a new chapter of opportunity to achieve stability and sovereignty? 

The “strategic dialogue” with Washington could be a rare opportunity for Iraq to break free from this vicious circle of Iran’s hegemony and effectively establish a solid position for itself in the world’s geostrategic environment and promote its own national interests.

Thus far, indecision has reigned in the Iraqi leadership, which is paralysed by inefficiency, corruption, political and sectarian divisions and competitive foreign and regional influences.

The core question for Iraqi policy-makers at this juncture is whether Baghdad should ask Washington to withdraw its troops from Iraq or seek to keep the troops in until Islamic State (IS) is completely defeated on the battlefield.

Iraqis are sharply divided on this issue which is expected to top the talks’ agenda with the internet ablaze with rumours, chatter and speculations about a US withdrawal, limited withdrawal or no withdrawal and the implications for both sides.

In January, the Iraqi parliament voted to remove US troops from Iraq. Some 168 members of 328-assembly endorsed a resolution submitted by Iran-backed Shia groups which specifically calls for expelling the US troops from Iraq.  

Most Sunni and Kurdish lawmakers boycotted the session, which was held two days after the killing of General Qassem Soleimni, head of Iran’s Quds force in Baghdad by a US airstrike.

Sunni and Kurdish political leaders have repeatedly made it clear that they don’t want the US troops to leave for fear that Iran will fill vacuum and Iraq could be dragged down to chaos.

Adel Abdul-Mahdi, Iraq’s caretaker prime minister at the time, said his government will work to implement parliament’s resolution. He also said that if US troops remains then they will be considered an occupying force.

Tehran-backed militias which have frequently attacked US interests in Iraq in the past also vowed to target some 5.550 US forces which they are believed to be in Iraq if they stay.

While al-Kahdimi’s government has yet to make its mind about its security needs from the US troops, it has also to tackle the accumulation of problems left by the former government as well as other challenges that emerged thereafter.

With coronavirus pandemic raging and plummeting oil revenues threatening Iraq’s economic collapse, its leadership will likely need help from outside sources to fix the country’s economic and financial woes.

In addition to direct assistance from Washington, Iraqi leaders realize that US support is essential for getting help from these sources such as the World Bank, Gulf Arab states, the European Union and the United Nations to confront its systemic difficulties.

More specifically, the Iraqi leadership needs a comprehensive strategy based on a careful assessment of both its needs and the US intents and purposes to negotiate a new deal with Washington that will guarantee Iraq’s rebuilding, a commitment overlooked by successive US administrations since 2003.

So far, the shallow rhetoric from both sides about the talks have little to show for this effort that it would successfully put Iraq on a pathway to peace, stability and prosperity?

How Baghdad and Washington resolve such a dilemma remains unclear while there’s little political and diplomatic infrastructure being adequately prepared for what may come from their “strategic dialogue.”

END

Analysis & views from the Middle East