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War against terrorism”: The Jordanian option

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War against terrorism”: The Jordanian option
With months of airstrikes failing to dislodge Islamic State forces in Iraq and Syria, the focus is shifting to Jordan in the war against terrorism by  Salah Nasrawi 
Since the seizure of key Sunni-populated cities by jihadist insurgents and their declaration of an Islamic caliphate in the region last year, much of Iraq has been in flames with dire consequences for the conflict-riven nation, its neighbours and the world.

The Iraqi military, Shia militias, Sunni tribes and Kurdish forces have been trying to drive back the Islamic State (IS) forces but with modest success as most of the territories the group has captured remain under militant control.

Though the insurgency could break the country apart, neither Iraqi nor the US-led international coalition helping in the war against IS seems eager to say when the long-awaited all-out war to eject IS will be set in motion.

Since mid-June, when IS captured Mosul, Iraq’s third-largest city, and made startling advances into other Sunni cities, the areas have been the scene of intense back-and-forth fighting with the Islamic State.

At this point, the fight seems largely aimed to contain the resilient insurgency inside the Sunni-populated areas with little evidence that the liberation of Mosul as well as Tikrit and Fallujah is on the list of urgent priorities of Iraq’s Shia-led government or the Kurdish authorities and the international coalition.

Seen from this perspective, all the parties involved in the fight against IS seem either ill-prepared or unwilling to finish the job of defeating the terror group and are instead resorting to unexplained delaying tactics.

Iraq’s Shia-led government has secured Baghdad and Shia-populated areas by relying heavily on Iranian-backed Shia militias. Shia prime minister Haider al-Abadi has made it clear that he does not want “to go into a war in Mosul in which the aftermath will be unknown.”

On the other hand, Kurdish Peshmerga forces have pushed back IS fighters and are now holding their ground and digging in along a new border line drawn up after seizing large swathes of land following the chaos triggered by the rise of IS.

Kurdistan Region president Massoud Barzani, who has repeatedly pledged to seek a referendum on Kurdish independence from the rest of Iraq, has described the new frontier as being “demarcated in blood.”

As for helping in liberating Mosul, Barzani told the London-based Al-Hayat newspaper that this “will depend on the degree of preparedness of the Iraqi army. Any advances by our troops from their current positions will require [our] consideration in advance,” he said.

Iraq’s Sunnis, supposed to be the main component in any strategy to defeat IS, are also divided between those loyal to the militant group and those supporting the government. Thousands of Sunni tribesmen are willing to hit back against the militants, but many are not fully on board.

The US-led coalition meanwhile continues to pound IS positions with airstrikes, but with no plans to send in combat troops to fight the group on the ground. US president Barack Obama has described his slow response in Iraq as part of his newly declared “strategic patience” strategy in the region.

In Syria, where the terror group has also occupied large chunks of territory, efforts to push IS back are foundering, and the group is reportedly making important gains despite its bitter defeat in the town of Kobani.

If any conclusion can be drawn from this messy situation, it is that there is no comprehensive strategy to wipe out IS and that even if the militants are defeated or simply degraded there are no concrete ideas on how to reintegrate Sunnis back into the old states of Iraq and Syria.

This is more evident in Iraq as attempts to take back the territories captured by IS and the Kurdish Peshmergas will test the willingness of all the parties concerned to save Iraq as a unitary state.

With the crisis in Iraq and Syria now becoming more serious and threatening the countries’ neighbours and the world at large, the debate is being redirected towards the possibility of sending in combat troops to fight IS.

One argument that is widely being used is that the Iraqi security forces are not prepared to push back IS and therefore that foreign troops may be needed to respond to the threat.

But as the United States continues to dither about how to respond, ideas about the possibility of a regional ground force have started to arise after the brutal murder of a Jordanian pilot by jihadists earlier this month.

The gruesome killing of a Jordanian pilot at the hands of Islamic State militants has unleashed a wave of speculation about an increasing military role for Jordan in the war against IS.

Following the execution of Muath al-Kassasbeh, Jordanian officials have said the kingdom will go after IS militants wherever they are and plans to “wipe them out completely.”

“The blood of martyr Ma’ath al-Kassasbeh will not be in vain and the response of Jordan and its army after what happened to our dear son will be severe,” Jordanian king Abdullah said in a statement. “We will hit them in their strongholds and centres.”

Since the immolation of the pilot, Jordan has stepped up its air force assaults on militant positions, including strikes on militant strongholds inside Iraq.

Jordan’s combative response has prompted some international law experts to speculate that the kingdom’s military actions following the murder of the pilot are probably being conducted beyond the needs of individual self-defence and with a view to a calculation of broader proportionality that in practice means moving towards playing a more robust role in the war.

Though Jordan has not confirmed it is ready to send in ground forces to fight IS, the cry for revenge and such interpretations of the kingdom’s intensified airstrikes have shifted the focus to Jordan.

Some Jordanian officials have already given signals of a possible ground engagement with IS. “We are upping the ante. We’re going after them wherever they are with everything that we have. But it’s not the beginning, and it’s certainly not the end,” Jordan’s foreign minister Nasser Judeh told CNN.

The possibility of an increasing Jordanian role in the war was also raised by US envoy John Allen, who told the official Jordanian news agency on Sunday that “there will be a major counter-offensive on the ground in Iraq in the weeks ahead.”

He said “the coalition will provide major firepower associated with that.”

However, the speculation about a greater Jordanian role comes amid talk that the crisis in Iraq and Syria may continue for some time. Some such signs are coming from western leaders, suggesting that the fight against IS could take years.

British prime minister David Cameron told MailOnline, a news Website, last week that the threat posed by the “disease” of Islamist extremism would last for a generation. Former British ambassador to Saudi Arabia Sir John Jenkins, who retired earlier this year, told the UK newspaper the Daily Telegraph that the instability caused by IS could last from 10 to 15 years.

Whispering about an expanded Jordanian role in the Iraqi and Syrian crises has been in circulation for a while. What is significant about the idea is that it comes amid the turmoil that is wracking the region and threatens many of its countries with remapping.

On 30 November, the Lebanese National News Agency quoted Hassan Nasrallah, leader of the Shia Hezbollah Party, as saying that Jordan may become part of a plan to create “a Sunni region” by taking over parts of Iraq and Syria that are now populated by Sunnis.

Nasrallah warned that Jordan could later annex the territories before the new country was turned into “an alternative Palestinian state,” an old notion promoted by some radical Israeli politicians who want to transfer Palestinians in the West Bank to Jordan in a plan known as the Jordanian Option.

US senator Lindsey Graham has been quoted as saying that “Jordan is now ready to send ground forces into Iraq and Syria” to try to destroy IS. Graham made his remarks before a meeting with king Abdullah before IS announced the murder of al-Kassasbeh.

He said Saudi Arabia and other Arab nations were also on board.

On the surface, the new Jordanian angle looks like another Middle East cloak-and-dagger game, but the question remains of how far the volatile kingdom is ready to go with such a precarious policy at a time when its neighbours are threatened with Balkanisation.

It is not news that Jordan has been under pressure from the United States and other partners in the international coalition to open its borders for military activities against IS in Iraq and Syria. King Abdullah has resisted the pressure for fear that such interference could be destabilising to his kingdom.

Given Jordan’s geopolitical and demographical realities, such a gross manifestation of interference in two of Jordan’s strategic neighbours would present a complicated challenge to the regional order.

Jordan’s army is too small for such an undertaking alone.

Despite the cries for revenge that followed the pilot’s murder, a large proportion of Jordan’s population is believed to be opposed to Amman’s participation in the US-led air campaign in Iraq and Syria.

A bigger military role against the militants could ignite more voices of dissent, especially among the Islamist bloc.

Worst of all, both Iraq’s Shia-led government and the regime of president Bashar al-Assad in Syria have categorically rejected outside help in battling IS militants.

On Monday, Syrian foreign minister Walid al-Moallem said Damascus would not accept Jordanian or other foreign ground troops crossing into Syria to fight Islamic State. Any such incursion would be considered a violation of Syrian sovereignty, he said.

*Salah Nasrawi is an Iraqi journalist based in Cairo.

*This story was first published at Al-Ahram Weekly on  Thursday 12 Feb 2015

 

Iraq-Corruption

Iraq tightens its belt

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Iraq tightens its belt

The people of Iraq will face severe hardships under the country’s new austerity budget, writes Salah Nasrawi

With oil prices plummeting and the economy squeezed by inefficiency and corruption, Iraq’s parliament has approved a belt-tightening budget. The step is widely seen as having significant ramifications for the country’s volatile domestic politics and the war against the Islamic State (IS) terror group.

Iraq’s 328-member House of Representatives endorsed the country’s 2015 budget last week. The budget approval followed weeks of squabbles over cuts, allocations and what oil price the government should base the budget’s projected revenues on.

The lawmakers approved a cut of nearly three per cent in spending, bringing the total expenditure in the budget to $99.6 billion, down from the $102.5 billion the cabinet had initially proposed in the draft.

Before sending the bill to parliament for ratification, ministers warned that this would be an austerity budget, slashing the country’s bloated public sector and freeing up funds for military spending as Iraqi forces battle IS.

Iraq’s government had originally forecast a $125 billion budget for 2105, but faced with still-falling prices for its oil exports it was forced to slash this by some 20 per cent.

The new budget is based on a price of $56 for a barrel of crude, lowered from $70 and then $60 a barrel in earlier drafts. The expected budget deficit will still be around $19.1 to $21.1 billion, however.

One of the main hurdles that delayed the budget’s endorsement were objections from some Shia members to an oil-export deal struck in December between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government.The Shia MPs said the deal would unfairly benefit the Kurdistan Region at the expense of the Shia-populated oil-producing provinces in the south.

Sunni lawmakers also threatened to boycott the vote because the budget did not include funding provisions for a national guard, a new security force to be set up to fight IS and police Sunni-populated provinces.

Many lawmakers also objected to the oil price assumption in the budget, saying it was unrealistic as market prices had slipped below $50 a barrel with no concrete indications that they would rebound in the foreseeable future.

The reduction in oil prices is expected to strangle Iraq’s economy at a time when the country needs a boost in resources to cement its fractured national unity and sustain the war against terrorism.

While the government said it would not cut salaries or pensions, other reductions in the lavish spending of oil money, such as generous allowances, travel and office expenses, were announced.

But the bulk of the funds to cover the deficit will come from taxation, borrowing and withdrawals from the country’s reserves, estimated at $75 billion. While the Central Bank is expected to provide funds from its reserves, the government said it would also issue bonds in foreign currencies.

Under the provisions of the budget the government will be able to meet part of the deficit by introducing new taxes, levies and duties. Obligatory saving accounts are also to be opened for senior government officials to deposit part of their salaries.

Since the fall of the regime of former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein in the US-led invasion in 2003 Iraq’s parliament has had difficulty passing annual budgets in regular order. Wrangling over budgetary allotments are routine, and last-minute deals usually come at the expense of a solid fiscal plan.

Worse still, Iraqi governments throughout this period have failed to present their final revenue and expenditure accounts for review and endorsement before passing the next annual budget.

Last year, parliament was unable to approve the state budget because of a dispute between the central government and the autonomous Kurdistan Region over independent oil exports from the region.

The crisis allowed former prime ministerNuri Al-Maliki to use budget advances and emergency provisions, circumventing the checks and balances enshrined in the constitution to ensure limits imposed by parliament are respected.

As a result, billions of dollars in unchecked spending are now unaccounted for. Lawmakers have said that Iraq’s state coffers were nearly empty when the government of Prime Minister HaidarAl-Abadi took office in August. Iraq’s economy has been hard hit by decades of war, international sanctions and inefficiency.

But the country’s current economic ills are largely due to the abysmal economic policies of post-Saddam governments. Instead of working to rebuild the economy and sustain growth in basic sectors, they relied heavily on oil revenues to bankroll the budget.

Though Iraq is the second-largest producer of crude oil in OPEC, the oilproducers’ organisation, the country’s economy is in a shambles due largely to mismanagement, poor public spending and rampant corruption.Some 70 per cent of the budget has been going to pay for food imports, energy subsidies and funding an inflated bureaucracy and ramshackle armed forces.

Government policies are mainly responsible for the decline in productive sectors.Agriculture has been neglected, and less than 15 per cent of the country’s total area is now being cultivated. The agricultural sector, which used to employ one third of the work force, now accounts for less than four per cent of the country’s GDP.

The manufacturing, construction and electricity industries are in tatters and account for only eight per cent of national wealth. Thousands of state-owned industries andsubsidised factories have shut down because of a lack of electricity and poor maintenance.

Iraq’s banking system is largely dysfunctional, and without an overhaul, analysts say, the economy has little hope of competing with its oil-rich neighbours. Iraq has failed to invest in sovereign wealth funds, unlike oil-exporting countries in the Gulf, whose investments are now being used to cover budget deficits and public spending.

Corruption comes at the top of the reasons behind the depletion of Iraq’s coffers. According to some lawmakers, some $750 billion has been lost in corruption, waste and inefficiencies over the last ten years.Though Al-Abadi promised to combat corruption in his policy statement to parliament when he took office, there have been no signs that his government has taken concrete steps to bring corrupt officials to account or recover stolen money.

One day before the parliament passed the 2015 budget, a report by the World Bank warned that Iraq faces “a crisis which will have important implications for the welfare of its people.”The report said that about 20 per cent of Iraq’s population lived below the poverty line in 2012 and a significant portion of the Iraqi people was vulnerable to falling into poverty.

It said “poverty declined only modestly” since 2012 and “deep deprivations in non-monetary dimensions persisted.”The report painted a grim picture of Iraq before the current crisis. It said close to half the population had less than primary level education and almost a third of children aged up to five years old were stunted.

The report said over 90 per cent of households in Baghdad and the central and southern provinces received less than eight hours of electricity a day, a third of men and 90 per cent of women aged 15 to 64 were neither employed nor looking for work, and more than 60 per cent of the calories consumed by the poor came from a nationwide food subsidy programme.

“Addressing this crisis will take time and concerted effort,” the report said.

Looking forward, there are real concerns that the new belt-tightening budget will have serious impacts on the lives of most Iraqis. Moreover, there are concerns that the combination of falling oil prices and the austerity measures will have adverse implications for the country’s stability and hurt efforts to fight IS extremists.

This article appeared first in Al Ahram Weekly on Feb.5, 2015

ما بعد التجربة

After Abdullah

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After Abdullah

King Abdullah’s successor has pledged to make ‘continuity’ in the oil-rich kingdom a priority,  writes Salah Nasrawi

“I beg the Almighty God to help me to serve you and to bestow security and stability on our country and nation and to protect them from any harm and evil,” declared Saudi Arabia’s new monarch, King Salman bin Abdel-Aziz, in his first address to his people following his accession to the throne of the world’s largest oil exporter.

In the few hours before the new king received the crown and made his televised inauguration speech, Salman, 80, hurried to put Saudi Arabia’s royal house in order by swiftly defining the line of succession following the death of his half-brother King Abdullah, 91, on Friday.

While the move suggested that Salman was trying to show that he is in charge, it reflected the growing anxiety about the kingdom’s biggest dynastic challenge since it was established by Abdullah and Salman’s father, Abdel-Aziz Al-Saud, in 1932.

By upholding a decision by Abdullah to name his youngest half-brother Mugrin, 69, as crown prince and by appointing nephew Mohamed bin Nayef, 55, as deputy crown prince, Salman has tried to quell speculation about internal power struggles within the royal circle.

Abdullah named Mugrin as Salman’s successor in 2013, in what was an unprecedented move in Saudi leadership turnover. Under Saudi law, the Allegiance Council — a committee made up of of the most senior Al-Saud princes, set up by Abdullah in 2006 — is in charge of appointing the future king and ensuring a smooth succession.

Still, it was the designation of Mohamed as heir to the heir apparent that raised more eyebrows and shifted the focus to internal palace rifts in Riyadh’s precarious power transfer and its implications for both the kingdom and the region.

Speculation was high that the appointment of Mugrin was designed to pave the way for Abdullah’s eldest son, Prince Mitab, to become a crown prince after Mugrin. Abdullah was believed to have been grooming Mitab and his appointment to minister of the National Guard in 2013, making him a member of the cabinet, was meant to bring him closer to the succession.

Abdullah also named another one of his sons a deputy foreign minister, and two other sons as provincial governors of the capital Riyadh and the holy city of Mecca respectively, a move seen as an attempt to enable his clan to consolidate its grip on power after his death.

Abdullah’s promotion of his sons was also seen as part of a dynamic to ensure transition to suitable candidates in the next generation of Al-Saud and the kingdom’s future political evolution. Its aim, experts argue, was to avoid a succession struggle among dozens, and probably hundreds, of aspirants to the throne among Abdel-Aziz’s grandsons and great-grandsons.

But even with a smooth succession after Abdullah, Saudi Arabia’s transition remains contentious, with bloggers and commentators casting doubt over a long-term royal family accord. Most concentrated on the generational problem of succession confronting Saudi Arabia as the prolonged hold of Abdul Aziz’s sons comes to an end.

Some influential royal family members, like Prince Al-Walid bin Talal, an Abdul-Aziz grandson, have already shown signs of dissent. On 23 January, the multi-millionaire prince and business tycoon tweeted: “I have made my allegiance to father Salman bin Abdul-Aziz and father Mugrin bin Abdel-Aziz and congratulated my brother Mohamed bin Nayef.”

With all the potential discord that could follow the transition to the second generation of Al-Saud, King Abdullah’s successors are expected to face daunting challenges at home.

Among their biggest tasks, analysts say, are determining when and whether the kingdom will introduce political, economic and social reforms. For years, Saudis have been urging their government to initiate change, including opening opportunities for political participation.

Liberal-minded reformers have been demanding reform of the political system to initiate a constitutional monarchy and establish an elected parliament, instead of the consultative 120-member appointed Shura Council.

Saudis hope Abdullah’s successors will be able to solve these and other concerns, such as human rights issues and the role of the conservative religious establishment, and relinquish the long-held view that stability is the guarantor of security and peace for the kingdom.

Today, among the key challenges the kingdom faces is the fall in oil revenues that form the bulwark of its state budget. A prospected deficit of $39 billion in this year’s budget has forced the government to cut spending.

Though the government has said the deficit will be covered by its huge foreign reserves, the revenue plunge will force Saudi Arabia to cut back on salaries, wages and allowances, which make up about half of budgeted expenditures.

Externally, with the Middle East and the Arab Gulf region in turmoil, Abdullah’s successors will find their country at the centre of enormous regional conflicts. They will be challenged by a whole range of geopolitical developments.

One of Saudi Arabia’s biggest headaches is Persian-Shia Iran. With its ambitious nuclear programme, its patronage of Shia communities and spreading influence, Iran is emerging as a regional superpower in a clash with Arab-Sunni powerhouse Saudi Arabia.

With a substantial Shia minority in the Saudi eastern province and on the southern border with Yemen, the new leadership will remain jittery about the effect of Iran’s regional rise as an emerging Shia power on Saudi Arabia’s Shia community.

Also, fear that Washington may reach a détente with Tehran following an agreement over its nuclear programme has created a rift between the United States and Saudi Arabia.

Inevitably, the new leadership in Riyadh has to deal with many Middle East crises, which have so far left the Saudi regional power off-balance, largely because of their overwhelming nature and the new regional order they have launched.

In Yemen, Abdullah’s successors are facing an escalating disaster as Shia Houthis assume control. With a civil war looming large in the country, Saudi Arabia’s southern neighbour is turning into a thorn in its side.

In Iraq and Syria, the kingdom also faces difficult dilemmas. Islamic State (IS) militants are digging their feet into both countries close to northern borders, despite the war waged by the US-led international coalition to degrade the group.

Neighbouring Bahrain, dependent on generous Saudi aid and security assistance, is facing a relentless Shia uprising. In Egypt, Saudi Arabia’s vehement support for President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi’s political and economic programme remains vital to the region’s security and peace.

Despite good relations with other partners in the Gulf Cooperation Council, Riyadh’s new rulers will face a daunting challenge from Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, which are either showing independent foreign policy tendencies or increasing their regional power at Saudi Arabia’s expense.

Saudi Arabia’s political system has demonstrated a surprising resilience and stability in the past, but with many of its neighbours on fire, the country seems in need of more than simply the prayers of its new monarch to maintain its stability.

This article appeared first in Al-Ahram Weekly on Jan 29, 2015

Iraq-Inquiry

A botched inquiry?

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A botched inquiry?

People across the Middle East have a stake in the UK’s Chilcot Inquiry into the causes of the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, writes Salah Nasrawi

When former British prime minister Gordon Brown set up a panel in 2009 to look into the UK’s involvement in the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq many Iraqis hoped that they would finally hear the truth about the invasion that left their country in ruins.

Britain, after all, was the US’s main ally in the war and its then prime minister Tony Blair was a key supporter of then US president George W. Bush, who still insists that the invasion was the “right decision” despite the hundreds of thousands killed and the numerous regional conflicts it has unleashed.

Nearly six years later the report of the UK’s Iraq War Inquiry has still not been made public, even though it was reportedly finalised in 2011. Last year it was disclosed that a deal had been reached between London and Washington to block essential documents in the inquiry, including critical pre-and post-war communications between Bush and Blair.

A new hurdle came this month when the inquiry panel, known as the Chilcot Commission after its chairman Sir John Chilcot, decided not to publish the long-awaited report, which will now be delayed until after the British general elections in May.

The delay has raised suspicions of a whitewash. The British Independent newspaper described it as “one of the most bitterly controversial episodes in recent British history.”

The leaders of both the ruling Conservative Party and the opposition Labour Party have been accused of a cover-up of what has been called the war of destruction on Iraq.

Deputy Prime Minister and Liberal Democrat leader Nick Clegg has suggested the delay of the report is an attempt to “sex it down.” Others have called it a scandal and urged voters to sign a petition calling for the publication of the report before the elections.

The criticisms go beyond the delay in the publication to include the alleged incompetence of the Chilcot Commission and the political calculations that have coloured its investigations, including caving in to pressure from the British and US governments.

What gives weight to charges that the inquiry process has been manipulated is the reluctance of both Prime Minister David Cameron and Labour leader Ed Miliband to push for publication of the report.

Both have been apparently engaged in an elections blame game. For many in Britain who have been demanding to know the reasons that pushed their government to submit to Bush’s whims, the postponement of the report has not been good news. They consider it to be a setback for justice, democracy and transparency.

For Iraqis, however, the war is history that cannot be forgotten. For 12 years, Iraq has been reeling in the apocalyptic aftermath of the invasion and occupation. For most Iraqis, these have been years of terror, grief and destitution. Their country now stands at a crossroads, with increasing fears that it will ultimately fall apart.

The majority of Iraqis do not need to know when Blair made commitments to Bush about the UK’s involvement in the invasion and its aftermath. But they expected the truth to be made public and the Chilcot Commission to disclose information about who did what in the plundering their country.

One of their expectations was that the commission would open a window of opportunity to expand the inquiry from merely probing Britain’s involvement and Blair’s secret deals with Bush to include the entire war and its devastating consequences.

Bereaved Iraqi victims of abuses committed during the war and the subsequent occupation also hoped a credible report would help them take those responsible for war crimes committed during the invasion and the occupation to court.

Hundreds of thousands of Iraqis were killed or wounded in the catastrophic occupation, while millions were forced to leave their homes and seek refuge abroad or within Iraq because of the sectarian violence triggered by the invasion.

Unknown numbers of Iraqis have been exposed to a range of environmental and chemical hazards caused by the allies’ use of weapons that carried potential health risks. The destruction of Iraq’s infrastructure has been immeasurable, along with the economic losses.

Other peoples in the Middle East also have a stake in the Chilcot report. The invasion of Iraq unleashed the turmoil that has culminated in the stunning advances of Islamic State (IS) forces in Iraq and Syria and the wave of religious radicalism it has unleashed in the region.

This threat of terrorism, which has hit Europe recently, should be underscored because Western politicians such as Blair still try to distance themselves and their policies from the snowballing problem and blame it on Muslims.

Last week, Blair claimed that a “closed-minded view of the world” was perpetuating what he termed a “culture of hatred.”

“At some point we have got to understand this extremism has grown up over a long period of time and over decades. Its roots are deep within a perversion of the religion of Islam,” Blair told participants at the Davos Economic Forum in Switzerland.

The outcome of the investigation should also have an impact on the US-led coalition which is fighting IS in Iraq and Syria. Iraqis are entitled to know that the war which the international coalition is fighting against IS is not driven by another conspiracy, and will not turn into an exercise in destruction like the one waged in 2003 to topple the regime of former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein.

As the recent exchange of blame over the efficiency of the coalition’s military aid in the war against IS has shown, the Iraqi government has little confidence in the coalition, something which makes observers believe it is undermining the campaign.

If the report of the Chilcot investigation is curtailed, the world will never know the truth of the secret deals between Bush and Blair that paved the way for the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and those responsible for Iraq’s misery will continue to escape being brought to account.

This article appeared first in Al-Ahram Weekly on Jan, 29, 2015

Iraq-Future

Is Obama’s strategy failing?

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Is Obama’s strategy failing?

The collapse of the US-led coalition against Islamic State forces in Iraq could only be a matter of time, writes Salah Nasrawi

When US President Barack Obama’s envoy to the US-led coalition against the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq, retired US general John Allen, visited the country last week, his discussions with government leaders were not short of moments of frankness.

Allen was told by the country’s Shia and Sunni leaders that the coalition needs to do more to help Iraq defeat the terror group that has seized large areas in the north and west of the country and in neighbouring Syria.

Shia Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi told the American official that the US-led coalition should “increase the tempo of the effective air strikes on IS positions.” He also called for US-sponsored training of the Iraqi security forces to be expanded, according to his office.

Sunni Parliamentary Speaker Salim Al-Jabouri was even more vocal in his criticisms. “Until now our feeling has been that the international support is not convincing,” Al-Jabouri was quoted by Reuters as telling Allen.

The grievances listed by Iraqi leaders included ineffective air strikes against IS, poor coordination with the Iraqi military command, limited combat training of Iraqi soldiers, and a lack of intelligence and weapon supplies. But their main concern remains the political strategy of the US campaign against IS.

As expected, leaders of the Kurdistan Regional Government in the north have remained fully behind the international coalition, though they continue to complain about shortages of military supplies.

After the blitzkrieg carried out by IS in Iraq last June, Obama declared that US warplanes and an international coalition he had assembled would conduct a systematic campaign of air strikes against the militants while Iraqi ground forces went on the offensive.

Obama ruled out any direct combat involvement by US soldiers in Iraq, but promised a military package of aid that would include weapons deliveries, intelligence and training.

What began to be called the Obama Strategy for Iraq also entailed a political approach that called for national reconciliation among the country’s communities. The plans was to end Sunni exclusion by the Shia-led government and give the Sunnis an autonomy that included the policing of their own areas after taking them back from IS.

Obama made it clear that the US would take action against IS in Syria by training and arming the moderate opposition to President Bashar Al-Assad to enable it to fight IS militants and expel them from Syria.

Last week’s unexpected criticisms by the Baghdad government came as doubts started to emerge in the US media about the air strikes that the US and its allies have been conducting against IS targets in Iraq and Syria.

Critics of the air strikes point out that most of the territories the militants have captured since their major onslaught in mid-June, including major Sunni-populated cities, are still under IS control. In Syria, IS continues to gain ground and threatens key cities like Aleppo and Homs.

Though the US and its allies have continued pounding IS targets, the IS advance in Iraq has been largely contained by Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia militias and the Iraqi security forces. Kurdish Peshmerga fighters have also retaken territories that they claim belong to the Kurdish region.

Before leaving Baghdad last week, Allen attempted to respond to Iraqi concerns. He said the coalition has made “important progress” and reiterated Washington’s commitment to helping Iraq in the war against IS, including by carrying out air strikes, supplying weapons and training Iraqi troops.

Allen urged Iraqis to show “patience” and made it clear that “the pivotal battles” to defeat the terror group have not yet come. He reiterated Washington’s position that the defeat of IS does not depend solely on military success and urged Al-Abadi to deliver on his promise of “security reforms, advancing national reconciliation, and revitalising Iraq’s ties with its neighbours.”

The Obama Strategy is also irking some US Arab allies. The Arab media have been reporting a dispute between the United States and its Arab coalition partners over the anti-IS strategy in Iraq and Syria. On Saturday, the pan-Arab newspaper Al-Quds Al-Arabi reported from Amman that Arab US allies would now prefer an Arab-Islamic alliance to go after IS instead of the US-led coalition, which also includes Western powers.

The paper quoted Arab Gulf officials as saying that many Arab partners believe that Washington does not seem to be “serious in conducting radical operations to uproot IS, or at least weakening it on the ground.”

Some countries, including Saudi Arabia, want to include Yemen in the coalition’s mission and engage it in the fight against the Shia Houthis, who have taken control of the capital Sanaa. Other reports suggested that Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies are concerned that a deal between Washington and Iran over its nuclear programme might affect Washington’s response to Tehran’s ambitions in Iraq.

Syrian opposition forces are also expressing increasing frustration with the Obama Strategy. Burhan Ghalyoun, a former leader of the opposition Syrian National Council (SNC), slammed Obama’s strategy in an interview with the Al-Arabiya TV network, saying that the plan to train moderate Syrian opposition forces is “a delaying tactic.”

The Obama approach is also coming under fire in Washington. Republican leaders have criticised Obama’s reluctance to engage militarily with IS. They have also questioned his “Iraq first” war, which they charge has enabled IS to make gains in Syria without weakening it in Iraq.

From the beginning, the Obama anti-IS strategy has come under fire for being weak and lacking in focus. Critics have pointed to its military flaws, such as the use of limited air to defeat a formidable terror group that controls large areas and enjoys local support.

To date, eight months into the seizure of most of Iraq’s so-called Sunni Triangle, IS militants have been able to stave off offensives intended to dislodge them from the safe havens they have established. They have also lured more foreign fighters into their ranks and sent terror threats to countries as far away as Europe and the United States.

The failure of the American military to achieve victory over IS, or even to degrade its combat capabilities, has indicated that critics were right to discount aerial bombardment as an effective strategy to defeat the group.

Obama’s political approach has also been challenged for being naïve in the way it looks at the geopolitical complexities of Iraq and the region. Its main flaw lies in its dealing with IS as merely a terrorism issue, while ignoring the deep ethnic and sectarian conflicts that divide the region.

A closer look at the war in Iraq reveals that the Shia-led government is not managing the fight against IS in the way that Washington had intended. Baghdad may still need US air power, advanced weapons and good intelligence capabilities, but it has been fighting the war in its own way.

It has depended largely on Shia Iran to repel IS advances. Tehran has sent military advisors to help train and equip troops and allied militias to drive the IS militants out of territories occupied in central Iraq.

As the conflict has demonstrated, Baghdad has made up for the need for dedicated army and security forces soldiers by mobilising well-trained and battle-tested Shia militias in the fight against IS. After routing IS militants in cities and towns in the Baghdad belt and the mixed Diyalah province, the government is now deploying Shia militias in Sunni-dominated areas in preparation for a counter-offensive.

Last week, Kurdish media outlets said that the government dispatched “several brigades of Shia militias” to the highly volatile and disputed Kirkuk province, reportedly to protect towns populated by Shia Turkmens.

On Saturday, the London-based Al-Hayat newspaper reported that Shia militias had arrived in the Sunni-dominated Anbar province and that they were expected to fight alongside Sunni tribes allied with the government against IS.

Significantly, Baghdad has been reluctant to allow the Sunni tribes to form national guard units to fight IS militants and police their own areas after retaking them from the group. Plans to launch national reconciliation that would fully integrate Sunnis into the government have also foundered.

Both the Sunni forces and the Sunni inclusion were prerequisites for the US-led mission and for sustainable US support for Baghdad, accepted by Al-Abadi when he was nominated to form his partnership government in August.

What all this means, at best, is that the US-led coalition will remain the décor for Obama’s wishy-washy partnership with Iraq. At worst, it means that Washington will try to find an exit strategy in order to suspend the coalition and leave Iraq once again to its fate.

This article appeared in Al-Ahram Weekly on Jan. 22, 2015

 

Analysis & views from the Middle East