Arab-Politics

The Arab League at 70

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The Arab League at 70

The Arab League marks its 70th anniversary this month, but is there much to celebrate, asks Salah Nasrawi

It is 70 years ago this month that Arab leaders agreed to set up a political entity in the midst of a fierce struggle by their peoples for independence from the First World War colonial powers. The goal of the League of the Arab States, as this entity was officially named by its founding fathers, was to propel a united Arab world towards liberation, sovereignty and economic prosperity.

A major objective for the then seven-member organisation was also to help the Palestinians in their struggle against the Zionist Movement and its Western-backed endeavours to create a Jewish State in Palestine.

Yet, 70 years after the founding of the organisation the Arab world today is at a dangerous crossroads. Too many Arab countries are involved in armed conflicts, and political turmoil can be found across the region stretching from the Arab Gulf in the east to the Atlantic coast in the West.

Israel ended up controlling virtually the whole of Palestine after four major wars with the Arabs, leaving generations of Palestinians stateless inside their historic homeland and millions of others homeless around the world. Seven decades after the creation of the pan-Arab organisation, some 360 million Arabs remain trapped either in stagnant repression, poor governance or cycles of strife that rule out the possibility of progress.

Today, the case can be made that the League, founded on a charter to which have been added numerous agreements that have taken it from seven to 22 members, has failed to effectively and actively take the initiative, leading the Arabs facing daunting challenges and many of their countries finding themselves in a state of chaos.

Founding the League: Distinct from a project of federation, confederation or union, the Arab League was established to provide a legal and institutional framework that would bring the Arabs together and provide a platform to serve their interests.

Under its charter the main purpose of the League was to boost relations between the member states, to coordinate their policies in order to achieve cooperation between them, and to safeguard their independence and sovereignty.

However, while many Arabs hoped that the charter had laid the foundations for a strong and effective organisation, the League was ultimately a creature of the post-colonial era which divided the Arab world into separate entities. It could do only as much or as little as the Arab regimes permitted.

One of the main weaknesses of the League lies in its nature as a voluntary association of states, with members refusing to sacrifice some of their sovereignty in favour of closer integration. Its effectiveness has been further hampered by political divisions, rivalry and competition in key areas such as foreign policy and defence.

A key constraint on the Arab League system has been its tightly knit institutional structure which was based on its founding documents that gave decision-making power to the Arab regimes, many of them unelected.

According to the charter, a council composed of representatives of member states is tasked to make decisions and supervise their execution. Each state has a single vote, irrespective of the number of its representatives. This rigid and undemocratic system has made the League captive to the visions and decisions of the representatives of autocratic regimes, rather than to those of the Arab peoples and their civil societies.

A major constraint in the work of the League lies in its institutional capabilities. Its secretary-general and bureaucracy are considered to be “employees” who do not initiate plans or make decisions. The League lacks mechanisms to compel member states to comply with its resolutions, a void that has made it unable to function effectively.

Recognising the need for a more systematic approach in order to ensure the League’s role as a pan-Arab organisation that safeguards the Arab peoples’ interests, several attempts have been made to reform the system to enable the organisation to function more effectively. The current secretary-general, Nabil Al-Araby, has called for institutional reforms to revive the organisation, including of its structure, economic cooperation and citizen participation.

Al-Araby, a former Egyptian foreign minister and international lawyer, has repeatedly blamed the League’s failure on its member states, which he has accused of making its decisions and forging its policies and not the League’s secretariat. His main proposal has been to amend to organisation’s charter, described as being “unsuitable” to meet the challenges faced by the Arab world today.
A committee formed by Al-Araby to make recommendations for reforming the League is expected to submit its report to the Arab Summit in Egypt later this month.

One area where the League has been seen to have failed is in its attempts to help the Palestinians achieve their own independent state. From the outset, the League failed in its attempts to prevent the creation of Israel when a coalition of Arab armies fighting under the League’s military command lost the 1948 War. Subsequent wars and peace overtures have failed to bring a just solution to the problem.

The consequences have been devastating. The Arab-Israeli conflict has become a catalyst for wars and struggles that have exacerbated regional instability and added political challenges to existing economic and other hardships.

Inter-Arab disputes, whether border disputes or power and influence struggles, have also prevented closer cooperation in the political, military and economic spheres, contributing to regional instability and creating more conflicts.

The invasion of Kuwait carried out by former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein in 1990, for example, acted as the catalyst for a polarisation that split the Arab world, opening the door to foreign interference that deepened divisions and mistrust between the Arab countries.

A poor harvest: One of the League’s notable failures has been in the field of the economy. According to its charter, the organisation is tasked with coordinating economic cooperation between its member states with the aim of an integrated Arab market.

At its outset the League set up specialised agencies to promote cooperation in the fields of telecommunications, postal services and finance. Later, it established the Arab Common Market in 1965 to provide for the eventual abolition of customs duties on natural resources and agricultural products, the free movement of capital and labour among member states, and coordination of economic development.

But this never happened, and by 2014 inter-Arab trade did not exceed 10 per cent of member state trade volumes, with the rest mostly going to international partners such as China, Japan, the European Union and the United States.

The Arab countries sit atop perhaps half the world’s oil and a third of its natural gas reserves, yet the economies of the region are among the most stagnant in the world because of a lack of sufficient capital. Hundreds of billions of dollars in hydrocarbon wealth from the Arab Gulf countries have been kept in foreign banks instead of being used for badly needed investment in poor or lower-income Arab countries.

Sovereign wealth funds belonging to the Gulf countries were estimated to contain about $5.6 trillion at the end of 2013. They have become key players in world markets, but they are scarcely used for investment purposes in the Arab world.

Overall, economic growth in the Arab countries remains weak. According to the International Monetary Fund, growth in per capita income among the Arab countries has lagged far behind Asia, Latin America and Africa during the past 30 years, and even major oil powers such as Saudi Arabia have fallen behind.

In its 2009 Arab Human Development Report, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) found that, as of 2007, the Arab states as a whole were less industrialised than they were in 1970, with governments using revenues from oil, gas and other outside receipts to sustain unproductive economies that maintain large public sectors and import foreign goods.

In addition, mismanagement, corruption and the dependency of ruling cliques on foreign powers have remained key reasons behind this poor economic record. Economic growth rates have been consistently too low to keep pace with population growth, and most of the Arab countries remain deadlocked and struggling to make ends meet.

Unemployment, particularly among young people and women, remains high, and the size of government is staggering. In its Fourth Unemployment Report, released in September 2014, the Arab Labour Organisation disclosed that unemployment in the Arab world had risen from 14 per cent in 2008 to 16 per cent in 2013.

The phenomenon that helps to exacerbate this problem is the lack of a common regional labour market that would allow nationals of the Arab countries to be able freely to take up employment and settle in other Arab countries. The six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries are the largest recipients of migrants in the world and host some 16 million workers, but the majority of these are not Arabs.

As a result, Arab economic integration has turned into a ghost of what it could have been, and the Arab League has failed to achieve the minimal goals of the “joint Arab action” wanted by the League’s founders and promoters.

Another dismal shortfall has been in the field of knowledge. Statistics on knowledge indicators such as spending on science, technology and innovation have revealed Arab deficiencies on a major scale. According to the “Overview of the Knowledge Economy in the Arab Region,” written by experts at the United Nations University, the “Arab region is lagging far behind the comparable range of the other world regions and advanced countries, and even behind those of the developing countries.”

Of the top 500 educational institutions in the world, only five are based in the Arab world. In its Academic Ranking of World Universities 2014 (ARWU), the Institute of Higher Education of the Shanghai Jiao Tong University (SJTU) rated two Saudi and one Egyptian university among the 150 to 500 of its top 500 research universities worldwide.

In comparison, Israel has six entries in the top-500 university list, including three among the top 100.

Scientific and university-based research critical to the economic and social development of Arab societies has never been a priority for most Arab governments. The first Arab Strategy for Science, Technology and Innovation, or STI, was signed just last year. It remains to be seen if Arab scientists will be able to overcome political and other hurdles and create showcases in their fields.

Several world development and governance indicators also show the Arab world to be in a horrible state of regression. Nine Arab countries came among the 50 fragile states worldwide, according to the Foreign Policy Index of Fragile States for 2014. The 2014 Corruption Perception Index also ranked seven Arab countries among the most corrupt in its 174-country list.

However, Arab countries top the list of the World Happiness Report 2013, which provides critical data on how the world measures economic and social development.

At the edge: The dramatic events that have been unfolding across the Arab world since 2003 are seen by many as being apocalyptic and the result of a collective failure by the Arab countries to advance the Arabs’ political, economic and security goals.

Across the Arab world, countries that were once strategic pillars of the Arab political order are now unravelling, and the whole region seems to be heading towards a massive geopolitical shift that will have far-reaching consequences. The magnitude of the changes that are taking place could barely have been imagined some years ago even by the most pessimistic of Arab world observers.

The rise of the Islamic State (IS) terrorist group and its capture of large chunks of land in Syria and Iraq and proclamation of an “Islamic caliphate” has been a turning point. The group has abolished the borders drawn at the creation of two modern Arab states and raised its black banners over areas stretching from the Euphrates to the Mediterranean.

The war front against terror goes beyond the territory IS has captured in Syria and Iraq, however. Numerous terror groups from Egypt, Algeria, Libya and other countries have now pledged allegiance to the Islamic State and operate in unstable areas like Derna in eastern Libya and the Sinai Peninsula of Egypt.

Civil wars are raging in Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen, while several other Arab countries have been wracked by communal divisions and political uncertainty. In Iraq and Syria the chances are slim that the two countries will remain intact even if IS is defeated. Kurds in both countries are moving toward self-rule, while Sunnis are resisting Shia and Alawite domination.

In Libya, the popular uprising against the former regime of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi has now evolved into a war that could tear the country to pieces. While a civil war is raging in many parts of the country, some parts of eastern Libya have declared their autonomy. The Tuareg tribes in the south are looking for closer bonds with neighbouring countries.

Yemen has entered a turbulent era as Iran-backed Shia Houthi rebels now control much of the country after an uprising in September that has deepened divisions among tribal, sectarian and provincial communities fighting over the sharing of wealth and power. A federal system proposed by a UN-led national dialogue following the overthrow of the country’s long-time president Ali Abdullah Saleh is in tatters, with southern Yemen now pressing to break away from the north.

Elsewhere, the Arab countries are suffering from the repercussions of regional wars and do not seem to be immune from the ripple effects of Middle East balkanisation. With sectarian strife escalating all around them, governments and large segments of the populations fear that they might be the next ones to be hit by the turmoil.

It has never been plain sailing, but 70 years after the establishment of the League that was intended to safeguard its security and interests, the Arab world now seems to be heading towards a tectonic shift that could redefine its political landscape and century-old national borders. Such changes may take time, but if the momentum continues there will be no Arab world like the one we have known for the past seven decades in a few years.

In many ways, the new political map and the new regional order it will create will be a major setback and an invitation to transform the admittedly imperfect existing order into a chaos in which ethno- and sectarian-based new countries will be pitted against each other.

If the Arab world were to fall apart and be remapped in this manner, it would in many ways be the result of the failure of the Arab League to establish a political order, a security system and a common market that serves Arab interests.

Above all, the League has been unable to give the citizens of its member states an Arab identity alongside the national identities that preserve the region’s diversity. Unlike the citizens of the European Union who can see identity markers in the EU flag, the single currency and the free movement of goods, people, capital and services, the overwhelming majority of Arabs can see nothing of that sort when they look at the region.

Instead, in many cases Arab governments perceive Arab integration to be a threat to national identity.

This article appeared first in Al Ahram Weekly on March 19, 2015

Arab-Politics

Caught up in Iraq

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Caught up in Iraq

Can Saudi Arabia stop Iran in Iraq, asks Salah Nasrawi

“Iran is taking over Iraq,” Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al-Faisal decried last week while slamming Iran’s “hegemonistic tendencies in the region.”  “We see Iran involved in Syria and Lebanon and Yemen and Iraq and God knows where. This must stop if Iran is to be part of the solution of the region and not part of the problem.”

The blunt words by the usually reserved Saudi top diplomat made waves with its most scathing criticism for Iran’s support to Iraq‘s Shia-led government and raised a host of difficult questions about the kingdom’s strategy in dealing with the region’s simmering crises.

Prince Saud broke no new ground on Saudi doctrine on Iraq. Since the overthrow of the Sunni-dominated Saddam Hussein’s regime in the 2003 US-led war Saudi Arabia has viewed Iraq as falling under Iran’s influence and remained reluctant to establish full diplomatic and political ties with the Shia-led government in Baghdad.

But Prince Saud strongly-worded remarks reflect the Sunni Arab powerhouse’s anxiety over Shia Persian Iran’s close and increasing involvement in the sectarian-divided and war-torn country.

Since the stunning territorial victory of the militants in June and their seizure of nearly one third of Iraq’s territories, Iran has escalated its role in Iraq, especially in building the Shia militias. It has mobilised its elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to build a massive and effective Iraqi Shia paramilitary force through funding, training and weapon supplies.

Iranian commanders are also spearheading the Iraqi attacks on the IS-held towns, providing tactical expertise to Iraqis. Major-General Qassim Soleimani, commander of the elite Quds Force, the IGRC’s special operations arm, is directly overseeing the offensives against IS.

Echoing fear of sectarian reprisals during operations to drive IS’s militants out of Sunni towns, Prince Saud had referred to the ongoing offensive in the Sunni-populated Tikrit as an example of the overt Iranian involvement in Iraq.

A combination of some 30,000 Iraqi security forces and the Shia Popular Mobilisation Units launched an offensive to retake Tikrit from the terror group this week. Tikrit, the hometown of former President Saddam Hussein, is viewed as a key foothold for a widely expected assault on Mosul, the IS’s self-declared capital.

Members of Iran-backed Shia militias who are part of the Popular Mobilisation Units have been accused of abuses against civilians in areas Iraqi forces have retaken from Islamic State. Human rights groups also are fearful the campaign in Tikrit could lead to atrocities.

Perhaps the most worrying sign to Saudi Arabia about Iran’s influence in Iraq remains rhetoric by Iranian leaders which reflect Tehran’s ambitions in Iraq.

On Sunday, Ali Younesi, a senior advisor to Iranian President Hassan Rouhani boasted that Iraq has already become part of Iran.

“Iran today has become an empire as it was throughout history and its capital now is Baghdad in Iraq, which is the center of our civilization and our culture and identity today as it was in the past.”

Right now Iran is only helping Iraqis in battling IS. Still, Saudi leaders are wondering how much influence will Iran have in Iraq if the militants are evicted from all of the country and if this cozy relationship between the two countries is anything to be concerned about.

In short, Saudi Arabia believes that by increasing its control over Shia communities in Iraq and the region and through the persistent expansion of its influence, Iran is pursuing a power politics of the national interest. This has created enormous problems to Saudi Arabia which finds its leadership role in the Muslim Sunni world is being challenged by Iran.

In order to confront Iran, Saudi Arabia has tried a four-pronged approach to influence events in Iraq, without much success.

First, Saudi Arabia believes that empowerment of Iraqi Sunni Arabs is key to not only to put an end to their exclusion following Saddam’s ouster but also to resist Iranian influence in Iraq.

Saudi Arabia has largely relied on its traditional checkbook diplomacy to cement close connections with Iraqi Sunni tribes and political and religious figures to bolster their capacity politically and financially.

However, despite its generous support no viable and credible Iraqi Sunni leadership has emerged. Until the Sunni minority develops a united voice and platform to engage with Shia majority, Saudi Arabia will find it difficult to effectively push for meaningful change in Iranian pro-Shia policy in the country.

Moreover, accusations that Saudi Arabia’s policy somehow plays a role in supporting jihadi-style extremism has undermined the kingdom’s ability in advancing the Iraqi Sunni’s interests.

Second, Riyadh had resorted to oil as a weapon to have more latitude over Iran and the Shia-led government in Iraq. As the world’s largest oil exporter, Saudi Arabia can threaten the Iranian and Iraqi economies if it chooses to keep production high and prices low.

One way to do that is to continue its hands-off policy toward falling oil prices to screw its arch enemies in the region, the Iranians and the Iraqi Shia government.

But while the lower oil prices have harmed Iran’s and Iraq’s economic short term prospects their governments have worked hard to repair the damage caused by falling revenues.

Still, there is no doubt that Iran will continue military and political backing of its Iraqi Shia allies in the confrontation with IS even if it has to grapple with economic difficulties caused by oil prices’ slump.

Indeed, Tehran is showing no signs of battle fatigue and it is probably ahead of the game in clash with Saudi Arabia over other regional disputes, such as Lebanon, Syria and Yemen.

Third, Saudi Arabia has been trying to block a possible rapprochement between Iran and the United States following a potential nuclear deal with Iran. Knowing that the deal is neither directly nor exclusively about the nuclear issue Riyadh has been seeking assurance from Washington that there will be no “grand bargain” with Iran.

Here again Riyadh’s choices seems to be limited. Although the Obama administration tried to ease the kingdom’s concerns about a “comprehensive” deal with Iran, a nuclear agreement now seems more likely.

The United States also does not seem to see to eye to eye with Saudi Arabia about Iran’s role in Iraq. Last week top US general Martin Dempsey said Iran’s involvement in the fight against IS in Iraq could be “a positive step”, as long as the situation does not descend into sectarianism.

The military chief also claimed that almost two thirds of the 30,000 offensive were Iranian-backed militiamen, meaning that without Iranian assistance and Soleimani’s guidance, the offensive on IS-held towns may not have been possible.

Finally, Saudi Arabia has been trying to build a broad regional Sunni bloc to curtail Iran’s and Shia’s rising influence. A great deal of this Saudi effort is to engage largely Sunni-populated Turkey in shaping this bipolar regional sectarian system.

Nevertheless, such an alliance will have vast implications on the regional balance of power and has the potential to reshape relationships throughout the Middle East. Turkey which has succeeded in staying away from regional sectarian polarization may find it counterproductive to be part of a Sunni bloc against its powerful eastern neighbour and the entire Shia world.

As many Turkish commentators wrote following a visit by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to Riyadh last month an anti-Iran or anti-Shia front will only escalate sectarian tensions in the region and has no benefit for Turkey and any other country.

In addition, such an alliance will put Ankara’s key strategic interests such the Kurdish issue and its relations with its vast Allawite minority at risks.

Any assessment of Iran’s role in Iraq since Saddam’s downfall will show that Tehran has exploited Iraq’s 12 year old conflict to weaken the country and create outcomes that are likely to give it leverage over its Sunni neighbors and deprive them of strategic advantages and create new sources of threat.

Yet, Saudi Arabia and other Iraq’s Sunni neighbours have equally failed to come up with a viable plan to stop Iraq’s ethno sectarian conflict staying on a steady boil to threaten regional stability.

Unfortunately, the prospect of sectarian rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia is expected to escalate, with sources of tension evident across the region. Nowhere this competition for power and influence is more evident than in Iraq which is expected to bear most of its devastating consequences.

This article first published in Al Ahram Weekly on March 12, 2015

Arab-Politics

In quest of an Arab force

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In quest of an Arab force

Egypt is pressing ahead with proposals for a joint Arab force to counter the threat of terrorism, writes Salah Nasrawi

Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi flew to Riyadh this week to discuss with Saudi King Salman his proposals for a joint Arab force to combat terrorism as the Middle East continues to be overtaken by political unrest.

Thus far there have been no signs that Salman, who succeeded his half-brother King Abdullah, a staunch supporter of Al-Sisi, earlier this year, has endorsed the proposals, raising questions about the new monarch’s strategy to manage regional turmoil.

Ahead of his visit, Al-Sisi told two leading Saudi media outlets that he hoped Saudi Arabia and other Arab Gulf countries will join the military alliance, which he described as badly needed to safeguard the region’s security and stability.

“We have the capacity to form a credible force and [send] a strong message to potential adversaries that they cannot threaten us if we remain united, and terrorists cannot hurt us unless we stay disunited,” Al-Sisi told Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper in an interview.

“We are presenting this proposal to our brothers, and there is an opportunity to start a discussion on how to achieve the security and stability of our countries,” Al-Sisi told the Al-Arabiya television network in another interview

While Jordan’s King Abdullah has supported the proposals, Al-Sisi said, he hopes that Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates will join in.

Al-Sisi has become increasingly vocal about the need for Arab military cooperation after Islamist radicals in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula and in neighbouring Libya declared their allegiance to the Islamic State (IS) terror group, which has seized large swathes of territory in Iraq and Syria.

He has urged Arab countries to form a unified force to fight terrorism in the region after Egyptian air strikes last month targeted IS jihadists in the Libyan coastal city of Derna in retaliation for the slaughter of 21 Egyptian Christians.

The proposals are expected to top the agenda of an Arab League summit in Sharm El-Sheikh later this month. Arab League Chief Nabil Al-Arabi said the summit, which will be headed by Al-Sisi, will discuss the “re-activation” of the Arab Defence and Economic Pact to confront jihadist terrorism and other security threats.

Under the 1950 agreement setting up the Economic Pact, the 22 League members consider “any attack against one of them as an attack on all” and allows them to use “all steps available, including the use of armed force, to repel the aggression and restore security and peace.”

Ideas to create a joint force have been floated before, but a pan-Arab military alliance has always proved difficult to achieve as security strategies remain largely a national issue for Arab governments.

At an Arab summit in Riyadh in 2007, leaders discussed an Egyptian proposal to adopt “a comprehensive concept for pan-Arab security.” The proposal was aimed at creating a “mechanism” to resolve regional conflicts “without foreign intervention.”

A year earlier at an Arab summit in Khartoum, Arab leaders made plans to set up an Arab Peace and Security Council that would be tasked with settling inter-Arab disputes, including the use of peacekeeping forces in hotspots.

The plan has never been implemented due in part to squabbles over sovereignty and national security and defence policies.

Separately, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has already set up the Gulf Shield Defence Force. The six-member council has also decided to create both a joint naval force and a common counter-terrorist body.

So far, these and other security-related agreements have largely proved ineffective or have remained unenforced.

But security in the Arab world has become a key concern in the current transformations that have swept across much of the Arab world after a series of popular uprisings in 2011 against some of the region’s worst autocratic regimes.

Political turmoil and the failure of state rebuilding that followed have given rise to chaos, violence and terrorism, prompting regional governments to search for better security frameworks.

Though A-Sisi has firmly and clearly stated the goals behind the proposals, Egyptian officials have disclosed few details about the envisioned military alliance.

On 27 February, the London-based newspaper Al-Hayat quoted a “well-informed” Egyptian official as saying the proposed force would be largely Egyptian with “symbolic participation from other countries.”

“The troops will be based in Cairo but will have units that depend mostly on commandos and rapid deployment forces with a joint command,” the official was quoted as saying.

The joint operational command will draw up plans, supervise training and prepare the force to be deployed in hotspots, he said.

Countries with armies will provide troops, while other partners will provide logistic support, the official said.

It is also not clear how the potential partners in the Egyptian-proposed alliance will shift from unilateral anti-terrorism approaches to a multilateral policy. While most Arab governments agree on the need to combat terrorism, they do not see eye to eye on how to eliminate its threats.

Saudi officials have not publicly reacted to Al-Sisi’s proposals or to the report in Al-Hayat. Following Al-Sisi’s talks with King Salman, the official Saudi Press Agency reported only that the two leaders had “reviewed regional and world developments.”

But several Saudi commentators closely connected to the royal family and usually reflecting official Saudi views have been outspoken about evidence of differing Egyptian and Saudi priorities over regional security issues.

A key disagreement revealed by these writers concerns the kingdom’s preference for an alliance that brings together Egypt and the rest of the Sunni Arab countries with Turkey to confront Iran and its regional Shia proxies.

Writing in the Saudi-owned Al-Hayat newspaper on the same day Al-Sisi visited Riyadh, prominent Saudi columnist Khaled Al-Dukheil said the kingdom is interested in Egypt joining a Saudi-Turkish-led alliance.

“Under current circumstances, this triangle is a strategic necessity that will restore some of the balance after the fall of Iraq and Syria. In addition, it will form a defence against the destructive Iranian role,” he wrote.

“Turkey is a pillar of this region,” he added. “Will Egypt be moving, even a bit, in the direction started by Saudi Arabia?” Al-Dukheil asked.

Another Saudi writer, Jamal Khashoggi, questioned Egypt’s strategy against jihadists in Libya and warned Cairo against getting “carried away” by its air strikes on Derna.

“Those who love Egypt should prevent it from falling into the trap of Da’esh and going into a war in Libya,” he wrote in Al-Hayat, using IS’s Arabic acronym.

In a Twitter posting, Khashoggi even denied earlier reports that Egypt had already sent troops to the Saudi-Yemeni border to help the kingdom secure the restive area, saying that the Saudis can defend themselves.

These views underscore sharp differences between Cairo and Riyadh in approaching regional security problems. While Egypt feels threatened by the jihadists and believes that Turkey’s support for the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood fuels unrest, Saudi Arabia seems to give priority to wooing Turkey in its efforts to confront Iran and its Shia allies.

The arguments of the Saudi writers show another fundamental difference between Cairo and Riyadh over the validity of the US-led international coalition fighting IS in Iraq and Syria.

Cairo has repeatedly talked about double standards in the way the coalition is dealing with IS in Iraq and Syria militarily, while insisting on a political solution for the crisis in Libya.

Though Egypt has backed the alliance, it has not taken part in the coalition’s air strikes in Syria. Unlike Saudi Arabia, which wants to oust Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad, Egypt calls for a political solution to the crisis in Syria.

Speculation that the Obama administration is trying to forge a grand Middle East peace settlement with Iran through its nuclear negotiations have sent ripples of alarm through Riyadh and other Gulf capitals.

Saudi Arabia, which has long relied on US protection, seems still to be hoping that the international coalition will be a positive force in curtailing Iranian influence.

To be sure, the differences over how to confront the growing threat of terrorism and other security challenges paint a grim picture of the Arab world. Much of it is in a mess, with the instability worsening.

Nevertheless, the region’s leaders remain as divided as ever, even as they admit that they face an existential threat as never before since the modern Arab states came into being some one hundred years ago.

This article appeared first in Al Ahram Weekly on March 5, 2015

Iraq-Shia

The Shia militias’ moment

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The Shia militias’ moment

Sectarian chaos fomented by the Islamic State group is giving Iranian-backed Shia militias the chance to rise in Iraq, writes Salah Nasrawi

When Iraqi Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi met members of the Iraqi community in Berlin during a visit to Germany earlier this month, he stunned many in the audience who raised concerns about the growing role of Iranian-backed Shia militias in Iraq and reports of widespread abuses committed by their members.

“They have always been there and they will stay there even after the end of the presence of Da’esh in Iraq,” Al-Abadi told the small crowd at the Iraqi Embassy in Berlin, using the Arabic acronym for the Islamic State (IS) terror group.

The remarks were in sharp contrast to the government’s claim that Shia paramilitary groups fighting IS militants are operating under the umbrella of the security forces. They also contradict earlier statements by Al-Abadi that his government has zero tolerance for armed groups operating outside its control.

Some eight months after the beginning of the IS onslaught and its declaration of a Sunni caliphate, Iraqi Shia militias are struggling not only to beat back the radical Sunni militant group but also to make their mark on Iraq’s politics, and maybe even define the country’s future.

The Shia militias surfaced during the sectarian flare-up that followed the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq. They were reinvigorated after IS took over swathes of northwestern, Sunni-dominated, Iraq and threatened Baghdad and Shia-populated provinces in the south.

The international media and human rights groups have criticised these militias for alleged abuses, including kidnappings, forcing residents to leave their homes, assassinations and even executions in Sunni areas.

But little attention has been paid to the wider political implications of the rise of the Shia militias and how, in cooperation with their Iranian backers, they are changing the political landscape in Iraq and probably beyond.

The new forces started to emerge a few days after a senior Shia cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, issued a call to arms. After the fall of the northern city of Mosul in June last year, Sistani urged all able-bodied Shia men to join the security forces and stop the IS advance.

Tens of thousands of Shias who showed up at recruiting centres to sign up for the Iraqi security forces ended up joining the militias, some of which were established after IS expanded its reach to control large chunks of the country.

What was thought at first to be a short-term backup for the Iraqi military has now evolved into a new model for the Shia paramilitaries. It is called the Popular Mobilisation Force (PMF) and operates outside the control of Iraqi security forces.

Though it remains largely decentralised, the PMF has been effective in driving back IS jihadists along an extensive battlefront, at a time when Iraqi security forces routed in the IS blitz in Mosul still need rebuilding.

This has allowed the Shia militias to take centre stage not only in the war against IS but also in shaping national politics, which since the fall of the Sunni-dominated Saddam Hussein regime in 2003 has been based on a shaky system that attempts to maintain a balance between feuding communities.

But the risk posed by the Shia militias is daunting. Rather than helping to restore peace and stability and re-unite Iraq, their abuses and rising role in politics could further deepen the nation’s ethno-sectarian divisions.

One of the main challenges for the badly needed national reconciliation is the need to reassure Iraq’s Sunnis that the government will be able to reverse the sectarian and divisive policies of the former government of ex-prime minister Nuri Al-Maliki and create a more inclusive political system.

Atrocities attributed to members of the Shia militias are threatening to alienate Sunnis, whose support is vital in the fight against IS. Unless the government reins in the Shia militias it will be impossible to convince the Sunni community to turn against the militants.

Most Sunni tribes distrust the Shia militias and have rejected the participation of the PMF in operations to drive back IS from Anbar and Mosul that could begin in a few months.

Last week Hadi Al-Amri, the commander of the Badr Organisation, appeared in a video widely circulated on YouTube. He warned Sunni tribes in the city of Tikrit against staying “neutral” in the fight against IS.

In some cases, the Sunnis’ worst fears have come true. On 7 February, two men from a prominent Sunni tribe were killed in Anbar province after being detained at a checkpoint controlled by a mixture of security forces and Sunni and Shia volunteer fighters.

A few days later, a prominent Sunni tribal sheikh, his son and several of his bodyguards were abducted and killed in Baghdad.

Such incidents led Sunni political leaders to suspend their participation in the government and parliament. They are demanding that the militias be disarmed and dissolved.

Iraq’s Kurds also stand firmly against allowing Shia militias into territories captured by IS, including the oil-rich province of Kirkuk. Kurdistan Region President Masoud Barzani has insisted that the Shia militiamen will be “prohibited under any circumstances” from entering the city.

The Kurdish position has triggered a backlash. “You have no right to prevent any Iraqi from entering any province. When we come [to Kirkuk] you will run away,” Qais Al-Khazali, commander of the Iranian-sponsored Asaib Ahl Al-Haq group, said in response to Barzani’s statement.

The quarrel over the militias is further complicating other disputes between Iraq’s autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the Shia-led government in Baghdad. Last week, the KRG said it may withhold crude oil exports over a budget dispute, a move that could derail the fragile power-sharing agreement with the Baghdad government.

The dangers of the rise of the militias also extend to the Shia political groups that have been in power since 2003. Traditional Shia political movements that have monopolised Shia representation for decades, including the Islamic Dawa Party and Islamic Supreme Council in Iraq, have been eclipsed by the dozens of militias now vying for power.

In the short term, the militias’ increasing strength threatens to undermine the government’s authority and its efforts to reassure Sunnis that their interests are being protected.

The threat from the Shia militias is growing to the point where in the long run its supporters could have the power to overthrow the Shia-led government. Analysts have begun drawing parallels between Iraq’s Shia militias and the Shia Houthis in Yemen, who have replaced the government in a slowly progressing coup.

In a report detailing the militias’ abuses, the international rights group Amnesty International noted that the militias are not subordinate to the government and in many cases appear to have more authority and effective power on the ground than the beleaguered government forces.

The government’s primacy is also being challenged in other realms, including military effectiveness. The Shia militias now outnumber the Iraqi military and show more devotion and fighting skills than the security forces.

Naturally, in this phase of the conflict in Iraq, the militias are bound to affect the security forces’ ability to act effectively.

What is also worrying is Iran’s growing role in building the Shia militias, especially through funding, training and supplying them with weapons. After IS captured Mosul and other cities last year, Iran mobilised its elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to build a massive and effective Iraqi Shia paramilitary force.

Iranian top brass, including the powerful commander of the IRGC’s Al-Quds Force, Qassim Soleimani, have been travelling to the frontlines to coordinate war plans with militia commanders.

Arguably, in a Middle East already beset by deep sectarian schisms, there are fears that the PMF will evolve into an IRGC-style force whose role in regional conflicts will be to advance a Shia sectarian agenda and Iran’s interests.

But given the disastrous course of events in Iraq since IS’s brutal ascent and the ongoing regional polarisation, one can hardly expect violent non-state actors, including the Iraqi Shia militias, to fail to take advantage of a state weakened by incompetence, factionalism and chaos.

By seizing their chance amid the anarchy, the Shia militias may now have their moment in Iraq. But if they remain as a militarised force after IS is defeated, as stated by Al-Abadi at the Iraqi Embassy in Berlin, then they will be a strategic game-changer in Iraq.

Egypt-Qatar

Beyond Al-Jazeera

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Beyond Al-Jazeera

The Cairo-Doha dispute goes much deeper than the anti-Egyptian media blitz being orchestrated by Qatar, writes Salah Nasrawi

The day a Cairo court ordered two Al-Jazeera journalists accused of supporting the Muslim Brotherhood to be released on bail, the Qatar-owned network aired secretly taped recordings of conversations between Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi and his aides in which he purportedly expressed contempt for Saudi Arabia and the Gulf rulers.

The message could not have been missed: Doha does not seem to be interested in patching up differences with Cairo, and Al-Jazeera will continue its hostile coverage of Egypt, one of the main issues behind soured relations between the two countries.

Furthermore, the leaks, first aired by pro-Muslim Brotherhood television, seemed designed to drive a wedge between Egypt and the Gulf countries which are the main aid providers to Egypt.

Relations between Cairo and Doha deteriorated after the 2013 ouster of former Islamist president Mohamed Morsi whose Muslim Brotherhood group was backed by Qatar.

Al-Jazeera has since been broadcasting anti-Al-Sisi propaganda, labelling his takeover a “military coup.”

But what has appeared to be a row over negative television coverage may in fact hide a deeper conflict over a host of domestic and regional issues, in particular Qatar’s support for Islamists whom Egypt considers to be a threat to its security.

Efforts to reconcile Cairo and Doha have stalled as Qatar’s sponsorship of what has been termed the “Political Islam project” has been too much for Egypt to ignore and leave the ball in Qatar’s court.

In November, Al-Sisi tactically gave the nod to an overture by the late Saudi King Abdullah to reach out to Qatar after the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) rapprochement with its troublesome member state.

Egypt has shown pragmatism by not staying aloof from its allies in the Gulf – Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates – which are also its main financial backers.

But Egypt, familiar with the region’s chessboard, has seemed to be holding back and playing a waiting game. It has shown no sign of starting to mend fences with Qatar until the Gulf emirate changes what Cairo interprets as its hostile policies.

Egypt’s dispute with Qatar goes beyond Doha’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood and the platform for anti-Al-Sisi propaganda which Al-Jazeera and other Qatar-owned media outlets have been giving to the group.

Cairo’s grievances against Doha include its role in building a broader Egyptian opposition movement to Al-Sisi and targeting its ailing economy by withdrawing loans and deposits provided to the ousted Muslim Brotherhood-led government.

The two countries have also been locked in a political standoff over a series of regional disputes in Gaza, Libya, Syria and Sudan, conflicts that Egypt considers as having a direct impact on its stability.

Egypt believes that the Palestinian Hamas movement, backed and funded by Qatar, shares a large part of the blame for militant attacks in Sinai. Cairo says that militants from Hamas-run Gaza have been helping jihadist groups in Sinai, such as Ansar Bait Al-Maqdis, which is linked to the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria.

The terror group is responsible for attacks against Egyptian security forces in the Peninsula and it may be seeking targets in Egypt’s mainland.

Another major point of contention with Qatar is Libya. Egypt feels there is a danger to its security from its western neighbour where Islamist extremists and Muslim Brotherhood-backed militias supported by Qatar are fighting a government that is recognised by Egypt and the international community.

On Sunday, a Libyan terror group affiliated to IS said it had beheaded 21 Egyptian Coptic Christians who were working in Libya. Many Egyptians were angered by Al-Jazeera for hosting Al-Sisi’s opponents who have exploited the tragedy to blame the government for the massacre and not its perpetrators.

There is also Sudan, Egypt’s southern backyard, which is ruled by Islamists who have close ties with Qatar. Though Cairo and Khartoum continue to maintain working relations, Egypt remains wary of Sudan’s close ties with the Gulf state.

In November the Khartoum government signed a military cooperation pact with Doha that Egypt fears will be used to advance the Qatari agenda.

Egypt also has stakes in Syria where Qatar has influence over some of the Islamist extremist groups which are fighting to topple the regime of President Bashar Al-Assad. Egypt fears both the rise of Islamists in Iraq and Syria and the influx of jihadists to join the insurgency in Sinai.

Another case in point is Turkey whose ties with Egypt have been strained since the ouster of Morsi. Cairo accuses Ankara of forming an alliance with Doha in a bid to destabilise Egypt through support for the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas.

All this indicates that a breakthrough in ties with Qatar will have to come on Egyptian terms. In the words of Egypt’s Foreign Minister Sameh Shukri, “what is required is for Qatar’s policies to be supportive of Egypt and its national security and to avoid anything that leads to destabilising Egypt.”

The problem is that no one can be certain that Qatar is prepared to make the required changes in its foreign policy that Egypt takes to be a source of instability.

Touted as backing the Islamists, Qatar’s current strategy poses a serious threat to Al-Sisi’s drive to stifle the Muslim Brotherhood.

In broader terms, in its high-stakes regional game Qatar is challenging Egypt, the Arab world’s most populous nation and one of the region’s powerhouses.

There is an increasing understanding in Egypt that Qatar is trying to use its huge hydrocarbon-generated wealth and international connections to undermine Egypt’s efforts to restore its role as a major regional player, weakened by the turmoil after the 25 January Revolution that toppled former president Hosni Mubarak.

But even if the mood in Cairo looks to be calm and diplomatic relations with Doha remain normal, Egypt seems to have options on the table.

Last month, Egypt returned a US$2 billion Qatari deposit to Doha after negotiations to convert the money into bonds failed. It plans to return a further $500 million, the rest of the billions extended to Egypt after Mubarak’s fall, as a sign of refusing to be intimidated by Qatari money.

Al-Sisi had refused to use his authority to pardon the Al-Jazeera journalists and gave the law due process to decide their fate, something which denied Qatar the opportunity to claim that it had exercised pressure on Egypt to secure their release.

An Egyptian court, meanwhile, is continuing the trial of the deposed former president and another 10 men on charges of espionage and leaking secret documents, including military and security files, to Qatar while in office.

Though no details about the documents have been made public by prosecutors, questions have been raised as to whether they included the recordings used by Al-Jazeera.

Analysis & views from the Middle East