Egypt- Saudi-led campaign-Yemen

Supporting Arab interests

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Supporting Arab interests

Egypt’s role in the Saudi-led campaign in Yemen is part of a carefully calibrated regional strategy, writes Salah Nasrawi

When scholars at Cairo’s prestigious Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies held a panel discussion on the turmoil in the Middle East and its implications for Egypt’s national security last week, one item was missing from the agenda: Egypt’s role in the Saudi-led campaign against the Houthis in Yemen.

Even after leading sociologist Saadeddin Ibrahim intervened to ask the panelists at the opening session if they expected President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi to fulfil his oft-stated promise to help defend Egypt’s Gulf allies, none of the five distinguished experts on the podium was prepared to venture an answer.

“We will leave your question to be answered by the panelists in the next session,” Ali Al-Din Hilal, a prominent political scientist, told Ibrahim. His remark was met with amusement by the audience that had assembled to mark the 30th anniversary of the first issue of the centre’s Arab Strategic Report.

As the ongoing crisis in Yemen continues to plague the Middle East, questions remain over Egypt’s role in the conflict and the extent of its help to its ally Saudi Arabia, which is leading the Arab military alliance to defeat the Houthis in Yemen.

Al-Sisi has repeatedly warned that the security of Saudi Arabia and other Arab Gulf states is a “red line.” His statement that “it’s only a short distance” to go to defend them has become a catchphrase in Egypt and the rest of the Arab world.

Egypt announced on 26 March that it would join the Saudi-led military campaign against the Houthis, who are backed by forces loyal to Yemen’s former president Ali Abdullah Saleh.

Saudi Arabia regards the Shia Houthi group as a client of Iran, which the kingdom accuses of trying to increase its power in the region at the expense of the Arab countries.

Last week, Egypt extended by three months the authorisation for its military deployment outside the country but did not specify whether the renewed mandate could see Cairo deploy ground troops in Yemen to fight the Houthis.

Numerous media reports have since suggested that Egypt has joined the Saudi-led coalition in bombing the Houthis and has been sending naval vessels to the Yemeni coast. Some mainstream media outlets in the US have even speculated that Egypt could lead a ground operation in Yemen after the current air strikes campaign weakens the Houthis.

But there has been no evidence of Egyptians fighting alongside the Saudis in the war in Yemen, or of Egypt having plans underway to participate in a massive ground operation.

The Egyptian leadership continues to keep people guessing about its military moves in Yemen, while a debate goes on about whether Egypt should be partnering with Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies, who have provided billions of dollars in aid to help boost its ailing economy.

Egypt cannot spend time worrying about the repercussions of the conflict in Yemen and Iran’s expansionism in the region, which could have repercussions in the rest of the Middle East with a major impact on its regional role and security.

But it is critical that Egypt’s response to the Yemeni conflict and the wider implications of the Saudi-Iranian confrontation are carefully measured. Egypt must weigh its close relationships with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members against its vital interests in the region.

Like other Arab nations not directly involved in the conflict in Yemen, the war poses a regional dilemma for Egypt. Because of the intense polarisation the conflict has caused, Egypt may have hoped it had never happened.

Many in Egypt worry that the country’s participation in the war, especially if this were to take the form of ground battles, could further entangle it in the sectarian conflict that is spreading in the Middle East, fuelled by proxy wars in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.

A considerable part of the debate on Egypt’s role in the current crisis has been about whether Egypt’s participation could turn into “another Vietnam,” using the phrase to compare Egypt’s costly foray into Yemen in 1964-1967 to the US war in Vietnam in the 1960s and early 1970s.

Many pundits who evoke the Yemen War in the 1960s argue that Egypt is not eager to enter into another military intervention in Yemen. The earlier war was a disaster for the country, and some 26,000 Egyptian soldiers died fighting Saudi-backed royalists.

However, this could be a false comparison since apart from the fact that the Yemen conflict in the 1960s featured a variety of factors that belonged to its specific historical and political context, today’s war in Yemen is not about the strategy for Egypt’s interventions abroad.

Instead, the war in Yemen started just as Egypt had embarked on a defensive project to assemble a joint Arab force to help it in its fight against terrorism both in the restive Sinai Peninsula and in lawless Libya on its western border.

The war in Yemen has clearly demonstrated the willingness of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states to tackle such challenges and be ready to help Egypt fight terror groups such as the Islamic State (IS) group, which has declared its presence in Sinai and Libya.

Aside from shifting the focus from combating terrorism to fighting the Shia Houthis, Egypt’s other concern is that the war in Yemen will create a realignment that could allow the Muslim Brotherhood, Cairo’s other domestic foe, to resurface as a regional political force and thus threaten Egypt’s security.

Since the war on the Houthis started, reports have circulated that Saudi Arabia has been in contact with Yemen’s Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Al-Islah Party in an attempt to position it as a grassroots political organisation that would be empowered in post-war Yemen.

Saudi Arabia and Qatar, the other major ally in the war against the Houthis, are also reportedly in contact with Egyptian Brotherhood leaders and the movement’s branches in other countries. If true, the move would be seen as an attempt to put pressure on Cairo to bring about reconciliation with the group, which was banned in Egypt after the ouster of former president Mohamed Morsi, a Brotherhood leader.

The Yemen debate also comes at a time when Egypt is supporting a political settlement in Syria that does not include Sunni militants such as the Al-Qaeda affiliate Al-Nusra Front, who are widely believed to be backed by Saudi Arabia and other Gulf nations. The rise of the Islamists in post-Al-Assad Syria could spell an extremist threat to Egypt.

Saudi Arabia’s newfound robust approach to regional conflicts represents a daunting challenge to Egypt. The war the kingdom has initiated in Yemen and its all-out confrontation with Iran indicate that Saudi Arabia wants to be seen as an increasingly influential player in the region.

But many Egyptians are worried about what sort of power Saudi Arabia aspires to be. Will it use its influence to promote shared stability and prosperity, or will it seek to unilaterally alter the regional status quo?

Egypt has long been a cornerstone of the regional order, and any attempt to alter the geopolitical equation without Cairo being consulted and involved could be at Egypt’s expense as a key regional actor.

The notion that Egypt could be taken for granted or seduced by financial assistance will then be seen as little more than wishful thinking.

It is for such reasons that Cairo’s involvement in the Saudi-led war in Yemen is not a mystery. While it is opposing Iran’s increasing influence and rejecting its proxy wars in the region, Egypt has also resisted a rush to a large-scale military confrontation in Yemen.

Al-Sisi has bluntly declared that “the Egyptian army is for Egypt,” which can only be interpreted as meaning a rejection of the idea of putting Egyptian boots on the ground in a theatre where Egyptian interests are not directly implicated.

Egypt has sensibly invited Yemeni and Syrian political groups for talks in Cairo in an attempt to resolve the conflicts in these two embattled Arab countries.

This action, which enjoys the support of most Arab countries and of the international community, underlines the need to maintain the long-term interest of the Arabs and to resist the temptation to use short-term military muscle.

Iraq-Future

The looming Iraq disaster

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The looming Iraq disaster

As Iraq remains bogged down with the war against IS, another catastrophe could be on the horizon, writes Salah Nasrawi

The Iraqi government is considering a set of measures to deal with the crushing financial crisis, which many fear could lead to economic collapse and accelerate the breakup of the divided and war-torn country.

Under the plans to stave off default, the government of Haider Al-Abadi will seek foreign loans, issue bonds and sell parts of Iraq’s huge oil reserves. It also plans to overhaul the economy and get rid of the socialist-era sectors inherited from Saddam Hussein’s era.

But doubts abound that an emergency fund based on international credits or a government bond-selling programme would ease the burden on the Iraqi economy, hard hit by lower oil prices, government inefficiency and rampant corruption.

Selling the country’s national resources could also trigger popular resentment against the government’s oil policies and gives credence to claims that Iraq’s invasion in 2003 was to improve Western access to Iraqi oil.

Falling oil prices since last year has wrecked Iraq’s state finances. Iraq’s 2015 annual budget has projected a deficit of some $25 billion and forced the government to struggle to balance and fund its public spending and stabilize the national currency.

Under the budget law the government is to meet part of the deficit by introducing new taxes, levies and duties. Obligatory saving accounts are also to be opened for senior government officials to deposit part of their salaries. The government also decided to turn to the Central Bank reserves.

Iraq’s government, however, has not disclosed full details about its plans to deal with the financial crisis. Prime Minister Al-Abadi has even been insisting that Iraq is not facing a default but only financial difficulties due to plummeting oil prices.

While Al-Abadi appears to be either in a state of denial or lacking direct experience in financial affairs, his finance minister, Hoshyar Zebari, seems to be the one who is making most of the talking about Iraq’s plans to manage the financial crisis.

Last month Zebari disclosed that Iraq is in discussions with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and is seeking millions of dollars both in an emergency loan programme and by using Iraq’s Special Drawing Rights at the IMF.

Zebari later said Iraqi is seeking an aid package from the IMF that could total as much as $700 million in emergency assistance, a relatively small amount that indicates the sharp deterioration in Iraq’s financial conditions.

According to Zebari, the Iraqi government has also agreed for the first time to issue $5 billion in international bonds as part of a package to restore fiscal suitability and address its budget deficit. He disclosed that Iraq is negotiating with Citibank and Deutsche Bank.

In addition to the international credits and bond issue and a local-currency bond issue, Iraq is planning other measures, including a drastic shift in its policies.

Zebari said Iraq is planning to change the way it operates exploration and production contracts with oil companies. The switch will move Iraq for the first time to production- sharing contracts, where revenues are divided in a percentage split, from service contracts where oil companies are paid a set fee.

Moreover, one of the steps under consideration is to get rid of hundreds of state-owned enterprises, which employ some half a million workers. In one dramatic statement last month, Zebari described these companies as an “absolute failure.”

In its efforts to lower the deficit and cut spending, Iraq’s parliament approved in January a belt-tightening budget that reduced the lavish spending, such as generous allowances, travel and office expenses.

It also resorted to withdrawals from the country’s reserves, estimated at the time at $75 billion. Reports this week suggested that the national reserve has hit a new low at $60 billion.

But the worst part of the financial crisis is its overall impact on the war against the Islamic State (IS) terror group which has occupied vast swathes of territories in Iraq since June last year.

The campaign against IS has been slammed by cuts in spending, including the government’s inability to buy necessary supplies and pay salaries to tens of thousands of recruits in the Popular Mobilization Force, the Shia paramilitary force set to join the fight.

In March, Al-Abadi made a visit to the White House to make an urgent request of billions of dollars in financial and military aid from President Barack Obama for the ongoing campaign against IS. Abadi argued that the budget shortfall has hampered his government’s ability to mount military challenges to IS strongholds in northern and western Iraq.

Still, Al-Abadi returned empty handed after the Obama administration turned down the request. To make a bad situation worse, the US House Armed Services Committee passed a law last week which imposed preconditions on funding for the Iraqi security forces over the next year.

Shortages of funding is also blocking the government from restoring basic services to those towns that have been reclaimed by Iraqi force from IS. Iraq is now turning to the World Bank for help in financing development projects in these areas that suffer from a lack of infrastructure, education and health services.

Many economists and many Iraqis blame much of the financial crisis on Al-Abadi’s government and that of his predecessor, Nuri Al-Maliki, whom they accuse of mismanagement and widespread corruption.

Even with increasing fear of financial crash, Iraq’s Central Bank is still holding daily auctions through which hard currency is sold to banks, companies and traders in exchange for evidence of import and transaction receipts.

Last week, Abdel Basit Turki, Iraq’s ex-chief auditor and former Central Bank governor, told Al-Baghdadiya Television that most of these banks are phonies set up by corrupt politicians to target the foreign currency sales.

He said during his tenure as Central Bank head from 2011 to 2015 some $12 billion were skimmed from the Iraqi reserve and transferred outside Iraq using false documents.

Writing on his Facebook account, Ahmed Chalabi, the head of the parliamentary Finance Committee, disclosed that one Iraqi trader alone had made such transactions of $1.2 billion to a company in the United Arab Emirates over a one-year period.

Now Zebari’s disclosures are sounding the alarm that the country may be facing a slow-death scenario. The question remains, however, if the intended measures could prevent Iraq going bankrupt and stop the violence-ravaged country from sliding into further instability.

It is also not clear if these plans were reviewed and sanctioned by the government and whether they will be put for debate and endorsement by the parliament.

Some of the measures such as selling Iraq’s oil reserves and introducing production-sharing contracts, seem to be controversial. Many Iraqis believe that they will be conceding sovereign wealth to foreign companies.

There are growing concerns that compliance with the IMF conditions unveiled by Zebari, further cuts in spending and foreign borrowing will result in worse scenarios. Iraqis are already hard hit by high prices, rising inflation and a high rate of currency depreciation.

In the meantime, Iraq’s oil production policy seems in disarray. While Iraq’s oil exports rose in April to a record 3.08 million barrels per day (bpd) from 2.98 million bpd in March, the country is not expected to raise much higher revenues as crude prices remain low.

At the same time, Iraq’s bill for paying foreign companies operating in Iraq under service contracts regime, created by the US occupation authority following the 2003 invasion, based on a fixed dollar fee per unit, has ballooned just as its oil revenues fall.

The Iraqi financial crisis is widely seen as largely the result of the massive corruption and economic mismanagement of its political elite and not the plunge in oil prices.

While Iraq remains mired in sectarian strife, an economic crash will be detrimental to the country’s future. There would likely be ramifications that would significantly impact the war against IS and the country’s unity.

Yemen-Saudi-US

Understanding the Yemen war

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Understanding the Yemen war

Saudi Arabia has said it is scaling down its airstrikes in Yemen, but instead it has been stepping up both its rhetoric and the war, writes Salah Nasrawi

Two weeks after Saudi Arabia announced that the coalition it leads would end Operation Decisive Storm against Yemen after the airstrikes campaign had achieved its goals, Saudi jetfighters and gunships have continued pounding the kingdom’s restive southern neighbour.

The Sunni Arab powerhouse’s declaration that it is moving into a second phase of activities after downgrading the Iran-backed Shia Houthi group and eliminating threats from across its border has raised questions about what Saudi Arabia is up to in the war in Yemen.

Questions also persist about the role of the United States in the conflict as Washington tries to appease Saudi Arabia and its allies in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) following its tentative agreement with Iran last month over its nuclear programme.

The US dispatch of warships to the area to prevent possible Iranian arms shipments and Saudi threats that its navy would attempt to search the ships if they tried to dock in Yemen have raised concerns of a potential international confrontation in Yemen.

The disclosure by the United Nations envoy to Yemen, Jamal Benomar, that Yemeni warring political factions were on the verge of a power-sharing deal when the Saudi-led airstrikes started is bound to raise even more eyebrows about this war on one of the most impoverished Arab countries.

With Saudi strikes continuing, sectarian sentiments rising and competition for influence and military capabilities increasing, Yemen could likely become a flashpoint in the volatile Middle East and Gulf region.

What is at stake is whether Saudi Arabia, which appears poised to achieve the subordination of the Houthis, will be able to avoid a quagmire on its borders and if the region can avoid a sectarian conflict on a large scale.

Riyadh claims four weeks of airstrikes have wiped out the weapons and military installations of the Houthis, who took control of the capital Sanaa in September forcing Sunni president Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi to flee to Saudi Arabia.

But on the ground Saudi Arabia does not seem to have made much headway, especially in breaking the grip of the Houthis on power. The Saudi-led air campaign is no nearer to stopping the advance of the Houthis alongside army units loyal to former president Ali Abdullah Saleh.

Thus far, the Saudi campaign has failed to split the Houthi-Saleh alliance, and it has not succeeded in creating a gap between the members of the alliance and the larger Sunni tribes in Yemen either.

The Saudis have been no more successful in creating a credible tribal or political opposition to the Houthis to help reinstall Hadi in power.

Many observers believe that Saudi Arabia may even have no viable strategy for achieving its political goals in Yemen and compelling the Houthis to come to the negotiating table on its terms.

The Houthis and their allies are still making gains. They have overrun large swathes of the country, including parts of South Yemen, and they have encircled the coastal city of Aden whose facilities were widely feared to be being used to unload possible Iranian arms shipments.

Meanwhile, Egypt and Pakistan, two key Sunni allies, have rebuffed a Saudi request to send troops into the country, underlining the Saudis’ inability to resort to a ground option to deal with the Houthis.

As if to underscore how fragile Yemen is, on Saturday the Islamic State (IS) group declared its official presence in the country in a video. IS is the second terrorist group operating in Yemen alongside Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) which has long been trying to take over the country.

Some of the political and human impacts of the war may be devastating and will have long-term implications on Saudi Arabia itself, which will have to live with the chaos and devastation in its backyard.

By the time Saudi Arabia announced it was halting its operations on 19 April, some 1,000 Yemenis had been killed, including 150 children. Thousands of others had been wounded, some 120,000 displaced, and millions more trapped in their homes in an attempt to escape the bombings.

The airstrikes have pushed Yemen, the Arab world’s poorest country, to the brink of disaster. The Saudi-led blockade has deprived the Yemenis of food, fuel, water and medicine, causing what a Red Cross official called a “humanitarian catastrophe” in the country.

According to UN reports, almost 16 million people, or 61 per cent of the total population, have required humanitarian assistance, hundreds of thousands of these having been displaced by the waves of conflict over the past decade.

As Yemen suffers and Saudi Arabia continues its bid to bludgeon the Houthis into submission, attention is also being focused on the United States, which has aided the Saudis both diplomatically and militarily.

By publicly claiming that Iran was still seeking to supply weapons to the Houthis the White House has not only given credence to the Saudi pretexts for waging the airstrikes but also added more fuel to the fire.

Moreover, Washington has provided Riyadh with intelligence information and tactical advice, including vetting military targets, and it has accelerated the sale of new weapons to Riyadh and its Gulf allies.

The US navy has beefed up its presence by deploying the warship Theodore Roosevelt off the Yemeni coast, reassuring Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies of its continued support.

American pundits have been defending the Obama administration’s approach in Yemen as part of the US president’s broader “Iran doctrine” to reintegrate the Islamic Republic into the rest of the world by encouraging Tehran to break through its isolation.

They explain Obama’s approach as a “dual engagement” strategy by which Washington will bolster the Saudis and their allies through new US military commitments while continuing to seek to finalise a nuclear deal with Iran.

Others commentators believe the US engagement is about weapon sales. According to the New York Times, US industry officials have notified Congress that they are expecting additional requests from Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar for thousands of new US-made weapons, including missiles and bombs, to rebuild depleted arms stockpiles.

To many analysts, the fact that the United States is backing the Saudi campaign in Yemen despite the collateral damage and a general consensus about the campaign’s futility means that Washington has become an accomplice in the war in Yemen.

As for Saudi Arabia, failure in Yemen is certainly not an option. Saudi columnists and experts who usually reflect the opinions of the royal family have been toiling to convey Riyadh’s message that the kingdom is bent on confronting Iran not only in Yemen but also in places such as Iraq, Lebanon and Syria.

Yet, the key questions being asked these days are what Riyadh’s other options are and if it has any way out of what could become its Vietnam. Few outside Saudi Arabia and its Gulf partners believe the kingdom’s justification for the war and wonder if Riyadh is waiting for a ladder to get it down from the position it now finds itself in.

Many observers find the Saudi war in Yemen mystifying. What is Saudi Arabia seeking in Yemen? Why does Saudi Arabia feel it knows what is best for the Yemenis? Why is it fighting so hard when most Yemeni factions agree that talks can resolve the conflict?

Is it part of a short-sighted plan that has chosen Yemen as an arena to confront Iran and the Shia in the region? Is the incursion into Yemen part of an assertive Saudi foreign policy that uses the military to carry out its agenda?

Answering these questions and understanding the war in Yemen requires the meaningful evaluation of the potential outcomes that could ensue and in turn the complex implications of these outcomes and their broader ramifications in the region.

As doubts increase about the effectiveness of the Saudi air campaign, attention is being turned to a possible Saudi-led land incursion into Yemen. Though most analysts believe that talk about a Saudi invasion is just a bluff, Riyadh could resort to it as an act of desperation if it fails to achieve its goal of compelling the Houthis into submission.

But several unintended consequences could emerge either way which would undoubtedly impact the Saudi domestic front and alter Riyadh’s position in the regional order.

Domestically, ending the war without succeeding in subduing the Houthis would have dire consequences for the royal family and could trigger the power struggle that was thought to have subsided after king Salman moved quickly following his succession in January to put the House of Al-Saud in order.

Two of the most powerful members of the royal family, second-in-line to the throne, Minister of Interior and King Salman’s son prince Mohamed bin Nayef and Minister of Defence prince Mohamed bin Salman lead the war on Yemen and they could take the blame for its failure.

An unsuccessful Saudi military intervention would bolster the Houthis and would give them even more power in Yemen at the expense of Saudi Arabia’s allies. It would also give Iran more leverage and increase its regional status.

The implications of the failure to achieve the goals of the war on Saudi Arabia’s leadership role in the Gulf and in the Arab and Muslim world will be enormous. And the Yemen crisis and its outcome threaten to change the trajectory of the Shia-Sunni polarisation in the region for the worse.

One of its unintended consequences will be fertile land for radical organisations such as IS and Al-Qaeda to grow still further.

—

This article appeared frist in Al-Aharm Weekly on April, 30 2015

Iraq-US

Cracks in Iraqi-US relations

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Cracks in Iraqi-US relations

Last week’s visit by Iraqi Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi to Washington highlighted the widening gulf in the Iraqi-US partnership, writes Salah Nasrawi

Iraqi Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi stunned the Obama administration during a visit to Washington last week when he told journalists that the White House was unhappy with the Saudi-led military campaign against Houthi forces in Yemen which he warned could engulf the Middle East in war.

Al-Abadi’s criticism of the US-backed Saudi airstrikes in Yemen and his claims of the White House’s dissatisfaction with the mission prompted a swift denial from the Obama administration and the Saudi ambassador in Washington Adel Jubeir.

Whether scripted or not, Al-Abadi’s comments have underlined serious problems in the Iraqi-US relationship and have far-reaching implications for how Washington is engaged in Iraq’s political and security crises.

Since the US troop pullout in 2011, the Iraqi-US relationship has had many ups and downs but has worked largely by disguising key differences over several intertwined issues, mostly leftovers from the era of the decade-long US occupation of the country.

But many of the new disputes, which centre around broader regional policies and approaches to resolving and managing regional conflicts, seem to have made the Iraqi-US relationship more lopsided, and thus more fraught, than ever before.

While in Washington Al-Abadi took aim at the Saudi-led military campaign against the Shia Houthi rebels in Yemen. He explained his worries that Saudi airstrikes might be a precursor for a more assertive Saudi military role in neighbouring countries, including Iraq.

Ordinarily, this should not have bothered Washington, which is committed by the 2008 Strategic Framework Agreement with Baghdad to help strengthen “security and stability in Iraq” and enhance its ability “to deter all threats against its sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity.”

But Al-Abadi’s remarks seemed to have gone too far in unravelling the paradox in Iraqi-US relations and underscoring the Obama administration’s fractured and even contradictory Middle East policies.

For Al-Abadi and the rest of the Iraqi Shia, the US’s expanding role in Saudi Arabia’s campaign against the Houthis in Yemen is not helpful either in combating terrorism in the region or in easing mounting Shia-Sunni tensions.

For the Iraqi Shia, US support for the Saudi-led war in Yemen looks like a tale of hypocrisy that rules the world.

What is puzzling to the Iraqi Shia-led government is that while US President Barack Obama has called on the Gulf nations to use their influence on Libya’s warring factions to help resolve the chaotic situation there, US drones flying over Yemen transmit the information that Gulf jetfighters use to attack targets in Yemen.

Obama’s invitation to the leaders of Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies for a meeting at Camp David next month “to discuss ways to enhance partnership and deepen security cooperation” may also increase the Iraqi Shia-led government’s fears about Washington’s gamble.

One of the scenarios for the upcoming summit is that the United States may propose to help the Saudi-led camp to acquire a similar status to Iran, both with an internationally recognised nuclear programme and a reinforced regional posture.

This feared scenario, if materialised, could initiate a trilateral relationship between the US, Iran and the Saudi-led camp that Washington will hope will ensure regional equilibrium and enhance stability.

But such a perception ignores the fact that the dynamics of Arab-Iranian relations are further complicated by historical, nationalistic and sectarian enmities and regional competition.

Worse, without regional institutions to achieve its goals it remains questionable whether such an innovation on the multilateral front would amount to something that could usefully be considered as the basis for new regional arrangements.

In this regard, Iraq’s concerns remain immediate and focused. Al-Abadi’s warning in Washington about Iraq being within the radar of Saudi Arabia was actually a message to the Obama administration that it needs to be more sensitive to concerns that its approach to Saudi Arabia could turn the conflict in Yemen into an all-out regional sectarian war.

Furthermore, it could encourage the kingdom to launch a similar campaign against Iraq or Syria.

Another sign of fissures between the Iraqi Shia-led government in Baghdad and Washington is over differences in conducting the campaign against the Islamic State (IS) terror group in Iraq.

Since it started some ten months ago when IS captured vast swathes of territory in the country, the two sides have sharply differed on policies and the military strategies needed to beat IS and take back the land.

While Obama suggested a military strategy of airstrikes to “degrade and ultimately destroy IS” coupled with a political approach that called for Sunni inclusion in Iraq, the Baghdad government resorted to Shia Iran for help in battling IS.

Iran has been supporting Iraq with weapons, intelligence and training in the battles. But its main contribution has been in mobilising its elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to build a massive Iraqi Shia paramilitary force that has been effective in regaining control over Iraq’s Sunni provinces.

While the United States sees the Iranian involvement in the fighting in Iraq as possibly turning the war on terrorism into a sectarian war, the Iraqi government has criticised the “slow tempo” of the US airstrikes and their ineffectiveness.

Iraq complains of a lack of US intelligence and weapon supplies to the Iraqi security forces. Its main concern remains that the US military strategy to combat IS is not working and has even created further confusion in Iraq.

During Al-Abadi’s visit to Washington a key difference surfaced when Al-Abadi told reporters that the next step in military operations against IS fighters would be to try to roll them back in Iraq’s western Anbar Province.

In contrast, US top brass general Martin Dempsey said defending Ramadi, the Anbar provincial capital, was of secondary importance compared with protecting the Beiji oil refinery from IS militants, a stance even some Republicans in the US have criticised as minimising setbacks.

Earlier, the two sides had differed publically on when a military push to retake the northern strategic city of Mosul, Iraq’s second-largest city, would take place. Again, US officials expressed concerns about the role of the Iran-backed militias in the offensive, while the Iraqis insisted that they should be in control of the timetable and tactics in the battle to retake Mosul.

The disagreements have been costly as Iraq has had to delay an offensive to take back Anbar following Washington’s insistence that the Shia paramilitary forces should not take part in order for the US to provide airpower support to the Iraqi troops.

As a result, the IS militants initiated a counter-offensive and seized more land in Ramadi this week, forcing tens of thousands of civilians to flee Ramadi and triggering a fresh humanitarian crisis in Iraq.

Iraq’s security forces had to reorganise and bring reserves from the Shia-led Popular Mobilisation Force in order to halt the militants from further advancing in Ramadi and threatening Baghdad.

One more sign of Iraqi frustration with Washington has been the latter’s failure to support Baghdad with the kinds of weapons it needs to fight IS. While in Washington Al-Abadi kept telling the media that the Iraqi security forces needed American weapons such as tanks and warplanes “badly”.

Nevertheless, he returned to Baghdad empty-handed and with only a pledge from Obama for $200 million in humanitarian support for those displaced by IS onslaughts.

The United States may have adopted certain policies in Iraq and the Middle East, but the Obama administration’s approach can hardly be seen as reflecting the true reality of Iraq’s and the region’s complex politics.

Its main deficiency is that it has failed to understand the region as it really is.

The confusion it has created has divided people in Iraq and in the Middle East between those who believe that the administration’s strategy empowers the Shia militias in Iraq and Iran, and others who see Washington as an ally in the war against the Shia.

At no time since it withdrew its troops from Iraq has the United States seemed so undone as a strategic partner because of its poor policies.

If there is one simple way of describing the US attitude towards Iraq, it is in the Iraqi proverb: “I won’t feed you. And I won’t let you beg.” That can hardly maintain a partnership based on trust and confidence.

—

This article appeared  first in Al-Ahram Weekly on April 23, 2015

Iraq-Kurds

End of democracy in Iraqi Kurdistan?

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End of democracy in Iraqi Kurdistan?

The fate of Masoud Barzani’s presidency has put the nascent democracy of Iraqi Kurdistan to its biggest test yet, writes Salah Nasrawi

Ali Hama Saleh, a member of the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Parliament for Gorran, or the Movement for Change, seems to have followed the wrong path in defending his party’s platform of reform. He has chosen to defy Kurdistan’s strongman, Iraqi Kurdistan’s President Masoud Barzani, who is making a bid to cling to power, by criticising his foot-dragging in giving the autonomous region a constitution.

Last month, Saleh wrote an open letter to Barzani whose Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and family members have dominated Kurdish politics for more than half a century, urging him to quickly fix the “presidency problem through dialogue between political groups.”

“Delay,” he wrote on his Facebook page, “will result in dire consequences.”

The reform-minded lawmaker and anti-graft campaigner also blasted the Region’s government led by Barzani’s nephew and son-in-law Nechirvan Barzani for widespread corruption and the mismanagement of financial affairs.

In his post, Saleh detailed the waste of billions of dollars received from the Baghdad government’s budgetary allocations over 12 years, revenues from selling oil from the Kurdish Region, local taxes and loans from foreign banks.

Thousands of loyalists and cronies had been receiving pensions and salaries from the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) without being eligible for payments, while the government had claimed it did not have enough cash to pay the salaries of its civil servants, Saleh wrote.

“Who is responsible for the financial situation of Kurdistan, and why has it reached this stage,” he asked.

In a nascent democracy critical views by an MP would be tolerated, but not in Iraqi Kurdistan where Saleh’s call has provoked a strong response from Barzani’s supporters who have sought to punish him for crossing a red line by challenging Kurdistan’s leader.

When Saleh attended the parliament a few days later the wolves were circling waiting for him. Two KDP members attacked Saleh as he tried to step into the session.

As the assembly erupted in protest, members dragged the assailants out of the chaotic hall. Speaker Youssef Mohamed also ordered the session suspended, fearing an outbreak of skirmishes between rival members.

But the assault on Saleh soon resonated across Kurdistan, renewing a debate about Kurdish democracy, a much-trumpeted achievement since the autonomous region was established as a federal region of Iraq following the US-led invasion in 2003.

Almost 12 years later that cherished narrative of Kurdish democracy is giving way to frustration and disillusionment among Iraqi Kurds who have been watching their government turning into another Middle Eastern autocracy.

The brawl in the Kurdish parliament has underlined how an iron fist is being used to silence opposition groups seeking reform. But it has also thrown Barzani’s controversial presidency wide open as he maneuvers to stay in power despite legal and constitutional restraints.

The wrangle over Barzani’s presidency has intensified ahead of the end of his term in office this summer amid demands by the opposition for a constitution for the Kurdish Region which sets out the rules for the election of the president of Kurdistan by the Region’s parliament.

The document, drafted in 2009, has never been put to public referendum for ratification after Barzani declined to sign it. It states that the president of the Kurdistan Region “may be re-elected for a second term on the date this constitution enters into force.”

The opposition argues that the draft constitution was rushed through by the parliament at the time by a caretaker government controlled by the KDP and the PUK, another Kurdish party, which share power in the region.

According to the opposition some of the constitution’s articles were changed within a matter of days and presented for endorsement by the parliament when one third of its members were not present.

It also claims that among the articles that were changed were those that made the Iraqi Kurdistan Region a presidential system, whereas the original document drafted by a special committee had stated that the region enjoyed “a parliamentary political system”.

Under the controversial draft constitution, the president wields absolute power, including the power to declare a state of emergency, issue decrees that have the force of law, dissolve the parliament and dismiss ministers.

Now the opposition wants the constitution to be sent back to the parliament to amend items related to the president’s power and reinforce the assembly’s powers, including its right to elect the president.

Barzani was first elected for a four-year term in 2005 by the parliament. In 2009, he was re-elected by a public election according to a law that stipulated that Iraqi Kurdistan’s president be directly elected by the people.

The opposition says that law contradicted the draft constitution and insists that Barzani has now served the two terms allowed in the document.

However, Barzani’s supporters argue that the term limits are not retrospective, so Barzani is eligible for re-election.

Nevertheless, when Barzani completed his two terms in office in July 2013, the parliament passed a law extending his tenure for two years. The move, pushed through by the KDP and its coalition partner the PUK, was rejected by the opposition parties and prompted fist-fights and the throwing of water bottles in the parliament.

Many of Barzani’s critics believe his insistence on holding a referendum has more to do with his autocratic tendencies and his intention to stay in power than it does with any concern for democratic politics.

To stave off a deeper confrontation over Barzani’s presidency, the region’s parliamentary speaker has started discussions with the main political groups to find the best way out of its worst political standoff since 2003.

But the crisis talks have remained inconclusive.

While the PUK’s Deputy Secretary-General Kusrat Rasoul said his party, which has 18 seats in parliament, needs more time to make a decision on “such a critical issue,” Gorran Party leader Nawshirwan Mustafa said his movement, which has 24 seats in parliament, still wants the election of the region’s president to be held by the parliament.

He also reiterated his movement’s demand for the ratification of the draft constitution.

The Kurdistan Islamic Union, the fourth-largest group in the parliament with 10 seats, has so far refrained from taking a public stance on the crisis. But Ali Bapir, leader of the Islamic Group in Kurdistan, which has six seats in parliament, said his party would support another extension for Barzani if other factions backed the move.

Barzani, who on Sunday chaired a meeting of KDP leaders to discuss the crisis, has remained tight-lipped about the controversy. Following the meeting, a statement said the party leadership had made an “appropriate decision” but did not give details.

Insiders say Barzani may be trying to settle the dispute outside the parliament in order to avoid further wrangling and public embarrassment.

In the past, Barzani succeeded in stifling dissent either by buying off opponents or by playing for high stakes, knowing that the opposition groups were too weak to stop him from pursuing such a course of action.

Iraqi Kurdistan has long been dubbed an oasis of democracy, political stability and economic growth in violence-torn Iraq. With a multi-party electoral system that allows Kurds to go out and vote their leaders into power, technically the region is a democracy, though it has been a far from functioning one.

Many analysts believe that attempts by Barzani to stay in office through outmaneuvering the opposition and violating legal and constitutional limitations will turn democracy in Iraqi Kurdistan into farce.

The region’s latest political crisis also comes at a crucial time for Iraqi Kurds who face formidable challenges, including the war with the Islamic State (IS) terror group and a financial crunch that has forced it to suspend its ambitious plans to become a haven for business.

In an interview with the American PBS TV channel recently, Barzani acknowledged that the war with IS had delayed the Kurdish bid for independence from the rest of Iraq, a goal he has been vehemently pursuing.

Analysis & views from the Middle East