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Iraq’s post-IS stabilisation fiction

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Salah EBIraq’s post-IS stabilisation fiction

A UN-led relief and stabilisation programme could hinder the state-rebuilding process in post-IS Iraq, writes Salah Nasrawi

On 18 July, 18 Iraqi media outlets disclosed that members of the provincial Anbar Council had allotted millions of dollars to themselves as what they considered to be compensation for the damage caused to their houses during the fight to drive Islamic State (IS) group militants from cities in the province.

Some 38 members of the council will receive lucrative pay-offs, with at least one of the councillors netting approximately $1 million in compensation, according to documents obtained by the media. Millions of dollars will also go to councillors’ relatives, friends and cronies.

The revelation of the Anbar Council corruption scandal soon led to arguments, as international donors last month launched a vast UN-led assistance plan after the liberation of Iraqi cities and towns from IS militants.

There are growing fears that the appropriations may be badly run because of endemic corruption and backsliding in the Iraqi government on both the national and local levels, amid concerns that the UN bureaucracy, widely criticised as being beset by inefficiency and misconceived programmes, cannot be an effective tool in reducing graft on such a large-scale reconstruction and development programme.

Previous Iraqi governments’ humanitarian programmes were rife with corruption and money snaffling, which had corrosive effects on relief and reconstruction efforts. In November 2014, the country’s parliament voted to abolish a government committee tasked with providing emergency aid to displaced people from the cities taken by IS after accusations of rampant corruption.

Head of the committee Deputy Prime Minister Saleh Al-Mutlaq was accused of squandering some $500 million in unaccounted for purchases and expenses. Al-Mutlaq denied any embezzlement, but was later fired from his post. No proper investigation into the allegations was conducted.

Now the donor nations, working under the umbrella of the US-led International Coalition against IS, say they want to take responsibility for a new relief and rehabilitation programme that will be put in place once the Iraqi cities are retaken from IS militants.

The militants’ defences have been crumbling fast across Iraq, and an offensive to liberate Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city and last IS stronghold, is already under way. The aid programme is mainly designed to help pacify the mostly Sunni populated provinces affected by the war against IS in order to prevent the group from returning to the areas or a recurrence of the Sunni insurgency.

Most worrying, however, is the fact that the plan will put the international community in charge of post-IS Iraq’s reconstruction, without the active participation of Iraqis in planning and execution and without a mandate, or well-designed roadmap, for ending Iraq’s lingering conflicts.

Under the so-called stabilisation programme, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) will take responsibility for supervising a multi-billion dollar effort to support the Iraqi government in its efforts to stabilise the newly liberated areas.

The UNDP’s main goals, as outlined in a post on its Website, are to restore the delivery of basic services in the retaken areas, jumpstart the local economy, implement the emergency restoration of priority infrastructure in these areas, and stimulate the local economy to generate income and employment opportunities.

According to a mechanism called the Funding Facility for Immediate Stabilisation (FFIS), the UNDP is to work in several development fields, including public works, infrastructure rehabilitation, improving livelihoods and capacity support.

But this is an endeavour that Iraq’s coffers cannot afford. The country faces a huge budget deficit of up to $20 billion this year alone, as it grapples with low oil revenues and the heavy cost of the war with IS militants.

In May, the government announced that the World Bank would provide Iraq with a $1.2 billion loan to help Baghdad manage its finances and fund emergency reconstruction in towns recaptured from IS.

Last month, donor countries raised some $2.1 billion for Iraq, which organisers said will go towards alleviating the suffering, deprivation and devastation inflicted on the Iraqi people by IS.

But the United States made it clear that the money would not be going to the Iraqi government, but instead would go to the United Nations and its agencies for humanitarian assistance.

“These donations, and our contribution among them, will go to the UN to distribute. They do a remarkable job figuring out who needs to get it, where they are and how much they need to get. And we have complete trust and confidence in their ability to keep doing that,” said US State Department Spokesman John Kirby.

Whatever the reasons behind such a move, the UN-led programme will put Iraq’s future in the hands of an international agency, and the stakes are high that Iraqis will once again miss an opportunity to engage directly in an interactive process to rebuild their battered nation.

A constructive role by the United Nations in Iraq’s rebuilding remains crucial, but it is expected to include the process of nation-building, transformation and state-building at the same time.

Any such programme should shift in approach from merely providing funding for post-conflict pacification to a comprehensive strategy of rebuilding a failed nation.

The UNDP says the mechanism will be used to promote community reconciliation and alleviate concerns relating to human rights and inclusion through a set of guidelines and a steering committee to supervise the programme.

But this is not enough to resolve Iraq’s 13-year internecine conflict and bring peace to the war-battered country. In order for such an effort to be effective and bear fruit, the international community should allow the Iraqis themselves to drive the entire process until it reaches its ultimate outcome.

While the world can provide financial, technical and political assistance, Iraq’s rebuilding remains the duty of Iraqis. One of the imperatives of working together in such a national endeavour is to initiate a learning process that can promote both the healing of old wounds and reconciliation.

For this approach to succeed in launching an effective state- and nation-building process, Iraq’s different communities, political groups and civil society should come up with a new deal for post-IS Iraq.

The first step should be for these communities to reach a new social and political contract for a functioning national political structure to replace the current dysfunctional system.

In order for this process to move forward, a transitional period should start the day after the Iraqi security forces have won the war against IS, alongside an effective, well-defined and sustainable stabilisation programme.

This will require a new transitional period that will include writing a new constitution and electing a new parliament that will choose a government that will take responsibility for implementing the new national contract.

While managing a successful transitional process remains the duty of Iraqis, the world can still assist by providing expertise and support in building institutional capacity and encouraging a new generation of Iraqis to take responsibility for reconstructing their country’s entire system.

The world should understand that stabilisation and reconstruction in Iraq following the defeat of IS needs more than short-term funding programmes, such as the FFIS adopted by the UNDP. Iraq’s troubles run so wide that the country needs a long-term sustainable programme that can overcome the political crises that breed trouble.

The main weakness of the current programme is that it deals with problems in areas affected by the war against IS with relief and development projects, while the biggest strategic concern should be dealing with the whole country, which is in ruins.

One major concern is that funding will mostly go to the administrative and operational costs of the UN agencies and foreign NGOs rather than to actual relief work, humanitarian needs and assistance.

While corruption such as in the Anbar Council compensation scandal remains a major concern, Iraqi NGOs and relief agencies such as the Red Crescent should be encouraged to take an active part in the programme. The participation of cross-sectarian NGOs in the rebuilding programmes should be part of the transformation of Iraq.

Iraq needs a pan-Iraqi reconstruction and development programme and a concrete nation- and-state-rebuilding scheme that replaces the current failed state with a new and functional system that gives Iraqis hope for the future.

The success of any stabilisation programme in post-IS Iraq will depend on whether the transitional period can produce a transformative leadership.

Such a leadership can only come into being through moulding a new Iraqi national identity, and it cannot be just about putting Shia, Sunnis and Kurds or other ethnicities in positions of power.

—

This artcile appeared first in Al-Ahram Weekly on August 18, 2016

 

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Heikal, Egypt’s most famous journalist, dies at 92

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Heikal, Egypt’s most famous journalist, dies at 92

Muhammad Hassanein Heikal was well-recognised for his distinguished career in journalism and political experience.

Salah Nasrawi

Muhammad Hassanein Heikal, a leading Egyptian journalist, author, television celebrity, politician and a noted authority on modern Middle East whose work brought him worldwide fame and influence, died on Wednesday, aged 92.

Egyptian state television said Heikal, a heavy cigar smoker, died following a short period of illness.

As Egypt’s, and probably the Arab world’s, oldest active and most celebrated intellectual, Heikal was perceived by critics and admirers as a towering figure who had continued to attract attention until his death.

Above all, Heikal was one of the most trenchant defenders of Nasserite Egypt and its pan-Arabism trends.

Heikal was born on September 23, 1923, to the family of a wheat merchant in the Nile Delta province of Qalyubia. His father thought that Heikal, as the eldest son in the family, should join him in managing his business. Instead, Heikal decided to pursue his education.

Educated briefly at the American University in Cairo, Heikal became a crime reporter for the Egyptian Gazette in 1943. The paper which catered to the needs of expatriates living in Egypt had among its writers famous British authors such as George Orwell and Lawrence Durrell.

The following year, Heikal joined the staff of Rose El-Youssef, an opposition political satirical weekly.
Heikal first won public attention as a war reporter covering the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948 and then briefly the Korean war of 1950-1953.h the military coup in 1952 which brought Gamal Abdul Nasser on the helm of army officers who ruled the country after overthrowing the British-backed King Farouk.

As Nasser’s friend since they first met during the war with Israel, Heikal became a staunch supporter of the coup and helped in drafting Nasser’s manifesto, The Philosophy of the Revolution, which outlined his outlook for post-monarchy Egypt.

Heikal’s place in journalism was quickly recognised in 1953 when he was hired to serve as editor of Akhir Sa’a, an illustrated Arabic-language weekly published by Akhbar Al-Youm House.

In 1956 and 1957, Heikal served as editor of Al-Akhbar daily, a sister publication owned by media tycoons Mustafa Amin and his twin brother Ali, who are widely considered to be the fathers of Western-style modern Egyptian journalism.

A year after Nasser became president of Egypt in 1956 he installed Heikal as editor-in-chief of Al Ahram, the semi-official newspaper, and in 1959 made him chairman of the board of Al Ahram Establishment. During his tenure, Heikal improved Al Ahram’s coverage by subduing the sensationalism that had characterised Egypt’s media and taking it to the level of Egypt’s and the Arab world’s most prestigious paper.

Under his leadership the paper provided a platform for Nasser’s nationalist and pan-Arab policies. Heikal’s widely read Friday column in Al Ahram, “Bi-Saraha” [or “Frankly Speaking”], in which he used to convey Nasser’s messages and explain the government’s stances, became the barometer of Egyptian policy.

The column prompted the Washington Post to describe Heikal’s writings as “the voice of Egypt” and “the outside world’s window on that secretive regime”.

One of Heikal’s outstanding acts was to establish Al Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies as a think-tank that provided Nasser and the government with updates and feedback on regional and international affairs.

As happens with the intelligentsia under totalitarian or populist regimes, Heikal had probably failed to draw a clear demarcation between his role as a journalist and as an outspoken advocate of Nasserism.

In 1968, he became a member of the Central Committee of the Arab Socialist Union, Nasser’s ruling party. In 1970, Heikal became minister of National Guidance and briefly an acting foreign minister.

Heikal had a rocky relationship with President Anwar Sadat, Nasser’s successor. After Nasser’s death in 1970, Heikal remained editor of Al Ahram and adviser to the new president. He even helped Sadat to get rid of Nasser’s remnants in the government whom Sadat accused of conspiring to remove him from power.

Later Heikal fell out with Sadat over his domestic and international policies, prompting Sadat to relieve him of his duties in 1974. The disagreement culminated in Heikal’s opposition to the 1979 peace treaty Sadat signed with Israel.

At one point, Sadat accused Heikal of opportunism and betraying the national interests. A smearing campaign in the government-run media also denounced Heikal as a tool of the Soviet Union and linked him with unsubstantiated scandals.

In 1981, Sadat ordered Heikal to be jailed, together with hundreds of political leaders, writers and intellectuals who were opposed to his peace overture with Israel and his alliance with the United States.

Heikal was released a month later by former President Mubarak, shortly after he took office following Sadat’s assassination in October 1981. Mubarak, however, did not bring Heikal to his entourage or let him return to Al Ahram, and he was shunned away from writing in the Egyptian press.

Because of his prominence and his passion for journalism and writing, Heikal spent the following years freelancing for papers abroad. During this period he also wrote some of his most famous books, including Autumn of Fury, about the assassination of Sadat in which he condemned not only the former president’s policies but also his personal life through negative and even racist themes.

In the 1990s, Heikal resumed writing in Egypt. His pieces started appearing in Wijhat Nadhar, a monthly magazine that features essays and book reviews and is modelled on the London Review of Books. Some of his writings were controversial and even sessional.

On his 80th birthday in September 2003, Heikal said he would retire. In an article entitled “An Excuse for Departure” which appeared in Al Ahram, Heikal explained that he felt he had reached his “expiry date”. It was too good to be true.

In 2007 Heikal began hosting a series of weekly programmes on regional and world events on Al Jazeera Arabic Channel. Among the topics he discussed in the “Ma’a Heikal” [or “With Heikal”] show were US-Middle East policies, the Arab-Israeli conflict and Arab divisions. As it was expected, Egypt under Nasser came up in several programmes.

The Thursday night peak-hour show furnished Heikal with a greater platform, turning him into a household celebrity across the Arab world, and made him climb the media ladder to even greater heights.

In the second episode, Heikal told his audience that Al Jazeera gave him “a real opportunity to talk to people without censorship on a wide range of issues”.

In recent years, Heikal was a regular host on Egyptian privately owned television networks. His discussions were mostly pegged to the 2011 Arab Spring and the turmoil it had triggered in Egypt and the rest of the Arab world.

Even though some of the TV shows were conducted in a Q&A style, Heikal remained faithful to his old style, delivering a monologue on the themes of his choice.

Heikal had admirers as much as he had critics and enemies.To many of his disciples, El-Ustaz [or the Master] Heikal was an inspiration whether for his distinguished career in journalism, his intellect, his political experience or his prominence that earned him international recognition and friendship of powerful and influential people all over the world.

He had fans among Westerners, too. “His mind like a razor, that of a veteran fighter, writer, sage, perhaps the most important living witness and historian of modern Egypt,” wrote Robert Fisk, the veteran Middle East reporter for the British newspaper The Independent, in February 2011.

Detractors, however, accuse Heikal of being guilty of treason by being apologetic to Nasser and his long-time propagandist.

That was especially noticeable following the Arab-Israeli war in 1967 when he coined the word Naksa, an Arabic word for setback, as a euphemism for the Egyptian and Arab armies’ bitter defeat by Israel.

For many Arabs, the conflict not only resulted in their losing the West Bank and Syria’s Golan Heights to Israel, but it was also behind all political tragedies that have occurred subsequently in the Arab world.

Critics also noted that Heikal had never revised his views on Nasserism, even though it had become clear that it had its great share in many of Egypt’s political, economic and social woes.

Among harsh criticisms levelled against Heikal is making things up. Critics often claimed he was using quotations attributed to dead politicians which they believed were fabricated to support an argument or serve a political agenda.

Referring to Heikal’s allegedly unchecked facts, Canada-based Iraqi historian Sayyar Al-Jamil, who wrote two books on Heikal; Decomposing Heikal and The Remnants of Heikal, believes that the journalist’s works are mostly “whimsical fabrications or self-serving twisted facts”.

“I do not trust the man’s tales, neither his way of documentation. His writings are aimed at a specific timely political goal or self-serving or to satisfy his admirers in accordance with prevailing circumstances. He has the ability to hide the truth or to kill it,” he wrote in The Remnants of Heikal.

But Sherif Younis, a history professor at Cairo’s Helwan University whose theses tackled Heikal’s works, says the Egyptian author was a source to be reckoned with. “He might not be a historian, per se, but he was there witnessing where history was made,” he told Al Jazeera.

Heikal’s literary production, which spanned more than six decades, covered a variety of political issues. His books on Nasser are The Cairo Documents: The Inside Story of Nasser and His Relationship with World Leaders, Rebels, and Statesmen (1973) and Cutting the Lion’s Tale: Suez Through Egyptian Eyes (1987). In addition to Autumn of Fury, his books about Sadat’s era include The Road to Ramadan (1975) and October War (1980).

His Secret Channels: The Inside Story of Arab-Israeli Peace Negotiations (1996) was considered among the few books that examined the history of covert negotiations between Israeli and Arab representatives which culminated with the Oslo Agreement in September 1993.

Heikal’s books on Iran: Iran on a Volcano (1951), The Return of the Ayatollah: The Iranian Revolution from Mossadeq to Khomeini (1981) and Iran: The Untold Story (1982) made him one of the best Arab experts on Iran.

In his Illusions of Triumph: An Arab View of The Gulf War (1993), Heikal argued that Saddam Hussein’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait was less a challenge to the West and Israel than an attempt by the Iraqi leader to assert his leadership of the Arab world after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Heikal’s last book was Mubarak and his Time (2012), which extended his criticism of Mubarak, whom he portrayed as inept and corrupt.

With his death, Heikal leaves a legacy that will most likely be open for debate not only in Egypt but throughout the Arab world where he left disciples and enemies.

Heikal was quite aware of his role in modern Egypt’s politics and history. “I lived to see and I told what I had lived,” he once wrote.‏

Heikal is survived by his wife Hedayet Olwi and three sons: Ali, Ahmed and Hassan.

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The battle for the future of Iraq’s Sunnis

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The battle for the future of Iraq’s Sunnis

As Ramadi is declared recaptured from the Islamic State group and the battle for Mosul looms, the future of the Sunni areas in Iraq remains uncertain, writes Salah Nasrawi

In a surprise move, the United States has announced that it will deploy a new force of special operations troops to Iraq to combat the Islamic State (IS) terror group which has seized swathes of the country and neighbouring Syria.

US Secretary of Defense Ash Carter wrote in the US publication Politico last week that soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division would soon deploy to Iraq to join the fight against IS “with a clear campaign plan to deliver the barbaric organisation a lasting defeat.”

Though Carter did not give details about the deployment, he said the troop mission was to destroy the IS “parent tumour in Iraq and Syria by collapsing its two power centres in Mosul, Iraq and Raqqa, Syria.”

“Our campaign is to deliver IS a lasting defeat,” Carter wrote.

US Secretary of State John Kerry said “the government of Iraq was of course briefed in advance of secretary Carter’s announcement” and the two sides would work out details about the new deployment.

Joseph F Dunford Jr, the US top military officer, also said discussions between Washington and Baghdad had begun on how American forces would “integrate” with Iraqi military units to take back Mosul.

The move is a sharp departure from US President Barack Obama’s previous strategy that the US would not deploy “boots on the ground” in Iraq and Syria and would continue instead its current air campaign and military assistance to the Iraqi government.

Baghdad has not yet made it clear if it had agreed to let the US troops into Iraq. Iraqi Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi has repeatedly said foreign ground combat troops are not needed in Iraq. Leaders of the country’s Shia groups have warned that they will consider such a presence a violation of Iraq’s sovereignty.

If the statements by top American officials are any indication, the United States is now gearing up for war with IS, including in the battle for Mosul, Iraq’s second-largest city which was captured by the terror group in spring 2014.

Analysts believe that the US-led coalition against IS needs to take back Mosul, a sprawling city of more than two million people, and the US military shift signals Washington’s readiness to engage IS strongholds with ground combat operations.

According to US reports, one key element in the expected revamped US campaign is the severing of IS supply lines between Mosul and Raqqa in Syria.

The US has reportedly established a covert military base in Qamishli in Kurdish-controlled north-eastern Syria, allegedly to step up operations with Kurdish militants in the region. The installation lies within a few miles of Iraq.

Since November, when Kurdish fighters backed by US fire power and advisers retook Sinjar, a key strategic town between the two IS strongholds, Sinjar and the adjacent border area have been under the control of Kurdish fighters from Iraq, Syria and the Turkish Kurdish Workers Party (PKK).

Another key element of the new strategy is the deployment of US Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) teams, which have been inserted on the ground in both Iraq and Syria.

On 8 January, Iraq’s parliamentary speaker, Saleem Al-Jabouri, disclosed that US special forces, believed to be JSOC teams, had been carrying out raids on IS strongholds in northern Iraq ahead of an offensive planned later this year to retake Mosul.

In addition, the US teams have reportedly made contact with Sunni Arab tribal leaders in the area in preparation for a future assault on Mosul.

While some details of the US plan remain vague, it is clear that Washington has positioned itself to expand its military involvement in Iraq. Moreover, Washington seems to be readying itself to participate in the reshaping of Iraq in the post-IS era.

Last month, Iraqi security forces drove IS militants out of the city of Ramadi, dealing a major blow to the militant group in Iraq. With the liberation of Mosul, the bigger question of the future of the Sunni-dominated towns and cities within Iraq will be opened.

In order to defeat IS, Iraq needs to tackle a complex web of security, social and economic challenges. But victory over IS will depend on whether Iraq’s fractious communities can agree on a new inclusive order.

Given its central role, the Shia-led government needs to ensure a working system that guarantees inclusion within a just state that will deal with all Iraqis as equal citizens.

The government must realise that the only way to accommodate Sunnis is to create a strong Iraq that will serve as a beacon of good governance and economic success.

But also it largely depends on the Arab Sunnis themselves and what system they would like to see in post-IS Iraq. The recapture of Mosul is likely to be the biggest test of the Sunni leadership and unity thus far.

While most Iraqi Sunnis are hopeful that a more inclusive system will emerge after the defeat of IS, divisions within the community have highlighted the challenges ahead.

Several meetings inside Iraq and abroad in recent weeks have failed to resolve disputes over community leadership and representation. Sunni groups in the government seem to prefer a compromise that will improve their status and achieve partnership.

Sunni tribes that have joined the government fight against IS and are vying for power in running their provincial affairs and in the national government prefer closer ties with the Baghdad government.

Still, many Sunni leaders have been contemplating a Sunni federal region within Iraq similar to that already enjoyed by the Kurds. Though the call for Sunni Arab autonomy has been circulating for a while, the idea has been gaining strength in recent months.

Other Sunni leaders have been suggesting that a Sunni autonomous region be created after the liberation of the Sunni-dominated provinces from IS.

In an interview with the Kurdish news outlet Rudaw last week, Osama Nujaifi, head of the largest Sunni faction in the parliament and former vice-president, suggested that semi-independent regions be formed by Iraq’s provinces in order to solve the country’s sectarian and ethnic divisions.

Sunni leaders in exile have been touring world and regional capitals, including Washington, and lobbying governments for diplomatic channels that will bypass the central government in Baghdad.

On Monday, the main Sunni bloc, the Alliance of the Iraqi Forces said it had appealed to the United Nations for international protection of Sunnis in Diyala after rise of sectarian tension in the province.

All these moves come as suggestions for the creation of an “independent Sunni state” as the solution to the current crisis in Iraq and have been taking on momentum for months.

American politicians, academics and analysts have been drumming up support for a proposal for an independent Sunni state that would link Sunni-dominated territories in Iraq and Syria on both sides of the border.

Their argument for a Sunni state is based on the assumption that the Sykes–Picot Agreement drawing up the borders of the Middle East by France and Britain a century ago is the main culprit in the Iraqi and Syrian conflicts and that the countries cannot be put back together again after so much blood has been spilled.

The alternative, they believe, is that Iraq and Syria be Balkanised into autonomous regions

Last week, the president of Iraq’s autonomous Kurdish Region, Masoud Barzani, who has been advocating an independent Kurdistan from Iraq for years, acknowledged that his plan for secession relied largely on the idea that the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement no longer made sense.

Last week, Barzani called on global leaders to acknowledge that the Sykes-Picot Agreement had failed, and urged them to broker a new deal paving the way for a Kurdish state.

Barzani told the British Guardian newspaper that the international community had started to accept that Iraq and Syria in particular would never again be unified and that “compulsory co-existence” in the region had been proven wrong.

In the 18 months since IS captured vast amounts of territory in Iraq, Barzani’s administration has grabbed tens of thousands of square km of land which has drastically changed the map of northern Iraq.

The emergence of a mini Kurdish state in northern Iraq is another way of inciting Sunnis to break away from Iraq. There is no way that an Arab Sunni minority will stay in a lesser Iraq ruled by a Shia majority allied to Iran.

This article first appeared in Al Ahram Weekly on January 28, 2016

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A turning point for Iran

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A turning point for Iran

The lifting of the international sanctions against it is a huge breakthrough for Iran, even though it remains a challenge for its edgy Arab neighbours, writes Salah Nasrawi

For Iran, the beginning of the implementation of its landmark nuclear deal with the West this week was a moment to celebrate. It was another diplomatic triumph that will end the Islamic Republic’s isolation and reopen the doors to the international economy.
“Today is a historic and exceptional day in the political and economic history of the Iranian nation,” declared President Hassan Rouhani in a press conference following the announcement of the lifting of the Western economic sanctions on Iran.
The lifting of the crippling sanctions came after certification by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on Saturday that Iran has successfully completed all the nuclear-related steps to which it had agreed with the 5+1 powers in July.
The 12 years of sanctions have had devastating effects on Iran where millions of Iranians have been left living with a shortage of medical services, basic goods and services. The punitive measures also imposed a state of diplomatic isolation on Iran that weakened its international standing.
The embargo compromised the Iranian economy, and the country suffered from the devaluation of its local currency, the rial, double-digit inflation and an unemployment rate of nearly 11 per cent.
The lifting of the sanctions, however, means the government and people of Iran will now start to feel the enormous benefits of the agreement, which will make this regional power rebound from its misfortune.
The removal of the oil- and gas-related US and EU sanctions means that Iran can now resume its sale of oil and gas worldwide, having been restricted to selling it to a handful of countries, including China and India.
Even with plummeting oil prices, Iran plans to ramp up daily exports by some 500,000 barrels per day from one million barrels currently. It plans further increases in the months ahead.
The cancellation of the embargo also means foreign oil and gas companies are now free to enter Iran’s energy market, with American and European companies poised to become Iranian partners and bringing with them world-class technology.
It will allow Iranian banks to restore ties with the Western banking system and to open new business opportunities in the country to multinational corporations.
More than $30 billion (Iran says $100 billion) in assets overseas will become immediately available to Iran. While the money is expected to be injected into the Iranian economy, much of the funds are expected to be used as foreign currency reserves to protect the value of the rial.
The lifting of the sanctions will also allow Iranians to resume foreign trade and travel, and the transfer of assets to a wide range of individuals and companies. Politically, the lifting of the sanctions on Iran is expected to have a far-reaching implication on the country’s global politics, mostly on its regional standing.
Iran is expected to emerge politically stronger and with its regional influence increased. For precisely this reason, celebrations in the region have been muted. While most Arab nations, such as Saudi Arabia, have abstained from congratulating Iran or welcoming the deal, only Iraq and Oman have voiced positive reactions.
Iraq’s Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi, whose Shia-led government is one of Iran’s key regional allies, described the agreement as “historic”. Oman’s Foreign Minister Yusuf bin Alawi said: “The spectre of war has disappeared.”
Right from the outset, Saudi Arabia and its allies in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have opposed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, as the deal is known, and made every possible effort to thwart the agreement.
Saudi Arabia, an Arab Sunni powerhouse, has been concerned about Shia Iran’s growing regional influence and, from Riyadh’s perspective, a nuclear deal will leave Tehran stronger politically.
Saudi Arabia also suspects that the deal will not stop Iran creating a nuclear weapon, since the deal will only take effect for a relatively short period of time, 15 years, and will not destroy Iran’s technical capabilities to maintain a nuclear programme. The results will embolden Iran and its Shia allies in the region, according to this perspective.
Surprisingly, Iran has wasted no time in throwing down the gauntlet and defying Saudi Arabia for its opposition to the nuclear deal and the lifting of sanctions. Shortly after the announcement of the deal, Rouhani was quick to point to Iranian-Saudi political tensions and the security rivalry that has dominated the two countries’ relationship for nearly four decades.
“Saudi Arabia did not apologise for the pilgrims killed in the human tragedy in Mina,” said Rouhani, referring to the deaths of hundreds of Iranian pilgrims in a stampede near Mecca in September. He also said Saudi Arabia should pay reparations to the Iranian victims.
Rouhani blasted the oil-rich kingdom for “its behaviour towards the people in the region,” which he described as “not proper”. Rouhani specifically mentioned the Saudi-led campaign against the Shia rebel Houthis in Yemen, which he labelled as “the carnage of a Muslim nation”.
Rouhani bitterly criticised the Saudi government for the recent execution of the Shia religious leader Sheikh Nimr Al-Nimr, a vocal critic of the Saudi government. Riyadh cut diplomatic relations with Tehran following Iran’s protests against the execution of Al-Nimr.
On the other hand, Iran has also been raising the blood pressure of observers for some time in many Arab countries over its actions in several regional hot spots.
Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies have serious questions about Iranian intentions in flashpoints such as Iraq, Syria and Yemen. There is little doubt that the rise in Iranian regional standing as a result of the new deal will raise tensions between Iran and the Saudi-led alliance further.
Saudi Arabia seems intent on trimming Iran’s regional influence by seeking to build a broader Sunni Muslim alliance to confront Shia Iran and its regional allies. Riyadh hopes that heavyweights, such as Egypt, Pakistan and Turkey, will join the 34-country Islamic coalition it said it is creating to battle terrorism but is widely seen as an anti-Iran alliance.
From Riyadh’s perspective, the three powerful Sunni-ruled nations, whose armies are among the largest in the world, could provide the much-needed critical mass to confront Iran.
Such support has been hard to win, however, as Cairo, Islamabad and Ankara have shown no great interest in actively joining such an alliance. Indeed, both Pakistan and Turkey, which have long borders with Iran, have offered mediation between Riyadh and Tehran, sidestepping the burden of having to pick sides.
Inevitably, the prospect of rivalry between the two regional powers is expected to be on an upward trajectory in the post-nuclear deal era.
With several sources of short- and longer-term tension in different arenas already evident, the two countries seem to be heading towards further split. Unfortunately, the key element of this confrontation is the widening Shia-Sunni split engaging the two regional powerhouses and their proxies.
This standoff is perhaps most glaringly apparent in Iraq, Syria and Yemen, which are expected to bear most of the adverse consequences of the competition for regional influence by Iran and its adversaries.

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Desert Storm through the eyes of an Iraqi reporter

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Desert Storm through the eyes of an Iraqi reporter

As Iraq braced for war with the US, Iraqi AP reporter Salah Nasrawi was torn between journalistic duty and patriotism.

Salah Nasrawi

On the eve of the 1991 Gulf War, I was working as a correspondent for the American news agency, the Associated Press (AP), in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. My job was not only demoralising, exhausting and hazardous, it was virtually suicidal.

War was looming, and I was pulled between my sense of duty and my sense of patriotism – the dilemma of a native journalist reporting on a conflict for a news organisation that, in theory, belonged to the other side – to the enemy.

I had already spent more than six years reporting for the BBC and AP on the Iraq-Iran war, which ended in August 1988. For much of that time, I was in the trenches along the 1,200km-long frontline or investigating the war’s human cost and its political and social impact.

I had my own war to fight, too, as I battled to maintain neutrality between the two sides’ narratives and positions. Complying with global journalistic standards often meant employing “tricks” to avoid Saddam’s censors.

Sometimes it worked. But sometimes it didn’t.

There were occasions when I faced the wrath of Iraq’s Ministry of Information or its ruthless intelligence service, the Mukhabarat – often for stories they considered negative or insufficiently patriotic.

But if covering the Iraq-Iran war for foreign media was daunting, it was nothing compared to reporting on the US’s Operation Desert Storm for a major American news agency.

Under Saddam’s authoritarian rule, there were strict limitations on what could be reported. The cost of breaching those could be grave. An Iraqi reporter might face death for gathering information considered to be confidential or for writing an article deemed to be harmful to the state.

Really, I should have quit. But that would have meant losing both my job and the opportunity to be on top of the biggest story in the world at the time.

When I contemplated resigning from AP during a heated discussion with then Minister of Information Latif Nussayif Jassim al-Dulaymi about a report I had written on Iraq’s war preparations, I was surprised that he rejected the idea.

“I will shoot you with my own gun and hang your body over the bridge,” he thundered.

He had his reasons.

We were, after all, showing the world horrific scenes of death and destructioninflicted by the Americans, images that he knew could prompt the world to demand that the US stop its bombardments.

American reporters fled before the bombs fell 

Many news organisations kept their teams away from the front lines, arguing that it would be too dangerous for their reporters to stay in Baghdad.

Then US President George Bush senior personally rang the heads of US media networks to ask them to ensure that their employees left.

Few foreign journalists were willing to remain. As they left and the doors to Iraq closed, I felt acutely aware of being stuck with my own destiny – for better or for worse.

The countdown to war had started as Saddam refused to comply with the UN’s January 15 deadline to withdraw from Kuwait, and I found myself deeply immersed in covering the crisis.

My fears gave way to my journalistic instinct.

On January 8, 1991, I made my fifth trip to Kuwait under Saddam’s occupation. It was a trip organised by the Ministry of Information to show Iraqi reporters the trenches and fortifications built by Iraqi soldiers across the country.

There was no doubt, war was imminent

On my return to Baghdad, I met the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) leader Yasser Arafat, whom I had known for years.

I had been at Arafat’s office less than two months before, when, on November 29, 1990, he had met the former Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone. Nakasone had previously met Saddam in an effort to convince him to defuse the crisis.

Go and tell Saddam that Iraq will be sent back to the pre-industrial age if he does not withdraw from Kuwait, Nakasone had basically told Arafat.

Now, I told Arafat that war was unavoidable.

To my surprise, he called an urgent press conference at his residence in an Iraqi government guesthouse, telling journalists: “There will be no war. There will be no war. I promise.”

Once the press conference was over, Arafat was whisked along the 1,000km-long highway to neighbouring Jordan in a Mercedes. When the war began two days later, US warplanes bombed that same road.

There was one last-chance bid for a peaceful resolution from the then-UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar. He arrived in Baghdad on January 12, 1991, to tell Saddam to pull out of Kuwait.

I was the only reporter on that historic day to have access to De Cuellar’s spokesman, Francois Giuliani, at a secret guesthouse. Giuliani, a former Reuters journalist, told me that De Cuellar’s encounter with Saddam was scheduled for after the Iraqi leader’s afternoon nap the next day. From that, I immediately understood that the UN chief’s mission was doomed.

Baghdad, the ghost town

I no longer questioned whether Iraq would be bombed, just what would become of the “cradle of civilisation”.

The moment we would find out came on Wednesday, January 16, 1991, the day after the deadline set by the UN.

Government offices and shops were shuttered. Windows were taped. Tens of thousands of Iraqis crammed into buses and cars and fled the capital.

As dusk approached, the streets were dark and quiet. Troops manned roadblocks at the main junctions, but Saddam’s henchmen seemed to have given up altogether.

The city that history books called Madinat al-Salam, or the City of Peace, was bracing for war.

My headline that night was: Saddam defiant, Iraq bracing for military showdown, Baghdadis leaving or cowering at home.

At 2:30am, the first bombs fell. Explosion after explosion rattled the city. Iraqi soldiers fired back from anti-aircraft batteries positioned on rooftops.

By morning, Baghdad was a ghost city. Its main government buildings and communication centres either disabled or heavily damaged.

There was no electricity or running water.

The city of “A Thousand and One Nights” seemed to be on its way back to the Middle Ages.

Today, I am retired from active reporting. Yet, I am still stuck with Iraq as much as it is stuck with me.

The 1991 Gulf War, as I have repeatedly argued in all my writing, including my memoirs, A Life of Paper, was an eruption that has left Iraq forever shaken, and with it, my own life too.

This article appeared on Al-Jazeera on January 20, 2016