Plans put forward by the president of Iraq’s autonomous Kurdistan region, Masoud Barzani, for a referendum on a draft constitution have sparked criticisms that the veteran Kurdish leader is seeking a third term in office despite objections by opponents who say the controversial document imposes a two-term limit. 

Barzani’s defiant move has also raised fears of a setback in the northern enclave that has been dubbed a paradise of political stability and economic growth in the sharply divided and violence-torn country.

On 23 May, Barzani announced that he would call for the referendum and accused the opposition of turning the issue into a political war. “If it’s a bad constitution, people are free not to approve it,” he declared to a huge, cheering crowd in Erbil, the Kurdistan provincial capital.

Opposition groups, however, were swift to blast Barzani’s suggestion.

The rising Change Movement, or Goran, and several Islamist parties demanded that the constitution be sent back to parliament for amendment before any referendum was held. Barzani’s long-term political ally, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) led by Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, also did not agree with the call for the referendum.

The Kurds have been enmeshed in internal wrangling over the elections after Barzani announced plans last month for balloting in provincial, parliamentary and presidential races in September.

The dispute centres around the right of Barzani himself to stand for election for a third term in office, despite the Kurdistan region’s draft constitution which stipulates in article 64 that the president of the Kurdistan region “may be re-elected for a second term as of the date this constitution enters into force”.

Barzani has not declared his candidacy, but his supporters argue that term limits are not retrospective, so Barzani, initially appointed by the Kurdish parliament in 2005, and re-elected by in a public vote four years later, is eligible for re-election. Barzani will complete his two terms in July.

The opposition accuses Barzani, whose Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and family members have dominated Kurdish politics for more than half a century, of becoming increasingly authoritarian.

It argues that Barzani’s move is designed to circumvent the opposition’s efforts to reform Kurdistan’s political system and make it more democratic.

The draft constitution of the Kurdistan region was passed by the regional parliament in 2009, but the two parties, the KDP and the PUK, that share power over the region never put it to a referendum.

The opposition argues that the draft constitution was rushed through by the parliament at the time by a caretaker government that was controlled by the two ruling parties.

It also claims that some of the constitution’s articles were changed within a matter of days and presented for endorsement by the parliament while one third of its members were not present.

The opposition said that among the articles that were changed were those that made Iraqi Kurdistan region into a presidential system, whereas the document states in article 1 that the region enjoys “a parliamentary political system”.

Under the controversial draft constitution, the president wields absolute powers including the power to declare a state of emergency, issue decrees that have the force of law, dissolve the parliament and dismiss ministers.

Many of Barzani’s critics believe his insistence on holding a referendum has more to do with his autocratic tendencies and his intentions to stay in power for life than it does with any concern for democratic politics.

Now the wrangle is expected to deepen divisions between Barzani’s KDP and pro-democracy groups that have been trying to stifle Barzani’s overall control of the government and politics of the Kurdish region.

Since the uprising that took place in the Kurdish region following the defeat of former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein in the US-led Gulf War in 1991, the region has been ruled by Barzani’s KDP and Talabani’s PUK, though the two groups control two linguistically and politically diverse portions.

After the US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003, the Kurds were able to convert their regional government into a semi-independent federal region.

The two parties, which had fought each other intermittently, entered a strategic alliance to run a government that many Kurds criticise for being authoritarian and corrupt. Critics say that the two parties have been using the 111-member parliament as a mere rubber-stamp assembly for executive actions.

But Kurdistan’s political landscape has been changing since the latest elections in 2009 when the Goran List won a total of 25 seats, making it the second-most successful list in the elections after the ruling Kurdistan List.

Since then the party has displayed a broader show of defiance against the two-party rule, and it is now leading opposition to Barzani’s decision to put the draft constitution to a referendum. 

However, it is uncertain whether Barzani and his party will take a step back, and he is more than likely to be his party’s candidate for president in the general elections due in September.

Indeed, Barzani is the dominant figure in Kurdistan, and his past shows that he will stop at nothing to keep himself, the KDP, and his family in power in the region.

His pressure to put the constitution to a referendum seems to be an attempt to mobilise the Kurdish street against the opposition by portraying it as undermining stability and prosperity in the region.

Yet many believe that by trying to humiliate the opposition by forcing the referendum Barzani may be taking a gamble too far that will awaken the long-stifled resentment felt by many Iraqi Kurds about his authoritarianism.

In fact, it could be said that the constitutional brinkmanship could mark a turning point in the almighty image of Barzani, proving his greed for power and his using of democracy for his own purposes.

In addition, his move will have far-reaching consequences for Kurdish national unity, and it will underscore deep splits at a time of great challenges for the Iraqi Kurdistan region.

The fact that the next elections are now on the rocks means that Barzani’s desire to remain president threatens the future of his party’s partnership with the PUK which for years has remained the bedrock for peace in Kurdistan.

The PUK has already announced that it will participate in the upcoming elections on separate lists, despite the fact that the two parties’ strategic alliance stipulates their participation in the local and national elections on the same list.

Barzani’s success in winning the referendum is far from guaranteed. If he loses the referendum, opposition to his rule will be stronger, and it will be unlikely that he can secure more power under the new constitution. This will likely deepen the crisis and heighten tensions in the region.

In 2011, protests against the two parties swept the Kurdish main cities in what was called the “Kurdish Spring” to rival the pro-democracy uprisings that toppled three Arab dictatorships.

The brutal crackdown on the peaceful demonstrations, which left ten people dead, then tarnished the image of Kurdistan as an emerging democracy.

Thus far, Kurdistan’s powerful leader has showed no sign of changing his mind, and he has used his assertive style and the common touch that courts the Kurdish populace to manipulate national politics.

These days, his rhetoric is all about his strained relations with Baghdad, with hints that the Kurds will seek full independence from the rest of Iraq if attempts to resolve disputes over oil and land fail.

On Monday, Barzani warned that the current round of talks with Baghdad that started last month marked the final opportunity to end the feud. He said that Kurdistan would be forced to seek a “new form of relationship” with the central government in Baghdad if no deal was reached.

Such blustering, apparently aimed at distracting attention, is unlikely to convince the Kurdish opposition to give way to Barzani. Given the determination of the opposition to oppose a new term for Barzani in office, a new spectre could haunt Kurdistan soon.

A group of militants attacked and killed eight policemen including one officer on Monday in Rawa, a town of a few thousand in Iraq’s Western province of Anbar, the heartland of the country’s Sunni Arabs and the centre of nearly five months of protests against the Shia-led government. The bodies of the dead soldiers were later found mutilated and dumped in the desert, a murderous scene reminiscent of the level of savagery in violent attacks that pushed Iraq to civil war following the 2003 US invasion which toppled the Sunni-controlled regime of Saddam Hussein and empowered Shias.

Seven policemen were also killed when militants attacked checkpoints and patrols in the nearby town of Haditha. Elsewhere in the Anbar province, armed groups attacked police posts and pro-government Sunni militias. The outbreak of violence in Anbar has raised fear that the anti-government insurgency has grown into a larger war as Iraq remains deadlocked in its worst ethno-sectarian struggle over power and wealth sharing.

Earlier this month community leaders in Anbar announced that they are forming a tribal army and warned that they will fight the Shia dominated and controlled government troops if they will not leave the predominantly Sunni populated province. Anbar offers a snapshot of what is going on among the Sunni groups elsewhere in Iraq. Tensions have grown in recent months between Iraq’s Sunnis and Shias, especially after Sunnis waged protesters to demonstrate against what they perceive as marginalisation and mistreatment by the government.

As the government refused to comply with the Sunnis’ demands to rescind the US-orchestrated political process which Sunnis believe had propelled Shias to power at their expense, the protests have turned to violence. On Monday, a wave of car bombings targeted Shia areas, army and police posts and pro-government Sunni militias across Iraq, leaving dozens of people killed or wounded. The attacks, some of which hit mosques, market places and crowded bus stops during the morning rush hour, pushed the death toll in Iraq in four days to nearly 300.

Monday’s shootings and bombings followed three days of attacks that killed and wounded hundreds of people in both Shia and Sunni areas. Although no one has claimed responsibility for the attacks, they look like retaliatory sectarian violence. On Friday dozens of people were killed when bombs struck as worshipers were leaving a Sunni mosque and attending a funeral in the city of Bakuba, about 60 kilometres north of Baghdad. A day earlier a suicide bomber detonated his explosive vest at the main entrance to a Shia mosque in Kirkuk. Six others were killed in Baghdad’s Shia neighbourhoods. These attacks followed blasts and roadside bombings that targeted mosques, cafes and commercial areas in predominantly Sunni neighbourhoods in Baghdad and elsewhere.

In other violence, gunmen killed Sahwa militia fighters in several towns in the Sunnis triangle that include Anbar, Nineveh, Salaheddin and Diyala. Sahwas are Sunni tribesmen who helped government troops subdue Al-Qaeda and are often targeted by Sunni militants who view them as collaborators with the Shia-led government.

Three men of a Shia family who were travelling to Jordan for treatment were kidnapped on Saturday after their car was stopped in the Anbar province on the highway linking Iraq with the neighbouring country. Family members told local media that they received calls from their abductors saying the hostages will be killed. Gunmen also ambushed and kidnapped 10 Sunni policemen near Ramadi, the capital of Anbar. Their bullet-ridden bodies were found later, dumped in a remote desert area.

Tribesmen clashed with security forces across Sunni areas apparently in bids to drive the government troops out and entrench themselves instead in that zone. The deadly attacks continued throughout the week causing more death and destruction in several parts of Iraq. The spate of attacks committed by both sides reveals that sectarianism, for so long a main factor in the Iraq conflict, is now a driving force for substantial elements of both the disgruntled Sunnis and politically dominant Shia.

The flare-up raised concern about the potential for another wave of deadly conflict in Iraq amid rising fear that the sectarian strife in neighbouring Syria will further strain Iraq’s fledgling ethno-sectarian balance. Iraqis might have been able to live up with daily bombings, but the longer and more vicious the new wave of violence turns the more likely it is that extremists on both sides will come to the fore.

This week Sunni Tribal leaders have given the government until Friday to meet their demands and warned of war unless the country splits into a federation. The London-based Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper on Monday quoted a local tribal chieftain in Anbar as saying that a military confrontation between the newly formed tribal army in the province and the government troops is “inevitable”.

The tribal chief said that some 1,000 well trained volunteers have already joined the “Army of Dignity and Honour”, some of them former officers from Saddam’s army, the rest insurgents. The disclosure came a day after Sheikh Abdel Malek Al-Saadi, who is considered the Iraqi Sunnis’ spiritual leader, announced he was withdrawing his proposal for a negotiated settlement with the government.

“News Iraq”, an Internet news outlet reported Sunday that Sunnis in Diyala had formed the “Revenge Battalion”, a militia to avenge government forces accused of killing Sunnis. In addition to the Al-Qaeda terror network there are several other Sunni armed groups, some of them linked to Saddam loyalists, which are already active in insurgency. Some hard-line Shia groups have joined the chorus calling for civil war and issuing similar undisguided threats.

Leader of the extremist Iraqi Hizbullah Wathiq Al-Battat has warned that more than 3,000 of the party’s members are ready to fight against “those who are waiving their arms. They are bloodthirsty to confront the enemy,” he was quoted as saying by Baghdad’s Al-Mada newspaper on Tuesday.

Another radical Shia group, Asaib Ahl Al-Haq, or the “League of the Righteous”, also said that it will fight alongside the government forces if war broke out with Sunni groups. “We are ready to back the army and the police,” Firas Al-Saidi, spokesman for the group told Al-Sharqiya television on Sunday.

Now the question is whether Iraqis have exhausted all their options to secure a political solution to their problems and started their descent to civil war which many believe could also be a march toward self destruction. Broadly defined a civil war is an armed conflict involving domestic political groups fighting for political or identity causes which entails massive numbers of casualties.

If that is the criteria, Iraq’s current wave of violence seems to be a civil war. First, the failure of the contentious sides to reach a political compromise. Iraqi sectarian groups have displayed an alarming degree of intransigence in recognising the legitimate concerns and fears of each other.

Second, the exhaustion of peaceful means to end the bloodletting is giving violent groups legitimacy and public support and encouraging others to join in. This increases polarisation, and the conflict thus becomes a true ethno-sectarian conflagration.

Third, the sharp rise in the number of people killed in political violence discredits the political process and increases motivation of people to engage in violence. With the UN claiming more than 700 people killed in April and probably double that number this month, Iraq’s bloodshed has surpassed the known average number of casualties in many previous civil wars.

Given the ongoing carnage, deepening sectarian hatred and the chronic political conflict, Iraq’s quagmire is getting worse every day and if it won’t turn into an all-out civil war soon it could become a prolonged Somali-like situation with a high cost to both Iraq and the region.