All posts by Salah Nasrawi

دولة علي بابا

 

 

                         دولة علي بابا

 

  في تشريح سلطة الفساد والمحاصصة في العراق

 

 

                    صلاح النصراوي

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

“متى كان ذكر المهتوك حراما،

والتشنيع على الفاسق منكرا،

والدلالة على النفاق خطلا،

 وتحذير الناس من الفاحش المتفحش جهلا؟

…والله تعالى يقول (لا يحب الله الجهر بالسؤ من القول الا من ظلم).

 

 

 

 

 

                                                          ابو حيان التوحيدي

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

                                             تمهيد

 

هذا الكتاب هو جزء آخر من سلسلة الكتب التي اصدرتها منذ الغزو الأمريكي للعراق عام 2003 والتي وثقت واستعرضت فيها جوانب متعددة من اوجه الإحتلال والمآلات الكارثية التي انتهى اليه، والتي ادخلت العراق في نهاية الأمر في نفق مظلم لا قرار له، ولا بصيص من نور يبدو في آخره، كما وضعت العراقيين على درب العذابات والآلام الطويل الذي لا يزالون يحدون فيه دون أي أمل في نهاية قريبة له.واذا كانت الكتب الاخرى قد تناولت متابعاتي وملاحظاتي وتقديراتي الشخصية منذ بدء الإستعداد للغزو الى ما انتهى اليه العراق من بلد يقف على حافة الهاوية، فان “دولة علي بابا، في تشريح سلطة الفساد والمحاصصة في العراق”، كما يوحي عنوانه خصصته لتوثيق ودراسة وتحليل الحجم الفعلي للفساد، تلك الآفة السرطانية التي ظلت هي التعبير الأبرز لحصاد تلك التجربة الأليمة، وعصارة آثارها ونتائجها المرة التي سيظل العراقيون يتجرعونها سنينا، وربما عقودا، اخرى قادمة.

ومن خلال تشريح سلطة الفساد يسعى الكتاب الى تفكيك عدة مسلمات على رأسها مسلمة أساسية راجت منذ الغزو وهي ان العراق اصبح دولة شيعية، او حتى دولة يهيمن عليها الشيعة، بسبب ما احدثه سقوط النظام الذي كان يقوده السنة العرب منذ تأسيس الدولة العراقية الحديثة بداية القرن الماضي من تمكين للشيعة وصعودهم على المسرح السياسي في العراق وفي المنطقة.يأتي هذا الكتاب في إطار جهد لطرح منهج وأفق جديدين لتاريخ الفترة التي اعقبت الغزو من خلال نقض هذه المسلمة واثبات ان الأمر لم يكن سوى اعتلاء جماعات الإسلام السياسي الشيعي في العراق دست الحكم وإنحدارها، مثلها مثل اية سلطة غاشمة اخرى، الى مستنقع الفساد وفشلها باقامة دولة العدالة الناجزة التي طالما انتظرها الشيعة.

ان الهدف من رواية تراجيديا الفساد الكبرى في عراق ما بعد الإحتلال هو ليس فقط لنقض الرواية التي تم الترويج لها عن بناء عراق ديمقراطي تعددي توافقي على انقاض نظام صدام حسين الدكتاتوري، وانما ايضا هز السردية التي روجت لها جماعات الإسلام السياسي الشيعية التي استولت على السلطة بعده بانها جاءت لتنهي مظلومية الشيعة المستمرة من بزوغ شمس الدولة الجديدة وان تقيم بدلاً عنه نظاما يستند الى تلك المبادئ السامية التي رسختها التجربة العلوية ومنهح آل البيت وعلى رأسها العدالة الإجتماعية.

في نهاية عام 2017، اي بعد ما يقارب من خمسة عشر عاما على الغزو اكتملت صورة العراق الجديد الذي بشر به المحتلون، بلد تعصف به رياح السموم التي تبغي اجتثاثه من جذوره، دولة مهيضة الجناح، مفككة، ومجتمع خائر القوى، كسير الروح، تفتك به الإنقسامات العرقية والطائفية.لم يصل العراق الى تلك الحالة فقط بسبب سياسات الإحتلال التدميرية والترتيبات الحمقاء التي وضعها لبناء الدولة الجديدة، او بسبب المؤامرات والصراعات التي ادارتها دول الجوار على أرضه، وانما ايضا بسبب انعدام المشروع الوطني الذي يستهدف بناء دولة كفوءة وعادلة تحل مكان دولة المشروع الإستعماري البريطاني بعد الحرب العالمية الأولى وأنظمة الإنحطاط والقهر والطغيان التي انتجته.

كانت الحرب على تنظيم داعش الإرهابي التي شنها تحالف القوات الأمنية الحكومية مع الجماعات المسلحة التي نظمت في إطار الحشد الشعبي والتي بدأت عام صيف 2014 قد استنزفت العراق حيث كلفته نحو مائة مليار دولار حسب اعتراف رئيس الوزراء حيدر العبادي، اي ما يعادل موارد ميزانية الدولة لنحو عامين، وهي نفس الفترة التي استغرقهما القتال، في حين انها احالت معظم المدن السنية التي جرت فيها المعارك الى أطلال من أحياء سكنية، وبنى تحتية مهدمة، في الوقت الذي بقي الكثير من سكان تلك المدن نازحين في الخيام او مشردين داخل وخارج العراق.بطبيعة الحال ان الثمن الذي دفعه العراقيون من شهداء وجرحى ومن تضحيات باهظة كان اكبر بكثير من التكلفة المادية للحرب والتي اتضح في كل صفحة من صفحاتها انه كان يمكن تجنبها لولا انماط الفساد السياسي والإدراي والمالي التي ضربت بمنظومة الحكم، ومن بينها الأجهزة الأمنية، والتي سمحت لتنظيم داعش الإرهابي ان يتمكن من اجتياح نصف العراق وان يعلن دولة الخلافة الكاريكاتورية على ارضه.ربما كانت الحرب تلك قد قضت على الخلافة المزعومة، لكنها بالتأكيد لم تقض على جذور الغضب والرفض لدى سنة العراق من مشاعر الإحباط والإقصاء والتهميش التي يشعرون بها منذ سقوط الدولة التي هيمنوا عليها نحو ثمانين عاما.

من ناحية ثانية، كانت الضربة القاصمة التي وجهت لمشروع الإستقلال الكردي، بعد اجبار قيادة إقليم كردستان على التخلي عن نتائج الإستفتاء بشأن الإنفصال، قد اعادت القضية الكردية في العراق الى المربع رقم واحد.وعلى الرغم مما بدا للوهلة الاولى انتصارا للدولة المركزية على الميول الإنفصالية التي اظهرتها القيادات الكردية، الا انه سرعان ما اتضح ان المحاولات التي جرت بعد ذلك لتحجيم الفدرالية الكردية وتقليص مكاسبها المتحققة قد اضافت المزيد من الملح الى جرح الكبرياء الكردي الذي انفتح مع انهيار حلم الإستقلال.ومثلما كان الامر مع صعود داعش فان أزمة الإستفتاء على إستقلال كردستان لم تجر بمعزل عن الفساد الذي ضرب الدولة العراقية برمتها وبضمنها الإقليم الكردي.لقد تجسد المشروع الكردي منذ بداية تاسيس دولة ما بعد الإحتلال الأمريكي بظاهرة “ريع الازمات”، وهي حالة الإعتياش على الموارد الطبيعية (النفط والغاز) في مناطق النزاعات والتي تستهدف فيها الأطراف المتصارعة الحصول والسيطرة على اكبر قدر ممكن من الموارد.واذا كان هناك من دروس للأكراد انفسهم عن اخفاق مشروع الإستقلال والهزيمة والذل اللذان شعروا به، فان فشل مشروع الإستقلال الكردي كان سيعني من دون حل جذري للأزمة مع المركز العودة من جديد الى حلبة الصراع على الحصص في الموارد الذي تأسس على الفساد ونهب موارد وأموال الدولة، مما يعني استمرار تلك الدوامة اللعينة من الصراع التاريخي الكردي العربي والصراعات الإثنية الاخرى التي دخلها العراق منذ عام 2003.

ان محاولة القيادات والنخب الشيعية الحاكمة تجيير هاتين النتيجتين، اي هزيمة دولة الخلافة التي اعلنتها داعش وتبدد الحلم الكردي بالإستقلال، لصالحها بإعتبارهما انتصارين للحكومة التي تقودها الجماعات الشيعية كانت في الواقع تعبيرا عن قصر نظر شديد واستباق مبكر للأحداث، كما انها عكست العادة التي دأبت عليها هذه الجماعات في الخداع والتبجح والتي تؤكد بدورها المأزق الذي تعيشه الدولة بسبب عجز قيادتها وعدم كفائتها وفسادها، وهي الأسباب التي تقف وراء كل الأزمات الاخرى.ورغم ما تشي به من أغراض سياسية انتخابية فقد كان تأكيد رئيس الوزراء حيدر العبادي ان المعركة القادمة التي سيشنها بعد داعش وخطر الإنفصال الكري ستكون ضد الفساد هو اعتراف دامغ على ان الخراب الذي انتجته ممارسات الفساد لحكومته والحكومات السابقة هي التؤم الشرطي لظهور كل الأزمات التي عانى منها العراق.

في الصفحات التالية سأتناول كل هذه القضايا من خلال تجربة الحكم في “دولة علي بابا” منذ نشوئها بعد الغزو الأمريكي عام 2003، والتي اسس لها من خلال العملية السياسية التي اشرف الإحتلال على اطلاقها، مستعرضاً من خلال مقدمة نظرية الجوانب المتعلقة بالمظلومية الشيعية التي استندت اليها جماعات الإسلام السياسي الشيعي التي اختطفت الدولة ثم تأسيسها لدولة الفساد الجديدة، بدلا عن دولة الحق والعدل العلوي التي كانوا يدعون الإنتساب اليها، وبعد ذلك استعراض مطول لأهم الميادين التي طالها الفساد في الدولة وفي المجتمع في العراق.

ما جاء في الفصول الستة عشر التي تستعرض تفاصيل الفساد هي غيض من فيض، اذ لم يكن ممكنا على الإطلاق الإلمام بجميع، او اغلب، قضايا الفساد التي عانى منها العراق خلال هذه الفترة لأسباب لا تخفى على احد.ولكن الأمثلة التي ضربت في الكتاب والوقائع التي جاءت فيه وتم الإشارة اليها في الهوامش والمراجع والمصادر يمكن ان توفر مرجعا مهما للمعنين، سواء لتوثيق بعض قضايا الفساد، او لمتابعة خريطة اتساع وتمدد هذا الورم السرطاني في الجسد العراقي ومعرفة آثاره المدمرة.

لم يكن ممكنا ابدا الوصول الى المعلومات التامة لرواية قصة الفساد في العراق كاملة، ليس فقط بسبب غياب الشفافية، وحجب المعلومات وعادة الإنكار المتأصلة لدى القادة والمسؤولين، بل وايضا بسبب المخاطر التي يتعرض لها الصحفيون والباحثون في محاولتهم الوصول الى المعلومات والبيانات، او التحقق منها، وهي مخاطر دفع ثمنها فعلا العديد من الصحفيين العراقيين الذي حاولوا القيام بهذه المهمة الجليلة.شخصيا حاولت سواء في مسعى الإعداد لهذا الكتاب، او ما نشرته من خلال مقالات صحفية عن الفساد، التواصل مع جهات ومؤسسات حكومية وبرلمانية معنية من خلال البريد الإلكتروني للسؤال والبحث وللتدقيق والتحقق في المعلومات الواردة في المصادر، الا ان كل محاولاتي تلك ذهبت ادارج الرياح.

لكن مع ذلك فان وقائع الفساد التي اشير اليها في ثنايا الكتاب، ورغم كونها جزءاً يسيراً مما دون في سجل الكتابات العامة عن هذه الظاهرة في مختلف أجهزة الإعلام ووسائل التواصل، اضافة الى مرويات مرموقة من صفحات التاريخ الشفاهي لهذه المرحلة جاءت على لسان بعض المقربين من الأجهزة الرسمية، او شهود العيان، تبقى لدي ذات مصداقية عالية نظرا لتطابقها بشكل يكاد يكون شبه كامل مع احداث ووقائع الحياة اليومية التي عاشها العراقيون، ومع تقارير ودراسات دولية معتبرة تناولت ظاهرة الفساد في العراق.يبقى اني سأعتبر نفسي مسؤلا عن صياغة الرواية العامة لوقائع هذا الفصل المأساوي من تاريخ العراق واتحمل مسؤوليتها وتبعاتها المهنية والأخلاقية والقانوينة لوحدي، آملا ان اكون قد اجتهدت فأصبت، غير ساع الى الحسنات، او الثواب، الا اكمال الرسالة التي اخذتها على عاتقي منذ ان بدأت تباشير الغزو الأمريكي للعراق في دحض الأساطير التي روج لها الأمريكان عن اهداف احتلالهم، وعن ذلك التاريخ الزائف والأوهام التي سعى لصنعها من اتوا بهم لحكم العراق.

ان هدف الكتاب يبقى مراجعة وتدوين لجزء من تاريخ هذه المرحلة المأساوية، ليس فقط من اجل نقض السرديات البالية التي انبنت عليها حكاية العراق الجديد وكل الأكاذيب والخدع التي رافقتها، بل كذلك لتذكير الأجيال القادمة من العراقيين بمسؤوليتها الأخلاقية والوطنية في اعادة قراءة هذه المرحلة التعيسة من تاريخ وطنهم من أجل إعادة وضع الأحداث ونتائجها في موضعها الصائب، بل الأكثر والأهم من ذلك، من اجل اتمام ما اخفق فيه جيلنا فيه، وهو توفير الأدلة الدامغة عن وقائع قضايا الفساد، احدى وسائل تدمير العراق، وتحديد كل ابطالها الأساسيين والثانويين، من اجل ان تتولى هذه الأجيال ما فشل فيه جيلنا، والقيام بملاحقتهم في كل مكان، لكي يدفعوا ثمن تلك الجرائم الخسيسة التي ارتكبوها في خراب العراق وتدمير خيارات شعبه.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Beyond Iraq’s budget crisis

Beyond Iraq’s budget crisis
Iraq’s budget crisis is its latest challenge to master. The standoff could have grave financial and political implications, writes Salah Nasrawi
A state budget in any country is the government’s most important economic policy tool which provides a comprehensive statement of the nation’s priorities in a fixed period of time.
But in Iraq, a nation mired in corruption, mismanagement and political turmoil, drafting the annual budget is perhaps the most obvious example of the country’s ruling elites’ indifference and impotence and ultimately the government’s dysfunction.
Since the fall of the regime of former dictator Saddam Hussein in 2003 Iraq’s parliament has had difficulty passing annual budgets in regular order. Governments have also failed to present their final revenue and expenditure accounts for review and endorsement before passing the next annual budget.
Iraq’s President Fouad Masoum last week refused to sign the government budget for fiscal year 2018 which parliament has endorsed over concern that it violates Iraq’s constitution and fails to comply with a consensual deal to earmark oil revenues with the autonomous Kurdistan Region Government (KRG).
In a letter to the parliament, Masoum, an ethnic Kurdish politician, raised 31 objections to the budget law which he returned to the assembly for redrafting.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF), which controls Baghdad’s access to over $5 billion in international loans, has also come out against the budget, largely due to cuts in allocations to the Kurdistan autonomous region.
IMF Deputy Division Chief Christian Josz told Kurdish media that the group has communicated to the Baghdad government that about $5.56 billion that are in the 2018 budget “do not suffice to cover the needs of” the KRG.
The government, however, said there will be no turning back on the budget. Saadi al-Hadithi, a spokesman for the government said the budget was passed “in accordance with the law and in agreement by the Iraqi state institutions.”
“Every provision in it is in line with the IMF conditions.” He said.
Iraq’s parliament on 3 March passed the 2018 budget of about 104 trillion Iraqi dinars, or nearly $88 billion. The budget will run with a deficit of 12.5 trillion dinars, or about $10.58 billion.
The budget of the world’s fourth-largest oil producer has steadily shrunk in recent years because of fall of oil prices. This year budget is based on a projected oil price of $46 per barrel and a daily export capacity of 3.8 million barrels.
The KRG’s lawmakers walked out of the session in protest against what they described as cuts to the region’s share of budget allocations and for putting a ceiling on its oil exports.
But Iraq’s budget crisis goes beyond the KRG’s rejection which was highlighted by Masoum’s rejection, the IMF’s veto and some Western governments’ reservations.
Iraq’s financial law for 2018 does little to tackle the country’s economic fragility and rein in its huge underlining financial and monetary problems. In addition, the budget fails to address many issues crucial for the country’s future such general population welfare, quality of health service and education.
Instead of dealing with the country’s structural financial crisis caused by plummeting oil prices and government mismanagement, the budget increases the burden on the state’s coffers through resorting heavily to international loans and bond issuing to finance its deficit.
Under the budget, Iraq plans to take out some $6 billion in loans and credits from the IMF the World Bank, foreign governments and international banks to cover the budget deficit and financing imports.
Baghdad has signed a loan package with the IMF that would also serve as the basis for international banks to provide additional finance. The deal under the fund’s stand-by arrangement (SBA) puts sever austerity and monetary conditions for the loans.
There are grave social consequences in the 2018, too. The budget cuts public spending in education, health and other essential social services which are already reeling.
The budget also imposes belt-tightening measures, including cutting subsides, imposing new tariffs, sale taxes and credit the revenues to the public treasury.
Among the budget’s austerity measures, the government will impose a freeze on all state employees to reduce workforce through attrition, exempting the military.
Now, the consequences that result from Masoum’s and the IMF’s rejection of the budget remains unclear. The post of presidency in Iraq is largely ceremonial and Iraq’s constitution does not grant the president a veto power.
It is up to the parliament now to decide whether it will meet to amend the budget law. Right now, however, it is unlikely that the parliament which ends its term in May will reopen the debate over the budget and will most probably insist that Masoum should ratify it anyway.
That could leave the budget into limbo and prevent the government from taking aim at the structural problems that affect Iraq’s economy and may lead to important projects and initiatives being put on hold.
One of the key question now is how will the government be able to meet the terms of the IMF deal — which include a wide-ranging restructuring programme that aims to “bring spending into line with lower global oil prices and ensure debt sustainability”.
If Baghdad fails to reach specific economic and governance benchmarks laid out in the SBA, the IMF can cite non-compliance to put the agreement, and therefore billions of dollars for Iraq, on hold.
Another key question is that Iraq may lose some $30 billion in international pledges to help Iraqi stabilization and reconstruction following the war against the Islamic State (IS) group.
International donors at the February conference in Kuwait made pledges include loans, direct investment and investment guarantees all depending on success of the Iraqi government in providing fiscal discipline and combating corruption.
The dispute over Iraq’s government budget has become the norm rather than the exception. Most of Iraq’s budgets since the fall of Saddam’s regime went through political drama as lawmakers squabble for weeks of allocations.
Careening from one budget crisis to another has eroded the capabilities of the Iraqi government on everything from national defense to the delivery of social services.
And, like budget stalemates before it, this one too is expected to have adverse implications for the country’s volatile domestic politics, stability and may hurt efforts to fight the (IS) extremists.
The acrimonious debate over the budget has certainly deepened mutual mistrust and divisions among Iraqi communities, primarily between Kurds and the Baghdad Shia-led government.
The failure to resolve the dispute over the budget will sends a terrible signal to the Iraqi people and provide further evidence about how their leadership is becoming incompetent beyond repair.
To be certain, Iraq’s main problem is that of mismanagement and poor leadership. Unfortunately, Iraq’s upcoming election doesn’t promise change in leadership style nor in policy.
Iraqis, therefore, should be ready to embrace the future with more crises and challenges- some of them may be very grave and probably even fatal.
END

What is Turkey up to in Iraq?

What is Turkey up to in Iraq?

Turkey is stepping up its confrontational rhetoric against Iraq. It is time to recognise its threat to regional geopolitics, writes Salah Nasrawi

The heated diplomatic bickering between Iraq and Turkey over the liberation of the northern Iraqi city of Mosul from the Islamic State (IS) terror group prompts two questions. Is the worst of the tug of war between the two neighbouring countries now coming, and what impact will the conflict have on the regional order?

The latest row started when Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan warned that once Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city, was taken back from IS, it should be for Sunni Muslims only, excluding Shia Muslims and other religious minorities from the city.

“I want to make it clear that Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the Western coalition will not allow sectarian domination [in Mosul]. But there is a key question: Who will then control the city? Of course, Sunni Arabs, Sunni Turkmens and Sunni Kurds,” Erdogan told a Saudi-owned television network on 2 October.

Iraq’s Shia-dominated “Popular Mobilisation Force PMF should not be allowed to enter Mosul,” Erdogan said through an interpreter.

Earlier, Erdogan said that the Turkish army would play a role in the looming battle to liberate Mosul from IS and that no party could prevent this from happening. “We will play a role in the Mosul liberation operation and no one can prevent us from participating,” Erdogan told the Turkish parliament.

Turkey has an estimated 2,000 troops in Bashiqa some 12km east of Mosul. Ankara maintains that the troops are necessary to protect the Turkish military mission at a camp for training Iraqi fighters who hope to participate in the battle to recapture Mosul.

The Turkish parliament last week extended a government mandate by one year that allows Turkish troops to remain on Iraqi and Syrian soil. Turkey launched a major military operation in northern Syria in August to clear Kurdish insurgents from the frontier region, and the onslaught raised concerns of further escalation in increasingly fraught regional conflicts.

Erdogan’s escalation over Mosul immediately provoked reactions from Iraq. The Iraqi parliament labelled the Turkish troops an ‘occupying force,’ while the government requested an emergency session of the UN Security Council “to discuss the Turkish encroachment onto Iraqi territory and intervention in its internal affairs.”

Iraqi Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi raised fears that Turkey’s move could lead to regional war, and the leaders of Iran-backed Shia militias threatened to fight the Turkish troops and expel them from Iraq by force.

Ankara has, meanwhile, lambasted the Iraqi reaction and insisted that it will not withdraw its troops from Iraq. The Turkish Foreign Ministry summoned the Iraqi ambassador in Ankara to protest against the Iraqi parliament’s unacceptable resolution.

Baghdad then summoned the Turkish envoy in Iraq in a tit-for-tat move.

In examining the Turkish argument over the crisis, five claims emerge that underline Ankara’s policy towards post-IS Iraq.

First, Turkish troops have been invited into the country by Iraq and their presence there is upon agreement with the Baghdad government. Some Turkish officials say the troop presence was arranged through president of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Masoud Barzani.

Iraqi officials categorically deny that the Turkish troops are in the country with Baghdad’s permission or knowledge, however. They also say that Barzani has no legal authority to invite foreign forces into Iraq.

Second, Turkey maintains that troops from 63 foreign countries have been sent into Iraq without Iraq objecting. Baghdad says that only foreign military experts have been invited in by the Iraqi government and they are not combat troops.

Third, Turkey claims Iraq is fragmented and has no right to object to the Turkish military presence. Turkish officials say that the Iraqi authorities are weak and cannot control events on the ground. Iraqi officials insist, however, that their country is a sovereign state and that Iraqi security forces are capable of stabilising Mosul after its liberation.

Fourth, Turkish officials say their troops were sent in to protect Sunni Turkmen in Mosul and to ensure that the demographic structure of the region will not be changed following the city’s recapture from IS.

Fifth, Turkey maintains that the troops are there to fight IS militants alongside the US-led international coalition. Both Baghdad and Washington say the Turkish army is on its own in Iraq and is not part of the alliance.

Sixth, Turkey claims that Iran’s influence in Iraq has increased since the sudden advances by IS in the summer of 2014, with the leaders of the Tehran-backed PMF showing the determination of their Shia fighters to participate in the Mosul offensive. Iraqi officials, meanwhile, reject Mosul’s being turned into a battleground for proxy regional conflicts.

On this score, Turkey’s narrative about Mosul effectively illustrates its desire to assert a direct military and strategic role in Iraq. Turkish officials say their troops will remain in Iraq despite Baghdad’s growing anger ahead of the planned operation to retake Mosul from IS.

As the launch of the operation to liberate Mosul approaches, tensions between the two sides have escalated.

Baghdad insists that there is no role for Turkish forces in the liberation of Mosul. Al-Abadi has warned Turkey that the “presence of its troops in Iraq won’t be a picnic.” The leaders of the PMF have also threatened possible attacks against Turkish troops when the Mosul offensive starts.

For many analysts, the shrill rhetoric and sabre-rattling emanating from Iraq and Turkey in recent days threatens to turn the battle for Mosul into another regional conflict, with attempts by competing powers to gain advantage by changing the facts on the ground.

Turkey is playing a risky game in the Iraqi conflict that could even lead to a wider war. The presence of the Turkish forces in the vicinity of the war zone with IS could spark a direct military confrontation between the Turkish troops and the advancing Iraqi forces.

With the participation of the PMF fighters who regard Turkey as an expansionist power trying to create a de facto presence in northern Iraq, the stakes are high that the standoff will turn into a broader, and more dangerous confrontation.

Turkey has taken to arguing that it has no territorial ambitions in Iraq and that it is only in the country to defend its interests and fight Kurdish insurgents who threaten Turkey’s national unity.

Yet, there is a broad consensus that the assertive Turkish approach in Iraq entails far-reaching geopolitical interests that are more than what they appear to be in Turkey’s claiming to help to defeat IS.

To understand the direction of Turkey’s foreign policy in post-IS Mosul, it is necessary to ask why Turkey is extending its security interests to northern Iraq as the country prepares to retake Mosul from the militants.

Turkey’s long-term strategy is based on attempts to scuttle efforts by the Kurds in both Iraq and Syria to establish an independent Kurdish state on its southern borders.

In order to benefit from what is expected to be a prolonged period of instability in northern Iraq following the liberation of Mosul, Turkey wants the strategic city to be a cornerstone in its plans to create a pocket of territory separating Iraqi Kurdistan from Kurdish-held territories in neighbouring Syria.

Together with dozens of outposts inside Iraqi Kurdistan and the security zone Turkey is building in northern Syria, Turkish strategists hope to erect barriers that will make the Kurdish dream of a state on its southern borders a mere ‘Swiss cheese’ under its control.

The real problem with this approach, however, is that building military settlements with cooperation from local (Sunni) populations might be impossible to achieve without plunging the region into a broader ethno-sectarian conflict.

On Saturday, five major parties in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region blasted the presence of Turkish troops in Mosul as ‘illegal’ and demanded that Turkey immediately withdraw its troops from Iraq.

They said they were “committed to preserving the sovereignty of the land of Kurdistan”. Some of the groups, such as the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, have been working closely with Turkish separatist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) guerrillas who have exploited the chaos in Mosul to build up bases in the area.

Ankara’s other concern is that the possible power shifts and geopolitical changes that will take place after the liberation of Mosul could give Iran advantages over Turkey. Turkey fears that the presence of PMF forces, which it believes are an umbrella for Tehran-backed Shia militias, will shift the balance and strengthen Iran’s position in the region.

On Tuesday Erdogan escalated his barbs and insult against al-Abadi.

“Know your limits. You are not in my quality. Even you are not in my level,”   Erdogan told al-Abadi in an address in Istanbul.

“The Turkish military will enter Mosul,” he added.

Nevertheless, by insisting that its troops will stay in Iraq despite its government’s rejection and widespread public opposition, Turkey is fundamentally challenging not only the established borders of Iraq but also the established regional order.

The sad reality is that the two countries have lacked diplomatic traffic or reasonable interlocutors to try to defuse the tensions and deter a flare-up. Hopes of a breakthrough are being undermined by Ankara’s insistence that it is not belligerent and by Baghdad’s rhetoric.

As things stand, northern Iraq may be heading towards a more dangerous confrontation after the collapse of IS in Mosul, and the entire region could face a greater threat than at any other point during the Iraqi and Syrian crises.

This article appeared first in Al Ahram Weekly on October 13, 2016

Sleeping with the enemy

Salah EB

Sleeping with the enemy

Washington’s way of doing business with Iraq’s Shia militias will test US strategy in the Middle East as never before, writes Salah Nasrawi

When Iraq’s Shia militias began rising to prominence following advances made by the Islamic State (IS) terror group in 2014, the United States put Baghdad on notice that it could lose military support if Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi did not reign in militiamen accused of stocking sectarianism.

Official US policy towards the Popular Mobilisation Force (PMF), the umbrella organisation of scores of Shia militias, was negative.

On many occasions the Obama administration threatened that the US-led coalition fighting IS would withhold support for the Iraqi security forces if the Iran-backed militias were deployed in battle, claiming that their involvement could help the militants rally Sunni residents to their cause.

Things have changed a lot since then. Another script is now running, as Washington seems to be looking favourably on a long-term enemy whom the United States and its regional Sunni allies have accused of being Iran’s proxy in the conflicts in Iraq.

The first glaring sign that Washington had found a new friend in Iraq’s Shia militias came from Brett McGurk, the Obama administration’s point man to Iraq officially known as the US Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter IS.

On 21 October last year, McGurk tweeted that “the US commends progress by Iraqi security forces & popular mobilisation forces against #ISIL terrorist in Baiji.”

In another tweet he wrote “these units performed heroically over months of fighting, and we now look forward to strengthening our partnership in coming offensives.” Soon Washington dropped its former resolve, and policy began moving in an affirmative direction towards the old adversary.

Now the United States is no longer objecting to PMF participation in battles against IS, and in many operations US warplanes have provided aerial support to PMF units.

On 12 March, US consul-general in Basra Steve Walker visited the Al-Sadr Teaching Hospital in the city to pay his respects to wounded members of the PMF. The visit marked the first time a top US official had publicly met members of the Shia militias.

In June, a declaration by a state department-sponsored coalition conference in Washington officially endorsed the PMF as a partner in the war against IS.

But the most dramatic shift in the US strategy in Iraq came nearly two weeks ago when Western diplomats working closely with Washington met secretly with PMF leaders outside Iraq.

The Monitor, a US-based media outlet specialising in Middle Eastern affairs, reported on 19 August that the Lebanese capital Beirut had been the scene of a series of secret meetings between Western diplomats and UN officials and PMF leaders.

It said the meetings, arranged by “one of the UN organisations operating in Iraq,” had been held in a Beirut hotel from 8 to 11 August. A PMF delegate told the media outlet that the meetings had been requested by Western governments and insisted that they were closely coordinating the move with Washington.

A spokesperson for the PMF in Baghdad gave a slightly different version of the discussions, however. Moein Al-Kadhumi said the meetings had been sponsored by the Helsinki-based International Dialogue on Peace Building and State Building to discuss the future role of the PMF in the war against IS.

The Monitor, however, quoted the militia leader as saying the discussions with the Western diplomats “covered almost everything”.

Among the key issues the diplomats wanted to clarify was whether the tens of thousands-strong paramilitary force would be “fully merged with the Iraqi army,” as Al-Abadi has decreed.

“Our answer was clear. We will be a military force that is part of the Iraqi state, but not part of the Iraqi army,” the leader told Al-Monitor. He said the PMF delegation had made it clear that “we will be an alternative army subordinated to the state, just like Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.”

The PMF leader said the Western diplomats also wanted to know if the militias were considering plans to take part in the parliamentary elections scheduled for 2018 and if they would join any political alliance or participate in the government.

“In terms of our relations with the various components of the Iraqi people, we stressed that the PMF had emerged from all of the Iraqi people,” Al-Monitor quoted him as telling the Western delegates.

“Because they insisted on meeting us alone and discussing the same issues, we deduced that the Germans were actually representing the United States in the meetings, and that this meeting was a preliminary step that would pave the way for subsequent direct or indirect contacts [with the United States],” he said.

“If liberating Fallujah brought us to Beirut, what will the liberation of Mosul bring,” asked the PMF leader, referring to last month’s recapturing of the IS stronghold in Anbar Province from the militants and their intention to participate in the battle for Iraq’s second-largest city of Mosul.

By and large, the Beirut rendezvous, which must have the blessing if not the support of Washington, was nothing less than a strategic shift in US policy towards the Iraqi Shia militias. But the exchange also underscores the militias’ cool pragmatism.

Militia leaders have often threatened that they will attack US forces in Iraq, rejecting any attempt to send more American troops to the country or to set up US military bases. Muqtada Al-Sadr, head of the Peace Brigades militia, blasted Walker’s visit to the country and those Shia officials who had welcomed the gesture.

According to US officials, there are up to 100,000 Iran-backed fighters now on the ground in Iraq. Last week Chris Garver, a Baghdad-based US military spokesman, confirmed to the US TV outlet Fox News that the fighters were mostly Iraqis, adding that the Iranian-backed Shia militia “are usually identified at around 80,000”.

At least one group, Kataib Hizbullah, is designated as a terrorist organisation by the United States.

There are thousands of Iranian-backed forces in Syria fighting in support of the Alawite-controlled regime of President Bashar Al-Assad. In addition to fighters from the Lebanese group Hizbullah and Shia militias, some of these Iranian-backed forces come from as far afield as Afghanistan, and hundreds have died fighting against Sunni rebels.

The new US approach towards the Shia militia in Iraq, however, raises three key questions far beyond the usual selective and situational relationships that have seemed to define Washington’s approach in the war against IS.

First, is the United States prepared to overcome its twitchiness and do business with the Shia militias, which have long been considered as a US enemy?

Second, is the United States readying itself for a new strategy in Iraq after the defeat of IS in which the Shias may expand, consolidate and institutionalise their power at the expense of both the Arab Muslim Sunnis and ethnics Kurds?

Third, does this mean that the United States will recognise Iraq as a playground for Iran and accept the Islamic Republic not only as the main actor in Iraq but also as a key regional superpower?

Of course, the answers to these questions will largely depend on the outcome of the war against IS and the new political landscape in Iraq and Syria that is expected to emerge. This will have broader implications for a region strewn with local conflicts that have been exacerbated by the interventions of regional and international powers.

Pragmatism, to say the least, has been the norm in the US way of doing business in the Middle East, including recasting policy to engage actors other than its traditional friends and allies.

With the Obama administration keen to snatch victory over IS before the end of the president’s term in January, Washington may think its new-found tough love approach to the Iraqi Shia militias could make that victory easier.

Yet, it remains to be seen if the next administration will embrace the new approach towards what has long been considered one of America’s most dangerous adversaries in the Middle East.

If that happens, it will represent a tectonic shift from the past, with dramatic consequences for both the region’s conflicts and US Middle East policy.

This article appeared first in Al Ahram Weekly on August, 25, 2016

Iraq’s post-IS stabilisation fiction

Salah EBIraq’s post-IS stabilisation fiction

A UN-led relief and stabilisation programme could hinder the state-rebuilding process in post-IS Iraq, writes Salah Nasrawi

On 18 July, 18 Iraqi media outlets disclosed that members of the provincial Anbar Council had allotted millions of dollars to themselves as what they considered to be compensation for the damage caused to their houses during the fight to drive Islamic State (IS) group militants from cities in the province.

Some 38 members of the council will receive lucrative pay-offs, with at least one of the councillors netting approximately $1 million in compensation, according to documents obtained by the media. Millions of dollars will also go to councillors’ relatives, friends and cronies.

The revelation of the Anbar Council corruption scandal soon led to arguments, as international donors last month launched a vast UN-led assistance plan after the liberation of Iraqi cities and towns from IS militants.

There are growing fears that the appropriations may be badly run because of endemic corruption and backsliding in the Iraqi government on both the national and local levels, amid concerns that the UN bureaucracy, widely criticised as being beset by inefficiency and misconceived programmes, cannot be an effective tool in reducing graft on such a large-scale reconstruction and development programme.

Previous Iraqi governments’ humanitarian programmes were rife with corruption and money snaffling, which had corrosive effects on relief and reconstruction efforts. In November 2014, the country’s parliament voted to abolish a government committee tasked with providing emergency aid to displaced people from the cities taken by IS after accusations of rampant corruption.

Head of the committee Deputy Prime Minister Saleh Al-Mutlaq was accused of squandering some $500 million in unaccounted for purchases and expenses. Al-Mutlaq denied any embezzlement, but was later fired from his post. No proper investigation into the allegations was conducted.

Now the donor nations, working under the umbrella of the US-led International Coalition against IS, say they want to take responsibility for a new relief and rehabilitation programme that will be put in place once the Iraqi cities are retaken from IS militants.

The militants’ defences have been crumbling fast across Iraq, and an offensive to liberate Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city and last IS stronghold, is already under way. The aid programme is mainly designed to help pacify the mostly Sunni populated provinces affected by the war against IS in order to prevent the group from returning to the areas or a recurrence of the Sunni insurgency.

Most worrying, however, is the fact that the plan will put the international community in charge of post-IS Iraq’s reconstruction, without the active participation of Iraqis in planning and execution and without a mandate, or well-designed roadmap, for ending Iraq’s lingering conflicts.

Under the so-called stabilisation programme, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) will take responsibility for supervising a multi-billion dollar effort to support the Iraqi government in its efforts to stabilise the newly liberated areas.

The UNDP’s main goals, as outlined in a post on its Website, are to restore the delivery of basic services in the retaken areas, jumpstart the local economy, implement the emergency restoration of priority infrastructure in these areas, and stimulate the local economy to generate income and employment opportunities.

According to a mechanism called the Funding Facility for Immediate Stabilisation (FFIS), the UNDP is to work in several development fields, including public works, infrastructure rehabilitation, improving livelihoods and capacity support.

But this is an endeavour that Iraq’s coffers cannot afford. The country faces a huge budget deficit of up to $20 billion this year alone, as it grapples with low oil revenues and the heavy cost of the war with IS militants.

In May, the government announced that the World Bank would provide Iraq with a $1.2 billion loan to help Baghdad manage its finances and fund emergency reconstruction in towns recaptured from IS.

Last month, donor countries raised some $2.1 billion for Iraq, which organisers said will go towards alleviating the suffering, deprivation and devastation inflicted on the Iraqi people by IS.

But the United States made it clear that the money would not be going to the Iraqi government, but instead would go to the United Nations and its agencies for humanitarian assistance.

“These donations, and our contribution among them, will go to the UN to distribute. They do a remarkable job figuring out who needs to get it, where they are and how much they need to get. And we have complete trust and confidence in their ability to keep doing that,” said US State Department Spokesman John Kirby.

Whatever the reasons behind such a move, the UN-led programme will put Iraq’s future in the hands of an international agency, and the stakes are high that Iraqis will once again miss an opportunity to engage directly in an interactive process to rebuild their battered nation.

A constructive role by the United Nations in Iraq’s rebuilding remains crucial, but it is expected to include the process of nation-building, transformation and state-building at the same time.

Any such programme should shift in approach from merely providing funding for post-conflict pacification to a comprehensive strategy of rebuilding a failed nation.

The UNDP says the mechanism will be used to promote community reconciliation and alleviate concerns relating to human rights and inclusion through a set of guidelines and a steering committee to supervise the programme.

But this is not enough to resolve Iraq’s 13-year internecine conflict and bring peace to the war-battered country. In order for such an effort to be effective and bear fruit, the international community should allow the Iraqis themselves to drive the entire process until it reaches its ultimate outcome.

While the world can provide financial, technical and political assistance, Iraq’s rebuilding remains the duty of Iraqis. One of the imperatives of working together in such a national endeavour is to initiate a learning process that can promote both the healing of old wounds and reconciliation.

For this approach to succeed in launching an effective state- and nation-building process, Iraq’s different communities, political groups and civil society should come up with a new deal for post-IS Iraq.

The first step should be for these communities to reach a new social and political contract for a functioning national political structure to replace the current dysfunctional system.

In order for this process to move forward, a transitional period should start the day after the Iraqi security forces have won the war against IS, alongside an effective, well-defined and sustainable stabilisation programme.

This will require a new transitional period that will include writing a new constitution and electing a new parliament that will choose a government that will take responsibility for implementing the new national contract.

While managing a successful transitional process remains the duty of Iraqis, the world can still assist by providing expertise and support in building institutional capacity and encouraging a new generation of Iraqis to take responsibility for reconstructing their country’s entire system.

The world should understand that stabilisation and reconstruction in Iraq following the defeat of IS needs more than short-term funding programmes, such as the FFIS adopted by the UNDP. Iraq’s troubles run so wide that the country needs a long-term sustainable programme that can overcome the political crises that breed trouble.

The main weakness of the current programme is that it deals with problems in areas affected by the war against IS with relief and development projects, while the biggest strategic concern should be dealing with the whole country, which is in ruins.

One major concern is that funding will mostly go to the administrative and operational costs of the UN agencies and foreign NGOs rather than to actual relief work, humanitarian needs and assistance.

While corruption such as in the Anbar Council compensation scandal remains a major concern, Iraqi NGOs and relief agencies such as the Red Crescent should be encouraged to take an active part in the programme. The participation of cross-sectarian NGOs in the rebuilding programmes should be part of the transformation of Iraq.

Iraq needs a pan-Iraqi reconstruction and development programme and a concrete nation- and-state-rebuilding scheme that replaces the current failed state with a new and functional system that gives Iraqis hope for the future.

The success of any stabilisation programme in post-IS Iraq will depend on whether the transitional period can produce a transformative leadership.

Such a leadership can only come into being through moulding a new Iraqi national identity, and it cannot be just about putting Shia, Sunnis and Kurds or other ethnicities in positions of power.

This artcile appeared first in Al-Ahram Weekly on August 18, 2016