Nearly four months after its general elections, Iraq’s self-ruled Kurdistan region is still without a functioning government due to political differences and bargaining over allocations of posts in the new parliament and cabinet.

Leaders of the prospective coalition parties have been struggling for weeks to finalise an agreement on sharing the seats in the new government and its programme. The failure to form a coalition government will accentuate fears of polarisation in Kurdistan, which is already gripped in budget and oil disputes with the central government in Baghdad.

The impasse has raised questions about Kurdistan’s democracy and whether its leaders, once viewed as liberators and reflective of Kurdish nationalism, are now straying into autocrats at the top of a corrupt bureaucracy in their emerging national state.

The Kurdistan region held its fourth legislative elections on 21 September, and final results were announced two weeks later. The new assembly convened briefly on 6 November to allow members to be sworn in, but it was then suspended indefinitely.

However, there is growing unease that prolonged coalition bickering and tactical posturing will not pay off in Kurdistan’s instability-prone politics. The risk of a power struggle has already prompted neighbouring Iran to offer its mediation to end the stalemate.

Some 88 MPs have demanded that the parliament reconvene immediately to resume its business and elect a speaker. They have warned that the suspension of the assembly for too long “will create a legal vacuum” and make people “lose confidence” in the parliament.

The elections in September resulted in a hung parliament in which no party garnered enough votes to form a majority government. Kurdistan’s parliament is composed of a total of 111 seats, out of which 11 were reserved for minorities such as Christians, Tourkoumans and Yazidis.

The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), the region’s most powerful party led by Kurdish regional president Masoud Barzani, secured 38 seats, far shy of the 56 seats needed to form the government.

Its main partner, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), won only 18 seats. The main opposition party, Gorran, or Change, which run on a reform ticket, won 24 seats, and the rest of the seats went to smaller parties which are also cashing in on voter dismay.

The result has thrown into disarray the bi-party system which had dominated Kurdistan’s politics for nearly two decades and made a coalition government with Gorran’s participation inevitable. Gorran was established in 2009 after its leaders split from the PUK seeking to promote a reform agenda in the region.

The Kurds have enjoyed semi autonomy since 1991, when a US-British no-fly zone helped protect them from former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein’s forces until his fall in the 2003 US-led invasion. Since then, the region has been enjoying self-rule as a federal region of Iraq.

From its emergence in 1991, the Kurdish Autonomous Region has been ruled by the alliance of the KDP and PUK. The two resistance groups which led the Kurdish armed struggle against the Iraqi governments promised a democratic Kurdistan, but as they held to power they pushed through measures that gave them sweeping powers and established an autocratic regime that belies the image of a true democracy.

Now the outcome of the elections has brought to the limelight public disillusionment over the two parties’ consolidation of power, their commitment to corruption and cronyism and their unbridled security forces.

Barzani had already asked his nephew and son-in-law Nechirvan Barzani, who is also his deputy as party chief, to form the government. The move was considered as highly unusual before parliament convenes, but it was seemingly aimed at undercutting any bid by the other parties to vie for the post.

Because the KDP can neither form the government alone nor with its partner the PUK, it offered to form a broad coalition government, accepting the prospect of making Gorran and other opposition parties junior partners

Initially, the KDP made it clear that it would grant the first choice of partnership in the next government to its strategic ally and coalition partner the PUK, which had lost most votes to Gorran.

The KDP also rejected preconditions by the main opposition parties, which had demanded portfolios in the new government distributed according to the popular vote.

But negotiations to form the new government have stalled, as have efforts by Gorran to challenge the hegemony of the two ruling parties.

Kurdish press reports suggest that demands by the PUK to keep the post of the speaker of the parliament and several key cabinet portfolios are the main obstacles behind the delays in forming the new government. 

The demands have been met by strong opposition by Gorran, which considers them to be attempts by the PUK, whose followers control the security forces and occupy prominent slots in the public services in many parts of Kurdistan, to retain its position of dominance despite its heavy losses in the elections.

As the coalition talks enter their fifth month next week, the KDP, which fears a backlash if the government deadlock continues, appears to be willing to abandon its “most favoured” treatment to its old strategic ally.

In recent days, several KDP officials have gone public in blaming the PUK for the delay in forming the government and issued warnings that their party’s patience may be running out.

The London-based Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper reported on Monday that Iran had asked the KDP and PUK to send high-level delegations to Tehran for talks on the government crisis.

The paper quoted an unidentified Kurdish official as saying that Iran “doesn’t want to see the political status of its strategic ally the PUK weakened”.  

Eventually, political deals may be done to form a new government, but the question raised by many Kurds is whether this will be able to get down to business and what it can afford for the Kurds.

During the election campaign, there were a number of themes that came through as priorities for Iraqi Kurdistan’s future, on top of them reform of the political system in the region including drafting a constitution to make it more democratic.

The next government is expected to address this issue, which was also among the main campaign promises by Gorran. Party leaders realise that compromising their ideals in exchange for a few cabinet jobs will cost them many of their supporters.

Since its inception following an uprising against Saddam’s government, the self-ruled Kurdish region has had no constitution, and a draft constitution which was passed by the regional parliament in 2009 was never put to a referendum.

The pro-reform parties have insisted on reworking this constitution and have argued that the draft charter was rushed through by the parliament which was then under the control of the two ruling parties.

They even claim that some articles were changed, including those which made the Iraqi Kurdistan region into a presidential system, whereas the original document states that the region enjoys “a parliamentary political system”.

Another dispute is over Barzani’s presidency. In July, lawmakers from the two ruling parties in the region voted unanimously to extend Barzani’s term exceptionally for two more years, despite a limit imposed by the draft constitution on his presidency.

The opposition parties denounced the vote as a coup targeting the parliament and the process of democratisation in the region. The Kurdistan region’s draft constitution states that the president of the Kurdistan region “may be re-elected for a second term as of the date this constitution enters into force”.

Other main opposition demands include unifying the region’s army of the Peshmergas and security forces, institutionalising the government, ensuring the independence of the judiciary, and creating a parliamentary political system.

A key challenge that the new government will face is mounting demands to address corruption and cronyism in the region. For the last 10 years, the administration has been refusing to meet any of these demands, allowing internal discontent to fester.

In addition, the next government should tackle the problem of the Barzani family’s domination of business and oil revenues, which allows the KDP to fund a wide network of services and patronage, putting other parties at a disadvantage.

Simultaneously, most Kurds want the new government to end the heavy-handedness of the security forces which are said to pull strings behind the scenes and who have been accused of repression and corruption.

Last month, Kurdish journalist Kawa Germyani was murdered outside his home. It’s believed he was targeted because of his investigations into corrupt security officials. His family have filed a law suit against PUK officials, including a politburo member whom they believe ordered his execution.

However, the big challenge remains if Kurdistan, celebrated by various international actors as a haven of peace and democracy in crisis-plagued and violence- battered Iraq, has any chance of producing significant political change.

More specifically, can Iraqi Kurdish democracy exist and advance under its current system when one hegemonic party is clinging to power and doing everything it can to abuse its power and stack the odds in its favour?

Tensions are soaring in Iraq as the country continues to experience violent clashes and political deadlock, writes Salah Nasrawi in Baghdad

When Iraq’s Shia Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki dispatched the army to the country’s Anbar province late last month, he vowed that the troops would obliterate the Al-Qaeda terrorist group in Iraq’s troubled western province.

Instead, the crackdown initiated an uprising in the Sunni-dominated province that many now fear is sending the country back to the edge of sectarian civil war.

In just one short week, Iraq, which has been struggling with its worst violence since 2006, has taken a dramatic turn for the worse.

The country now stands at a crossroads, and the power struggle between the two Muslim communities has reached a crescendo that may force them to rethink their future in a unified Iraq.

The escalation of violence broke out last week after the security forces arrested a prominent Sunni lawmaker and moved to dismantle a protest camp in the city of Ramadi that had been demanding an end to what the Sunnis perceive as being the marginalisation and exclusion of their community.

Fighting gripped much of the province as tribesmen seized control of Ramadi, the provincial capital of Anbar, and its second largest city Fallujah, fending off incursions by government forces.

As later developments suggest, an alliance of Al-Qaeda operatives and a variety of tribal insurgents then took advantage of the escalation to take over the two cities that control the strategic highway that links Baghdad with Jordan and Syria.

Bolstered by the air force and artillery bombardment, the Iraqi police and pro-government tribal fighters later claimed to have retaken part of Ramadi after fierce fighting had left scores of dead, though much of Fallujah has remained under the rebels’ control.

It was the first time in years that Sunni insurgents had taken ground in the province’s major cities and held their positions for several days, signalling a bold effort to defeat the country’s Shia-led government.

A second move in the insurgents’ new offensive strategy was to step up their attacks in areas closer to Baghdad and in Sunni-populated provinces like Salaheddin and Nineveh, which indicates a push to encircle the Iraqi capital and isolate and surround the government forces.

Like most of Iraq’s problems, the current standoff stems from the country’s political leaders who have been exploiting the ethno-sectarian divisions in their favour in order to grab more power.

The escalating tension shows how much the war-battered country is smarting from the anxiety of decline, and each new conflict seems to be plunging it ever deeper into the abyss.

In mapping Iraq’s political landscape following the flare-up, worrying signs can be identified to the effect that the country’s community leaders are still failing to rise above partisanship and engage in a fair and equal partnership.

By triggering the crisis, Al-Maliki hopes that he will be able to grab a victory ahead of crucial parliamentary elections in April. He thinks that by showing his readiness to use strong-arm tactics against his Sunni opponents he will be able to consolidate his power and his leadership of the Shias and guarantee himself a third term in office.

His Shia rivals, meanwhile, seem to be giving Al-Maliki enough rope to hang himself instead of trying to keep him on check or promoting initiatives to resolve the standoff. 

On the other hand, the power-greedy and poorly-led Sunni politicians are disunited and lacking in a vision and strategy that can address the underlined problems.

Equally, the Sunni tribal leaders are preoccupied with seeking their share in the country’s power and wealth and seem to have nothing useful to offer.  

Insurgents such as former Baathists and members of former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein’s army and security forces who remain determined to topple the post-Saddam regime appear to be in the forefront of the latest uprising.  

As for Al-Qaeda jihadists, their objective in Anbar seems to be mustering the broader population’s support in their fight to defeat the Shias and their endeavour to impose an Islamic state.

It is unlikely that the terror group will succeed in its enterprise, but it will remain a source of great uncertainty, much like the parties’ failure to reach a compromise.

The signal achievement of the latest escalation in the violence in Iraq may be that no one can now predict the course of the country’s sectarian conflict, which is being fought out in the glare of the media and amidst election frenzy.

The pity is that any optimism for stability in Iraq is becoming ever more elusive, as the conflicting goals of the various sides and the complicated battleground are making it that much harder to find a solution to Iraq’s growing sectarian crisis.

Not very important — at least not from the point of view of the Iraqi Ministry of Interior spokesman or the local and Baghdad-based international media.A Sunni family of five was killed in their home in a Baghdad neighbourhood on 27 November. Days later, the only account of this horrible story to appear was that the five family members, including two boys and a girl, had been killed by gunshots in their house in a Shia-majority neighbourhood of Baghdad.

The trouble was not that the spokesman was uncaring or that the reporters didn’t have enough information for a solid story, but that because Iraq’s story of daily killings has become so routine, if not boring, it is now failing to make front-page headlines.The world’s mainstream newspapers and TV networks have allowed the news of the costly conflict to slip off their radar screens because their editors perceive that Iraq-related stories cannot now get a prominent position without some local link.

Yet, Iraqis continue to bleed in the unrelenting violence. The same day that the family was gunned down, police found more than a dozen bodies around Baghdad and in Basra of people who had been killed in execution-style killings.A wave of bombings and shootings then hit markets, schools and mosques in several other towns, and by midday a total of 33 people had been killed and 76 wounded.

This year has been Iraq’s most violent since the Sunni-Shia bloodbath of 2006-2007, only now with a resurgence of sectarian killings as well as a growing insurgency campaign of bomb and gun attacks targeting security forces and civilians.

The United Nations has estimated that just under 9,000 civilians and members of the Iraqi security forces have been killed, with thousands more injured.

Iraq is suffering from its worst surge in violence since the US-led invasion in 2003 that toppled the Sunni-led regime of former president Saddam Hussein, with Sunni insurgents this year stepping up their bombing campaigns against the Shia-controlled security forces and mostly Shia civilians.

Violence has also developed its own momentum, with inter-community disputes sometimes bursting into bloodbaths. Scenes of the corpses of what it seems may be tit-for-tat kidnappings and assassinations littering the streets are now common.

The violence in Iraq has escalated steadily since the last US troops pulled out of the country in December 2011. It has been fuelled by many complicating factors, in particular sectarian Shia-Sunni tensions and the continuous political deadlock over sharing wealth and power.  

Tensions spilled out onto the streets in December, when tens of thousands of Sunni Arabs started a protest across the country’s Sunni provinces demanding an end to what they see as a Shia monopoly of power and the marginalisation and exclusion of their sect.

As the Sunni protests, seen by Shias as an attempt to regain the Sunnis’ former supremacy, have escalated, the struggle within the Muslim community has become more and more vicious.

A peace plan put forward in September by the Shia alliance to resolve some of the Sunni grievances in exchange for halting the insurgency has crumbled.

The initiative suggested measures to include Sunnis in the government, army and security forces, but it fell short of being a fully-fledged agreement on the fair distribution of wealth and power and demographic realities.

The violence is also taking place within the context of a civil war in neighbouring Syria that has been worsening sectarian tensions and highlighting security shortcomings.

One of its worst consequences is that Al-Qaeda in Iraq, which has banded together with extremists in Syria in the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, has now extended its influence from northern Syria to towns in the area that forms a Sunni demographic belt around Baghdad.

From there, terrorists can now infiltrate into Baghdad itself to carry out attacks in mostly Shia-populated neighbourhoods. In recent months, the group has also widened its geographical scope, creating devastation in the north and south of the country which have historically seen less violence than other regions.

In September, Al-Qaeda attacked the Kurdish Regional Government’s Interior Ministry building in Erbil, killing six security guards and wounding more than 60 people. Some Al-Qaeda-type attacks have also been taking place in Sunni-dominated areas.

The spiralling rise in the violence indicates the failure of government efforts to combat Al-Qaeda. Nearly two years after the US withdrew its last troops from Iraq, government security forces remain incompetent, untrustworthy, corrupt, and sectarian-oriented, and they have been largely blamed for failing to stop the bloodshed.

In recent weeks, the Baghdad government has launched a security sweep in Sunni-dominated provinces and neighbourhoods of the country in order to try to round up suspected militants.

Hundreds of suspects have been arrested in the crackdown, which the government says will continue until Al-Qaeda in Iraq has been defeated.

Behind the scenes, however, the government is also building new Shia-only security forces that are being trained in counter-insurgency and guerrilla warfare. Reports suggest that Shia militias have been remobilised and that they are working in secret with the security forces.

Iraq’s cycle of violence seems to be becoming unbreakable and even more vicious. Many Iraqis blame the government and the political groups for not doing enough to prevent the bloodletting. Others accuse the country’s greedy and corrupt political parties of fuelling the hatred or even of encouraging or engaging in violence themselves as a way to make up for lost power or to divert attention from their failure to resolve the country’s problems.

In addition, Iraq’s neighbours, especially Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, have been responsible for some of the violence, either by siding with the feuding communities or by paying too little attention to efforts to bring peace to the beleaguered country.

While the regional power struggle has enhanced local tensions, the region’s ever-deepening Shia-Sunni divide has also been fuelling broader antagonisms and violence inside Iraq.

Unfortunately, this sectarian schism is expected to grow further after the nuclear deal that Iran reached with the West last month, which many believe has the potential of turning Iraq into a playground for regional powers.

For now, and until the grievances and fears that are feeding the violence in Iraq are addressed, security in the country and the overall region will remain uncertain.

The violence in Iraq, after having been institutionalised, is increasingly turning into a norm of life. Violence at the levels of the individual, the family, the clan, the district and the town is increasingly becoming a critical source of social chaos and political instability.

In recent weeks, cases of assassinations by silencer-mounted guns and the bullet-riddled bodies of people killed in execution-style killings found on the streets have risen.

Unidentified gunmen routinely storm into houses and kill whole families including children before they leave. Residents in the very few remaining mixed towns and neighbourhoods have been leaving their houses after receiving death threats.

Such surges in arbitrary violence have been complicating matters further and driving Iraqis to lose all hope of regaining stability.

Sadly, all this makes the prospect of next year for the Iraqis even dimmer. It is an election year, and Iraqis know that their power-greedy leaders will most probably not only resort to murky means to achieve power, but will also attempt to incite sectarianism and bigotry.

Nothing is more likely to succeed in this than further bloodletting.

With Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki’s bid for a third term in office in trouble, will Iran now come to his rescue, asks Salah Nasrawi

Embattled Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki was a guest in the Iranian capital Tehran last week, even receiving unusually high praise from Iran’s spiritual leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

Al-Maliki flew to Tehran to discuss terrorism and the conflict in Syria, among other issues. But the trip may have had another agenda, being to provide an opportunity for Al-Maliki to speak directly with Iranian leaders about Iraq’s crucial legislative elections next year.

The polls are important because of their far-reaching impact on Iraq’s future, and they are widely expected to be a test of how far the violence-torn country can remain united.

Al-Maliki, who is seeking a third term in office, is facing growing opposition at home, including from two of his powerful Shia allies who say that they will contest the elections scheduled for 30 April.

Iran helped him to win his second term in office in 2010, and it would not be a surprise if Al-Maliki has now travelled to Tehran because he expects Iran to use its influence to stifle Shia opposition to his candidacy this time round.

Iran increased its influence in Iraq after the ouster of the Sunni-dominated regime of former president Saddam Hussein in the US-led invasion in 2003 and the ascent of the country’s Shias to power. Since December 2011, Tehran has been trying to fill the vacuum left by the departing Americans.

While top Iranian Shia clerics, some of them residing in Iraq, wield enormous influence through their religious pronouncements, including on whom to vote for in elections, Tehran maintains close relations with Iraqi Shia political leaders, many of them given refuge in Iran during Saddam’s rule and funded by Tehran.

In 2010, American and Iranian interests converged to lend support to Al-Maliki against Iyad Allawi, leader of the Sunni-dominated Al-Iraqiya List, which won most of the seats in the elections.

At the time of forming the government, US troops were preparing to leave Iraq, and Washington was keen to prevent a governmental crisis in order to keep its withdrawal plans on track.

Tehran, meanwhile, was adamant about keeping friendly Shia groups in power.   

This time round, Iraq’s political landscape has changed, and Al-Maliki’s task in winning a third term does not look so simple. With no American troops on the ground in the country, Washington also has little clout to be a power-broker.

Iran, however, is a key player in Iraq, and its aim is to maintain the Shia groups’ hold on power. But it is unclear how Iran will use its leverage with the divided Iraqi Shia leaders, many of them having made it clear that they will not support Al-Maliki for another four-year term.

Al-Maliki started his ascent to power by chance amid wrangling over who should be Iraq’s first full-term elected prime minister after the 2006 elections in which a Shia alliance won most of the seats.

Its candidate for the premiership, Ibrahim Al-Jaafari, was vetoed by the country’s Kurds and Sunnis. Al-Maliki, a senior member of Al-Jaafari’s Daawa Party, was a compromise choice, allegedly after a deal had been reached by Washington and Tehran.

After a brief honeymoon period, during which he tried to prove his security credentials by cracking down on the country’s militias, Al-Maliki began expanding his control over the government and security forces.

Opposition to Al-Maliki grew fast, with most Iraqis being disillusioned by his government’s failure to end the violence, combat massive corruption, and bring back basic services such as electricity, water and healthcare.

One part of Al-Maliki’s problem is his perceived lack of leadership. Last month, many Iraqi cities turned into swamps and thousands of people became homeless after torrential rain because the government had not taken precautionary measures to protect the population.

Instead of moving to solve the problem, Al-Maliki accused his opponents in the country’s local authorities of blocking waste-water pipes.

Among other accusations made against Al-Maliki is that there is rampant corruption in his government, particularly in the form of nepotism. In November, he drew criticism after he admitted that his son, who does not have a security portfolio, was fulfilling police duties under his instructions.

Another part of Al-Maliki’s problems is his perception of Iraq’s priorities and its need for healing policies. Al-Maliki’s policies have deepened societal mistrust and sectarian divisions in the country, and Iraqi Sunni Arabs have been protesting against what they say is the Al-Maliki government’s marginalisation and discrimination against them.

The Kurds also accuse Al-Maliki of monopolising power and acting as a dictator, complaining that their representatives have been barred from government decision-making.

Both communities fear that Al-Maliki, who controls the army, security forces and intelligence services, is trying to subdue them through his autocratic tendencies.

Dissatisfaction with his heavy-handed style of governance has also mounted among his Shia allies. Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani has reportedly declined Al-Maliki’s requests for an audience, and other Shia clerics have been lashing out at his government during Friday prayers.

As the frustration and anger against Al-Maliki build, he is becoming increasingly isolated.

The Al-Sadrist Movement, which holds 40 seats in the country’s parliament, and the other influential Iraqi Shia group, the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council, which has a strong presence in the legislature, have said that they will not endorse Al-Maliki for a third term.

In recent weeks, several of Al-Maliki’s long-time allies have abandoned him and announced they will fight the next elections as independents or join other political lists.

Some of them have fired serious accusations at Al-Maliki, such as fuelling sectarianism through the random arrests of Sunnis and the closures of their neighbourhoods, which they have said are behind the recent escalation of violence.

Meanwhile, those who challenge Al-Maliki have been paying the price for doing so.

The authorities last week issued arrest warrants against two senior Al-Sadrist Movement parliamentarians on charges of corruption. On Monday, a member of Al-Maliki’s bloc unveiled a list of 20 opposition lawmakers under investigation on charges of racketeering and embezzlement.

Al-Maliki has adopted the tactic of blackmailing his political rivals by threatening to reveal damaging information about them if they dare to defy him.

Saleh Al-Hasnawi, one of the Al-Sadrist lawmakers, said the crackdown was politically motivated and accused Al-Maliki of deliberately trying to “destroy opponents and harm their reputations” ahead of next year’s elections.

However, there has been no sign that Al-Maliki will capitulate, although the Iraqi media reported on Monday that his State of Law Bloc had been registered by the country’s Independent Elections Commission with Haidar Al-Ibadi, a senior Daawa Party figure, as its head, instead of Al-Maliki.

Al-Maliki will head another list, it was reported, a move which could be aimed at rearranging the elections chess board.

After he returned from Iran this week, Al-Maliki resumed his vigorous election campaign by making promises to combat the militias and build low-price houses for poorer Iraqi families.

One of his campaign goals is to blame his political opponents for being behind his government’s shortcomings over the last eight years.

Given Iraq’s political turmoil and sharp communal divisions, it is hard to gauge Al-Maliki’s electoral popularity. However, he has not only polarised Iraq’s politics at a time when communal reconciliation has been badly needed to ease political sectarianism, but he has also divided Shia politics ahead of the crucial elections.

As a result of the Shia split, Iran is expected to increase its influence in Iraq’s internal politics.

Only days before Al-Maliki flew to Tehran, Muqtada Al-Sadr, leader of the Al-Sadrist Movement and an arch-rival of Al-Maliki, said he had received assurances from Iran that it would not support Al-Maliki’s bid for a third term.

This may have prompted Al-Maliki’s visit to Tehran to seek assurances of Iranian backing.

Despite Iran’s niceties to Al-Maliki, whom it had helped install in power, and Khamenei’s hailing the performance of the Al-Maliki government, the Iranian supreme leader nevertheless emphasised that more “needs to be done” to advance bilateral relations.

“There is great potential for further cooperation in various areas,” Khamenei was quoted by the Iranian media as saying.

Reading the minds of Iranian politicians, a process needed since they are not always explicit in stating their agendas, Khamenei’s remarks could be seen as a wait-and-see response in order to avoid putting all Iran’s eggs in one Iraqi Shia basket.